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REGULATING BANK REPUTATION RISK
Julie Andersen Hill*
In the aftermath of a school shooting in Florida, the
New York State bank regulator urged banks to manage
the "reputation risk" posed by doing business with the
National Rifle Association (a gun rights advocacy
group). As part of Operation Choke Point, a federal
regulator told banks to end relationships with payday
lenders because those activitiesposed "reputationrisk."
Another federal regulatorwarns banks their reputations
might be damaged by lending to oil and gas companies
that are perceived to cause environmental harm.
Reputation risk is the risk that bank stakeholders will
negatively change their perception of the bank. It was
almost unmentioned in banking regulation until the
mid-1990s, but as these examples illustrate, it is now
ubiquitous.
This Article surveys reputation risk guidance and
enforcement efforts. It shows reputation risk regulation
is usually an ancillary consideration to credit risk,
operational risk, or other primary risk. In these
instances, reputationrisk adds little because regulators
have strong tools to address the root problems.
Sometimes, however, regulators justify guidance or
enforcementprimarily in terms of controlling reputation
risk. Regulators use reputation risk to weigh in on
hot-button political topics afield from bank safety and
soundness like gun rights, payday lending, and fossil
fuels. Because regulators believe reputation risk is
Alton C. and Cecile Cunningham Craig Professor of Law, University of Alabama. I am
grateful to Greg Baer, Mirit Eyal-Cohen, Miranda Perry Fleischer, Kristin Hickman, Claire
Hill, Michael Hill, Brian Knight, Ron Krotoszynski, Shuyi Oei, Lee Otis, Shruti Rana, Marie
Reilly, Christina Skinner, and Joseph Sommer for their helpful comments on earlier drafts
of this Article. I also appreciate the generosity of the faculties at Emory University School of
Law and William & Mary Law School where I workshopped these ideas. Finally, the Article
benefitted immensely from the expertise of the staff at the University of Alabama Bounds
Law Library and from the skillful work of the editors of the Georgia Law Review.
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present in every facet of banking, little prevents them
from using it to address other controversies.
This Article argues expansive regulationof reputation
risk is harmful. There is little evidence that regulators
can accurately predict and prevent bank reputational
losses. Moreover, because reputation risk is largely
subjective, regulators can use it to further political
agendas apart from bank safety and soundness.
Unnecessary politicization of banking regulation
undermines faith in the regulatory system and
correspondinglyerodes trust in banks.
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I. INTRODUCTION

There is an adage that it is better to under-promise and
over-deliver. This statement is an acknowledgment of reputation
risk. Banks that fail to live up to customers', shareholders', and
other stakeholders' expectations incur reputation losses. Consider
four examples.
First, Wells Fargo employees, in an apparent attempt to meet
sales quotas and earn bonuses, opened millions of unauthorized
customer accounts.' Because opening unauthorized accounts
violates the law, 2 the bank faced federal, state, and local
government investigations and fines. 3 In addition, Wells Fargo
spent $3.2 million on customer refunds and settled a class action
suit for $142 million.4 But the harm to Wells Fargo extends beyond
its legal costs. C.E.O. John Stumpf resigned,5 and more than 5,300
employees were fired. 6 New customers seem to be avoiding the bank.

1 James Rufus Koren, Wells Fargo to Pay $185 Million Settlement for 'Outrageous'Sales
Culture, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 8, 2016), https://www.latimes.com/business/a-fi-wells-fargosettlement-20160907-snap-story.html; E. Scott Reckard, Wells Fargo'sPressure-CookerSales
Culture Comes at a Cost, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 21, 2013), https://www.latimes.com/business/a-fiwells-fargo-sale-pressure-20131222-story.html.
2
See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1642 (2012) ("No credit card shall be issued except in response to
a request or application therefor."); id. § 5536(a)(1)(B) ("It shall be unlawful for ... any
covered person or service provider . .. to engage in any unfair, deceptive, or abusive act or
practice. . . .").
3 The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau fined Wells Fargo a record $100 million.
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., CFPB No. 2016-CFPB-0015 (2016). The Office of the Comptroller of
the Currency (OCC) assessed a $35 million penalty. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., OCC Docket No.
AA-EC-2016-67, OCC EA No. 2016-079 (Sept. 6, 2016). Wells Fargo paid $50 million to the
City and County of Los Angeles. Stipulated Judgment, California v. Wells Fargo & Co., No.
BC580778 (Cal. Super. Ct. L.A. County Sept. 13, 2016). Wells Fargo's Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) filings indicate that it is still facing investigations from
"[flederal, state, and local government agencies, including the Department of Justice,
the ... SEC[], and the United States Department of Labor; state attorneys general, including
the New York Attorney General; and prosecutors' offices, as well as Congressional
committees." Wells Fargo & Co., Quarterly Report 116 (Form 10-Q) (Aug. 2, 2019).
4 Press Release, Wells Fargo & Co., Wells Fargo Expands Class-Action Settlement for
Retail Sales Practices to $142 Million, Adds Accounts as Early as May 2002 (Apr. 21, 2017),
https://newsroom.wf.com/press-release/wells-fargo-expands-class-action-settlement-retailsales-practices-142-million-adds.
5 James Rufus Koren, Wells Fargo CEO Retires Amid Accounts Scandal and Is Replaced
by
a Longtime Company Insider, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 12, 2016,
4:55 PM),
https://www.latimes.comlbusiness/a-fi-wells-fargo-stumpf-resigns-20161012-snapstory.html.
6
Nathan Bomey, Wells Fargo CEO Refuses to Push for Exec Pay Clawback, USA TODAY
(Sept. 20, 2016, 5:55 PM), https://www.usatoday.comstory/money/2016/09/20/wells-fargo-ceo-
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Year-on-year credit card applications are down 55 percent and
checking account applications are down 40 percent. 7 "And the
bank's stock has suffered. It declined sharply in the weeks after the
scandal broke, and despite a recovery, has continued to
underperform compared to its peers."8
Second, when Bank of America announced a monthly $5 fee for
using a debit card, customer Kristen Christian posted her
complaints about the fee on Facebook and urged her friends to
transfer their accounts elsewhere. 9 Ms. Christian's complaint drew
a nationwide following that reportedly resulted in customers
moving "billions of dollars in deposits" from large banks.1 0 Bank of
America ultimately rescinded the fee.11
Third, Wells Fargo agreed to participate in a syndicated loan to
finance construction of the Dakota Access Pipeline-an
underground pipeline to transport oil from the shale fields in North
Dakota to Illinois. 12 Environmental and Native American groups

john-stumpf-congress-testimony/90726424/ (noting that two percent of Wells Fargo's
workforce was fired).
I See Kevin Dugan, Customers Still Hate Wells Fargo Following Fake-Accounts Scandal,
N.Y. POST (Mar. 20, 2017, 9:46 PM), https://nypost.com/2017/03/20/customers-still-hatewells-fargo-following-fake-accounts-scandall ("It's official: Bank customers still hate Wells
Fargo.").
8 James Rufus Koren, It's Been a Year Since the Wells Fargo Scandal Broke-and New
ProblemsAre Still Surfacing, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 8, 2017, 3:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com
/business/la-fi-wells-fargo-one-year-20170908-story.html ("Since Sept. 7[, 2016], the day
before the scandal broke, Wells Fargo shares are up just 3%. The KBW Nasdaq Bank Index,
a benchmark for the banking industry, is up 27% over that period.").
9 Aaron Passman, How Kristen Christian Came to Launch Bank Transfer Day, CREDIT
UNION J., Dec. 19, 2011, at 1.
10 Sarah Bloom Raskin, Governor, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Speech at
2013),
28,
(Feb.
Conference
Outlook
Banking
2013
the
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/raskin20130228a.htm.
11 See, e.g., Jason Kessler & Blake Ellis, Bank of America Axes $5 Debit Card Fee, CNN
PM),
3:08
2011,
1,
(Nov.
MONEY
https://money.cnn.com/2011/11/01/pflbank-ofamerica debitjfee/index.htm.
12 John Heltman, Will Big Banks Pay Price for Dakota Pipeline?, AM. BANKER (Feb. 17,
2017, 5:32 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/can-bank-divestment-stop-thedakota-access-pipeline.
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opposed the pipeline. 13 Their large protests drew media attention. 14
The Seattle City Council, citing the pipeline financing, voted 9-0 to
end the City's banking relationship with Wells Fargo. 15 The
California cities of Alameda, Berkeley, Davis, and Santa Monica
followed suit.16 Although Wells Fargo remained committed to
financing the pipeline,1 7 it "hired an independent human rights law
firm, Foley Hoag, to advise them on the project."1 8
Fourth, in rural China, rumors circulated that Jiangsu Sheyang
Rural Commercial Bank had "turned down a customer's request to

13 Justin Worland, A High-PlainsShowdown over the Dakota Access Pipeline, TIME (Nov.
3,
2016),
https://time.com/4556055/a-high-plains-showdown-over-the-dakota-accesspipeline/. The Standing Rock Sioux tribe opposed the pipeline, although it did not cross
reservation land, because it traveled near their primary source of drinking water and crossed
a burial ground. Id. Environmental groups opposed the pipeline primarily because it further
invested in fossil fuels infrastructure. Id.
14 Alene Tchekmedyian & Melissa Etehad, 2 Years of Opposition, 1,172 Miles of Pipe, 1.3
Million Facebook Check-Ins. The Numbers to Know about the Standing Rock Protests, L.A.
TIMES (Nov. 1, 2016, 6:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-standing-rocknumbers-20161101-story.html.
15 Lynda V. Mapes, Seattle City Council Votes to Cut Ties with Wells Fargo over Dakota
Access
Pipeline Lending,
SEATTLE
TIMES
(Feb.
22,
2017,
2:58
PM),
https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/environment/seattle-city-council-to-vote-onpulling-billions-from-wells-fargo/.
16 See Felicia Alvarez, City of Davis Votes to Divest from Wells FargoBank, DAVIS ENTER.
(Feb. 8, 2017, 7:23 AM), https://www.davisenterprise.com/Jocal-news/city-of-davis-votes-todivest-from-wells-fargo-bank/ ("[T]he Davis City Council voted unanimously to seek out a new
banking service in light of the bank's ties to the Dakota Access oil pipeline and other recent
controversies."); Kate Cagle, In Solidarity with Standing Rock, City Moves Forward to Cut
Ties with Wells Fargo, SANTA MONICA DAILY PRESS (Feb. 16, 2017, 7:00 AM),
https://www.smdp.com/in-solidarity-with-standing-rock-city-moves-forward-to-cut-ties-withwells-fargo/159811 ("[The Santa Monica City Council moved forward with plans to end the
City's banking relationship with Wells Fargo bank."); Tom Lochner, City Will Withdraw Wells
Fargo Business - Institution "Will Have to Compete with Other Banks" for Future City
Business, BERKELEY VOICE, June 9, 2017, at 1A ("The city will continue to do business with
Wells Fargo at least through May 2018 as it develops 'socially responsible banking' criteria
for future bidders."); Riley McDermid, Alameda Moves to Divest More than $36 Million from
Wells
Fargo,
S.F.
Bus.
TIMES
(Feb.
23,
2017,
10:16
AM),
https://www.bizjournals.com/sanfrancisco/news/2017/02/23/alameda-moves-to-divest-morethan-36-million-from.html ("The City Council of Alameda voted unanimously this week to
divest more than $36 million it has in accounts with Wells Fargo from the bank, citing its
funding of the Dakota Access pipeline and ongoing investigations into its banking practices.").
17 See Phuong Le, Seattle Splits from Wells Fargoover DakotaAccess Pipeline-CEOSloan
Says Bank Remains Committed, STAR TRIB., Feb. 9, 2017, at 3D ("Wells Fargo is committed
to helping finance the pipeline, Chief Executive Tim Sloan said . . . .").
18 Melodie Michel, Post-Truth Reputational Risk: The Wells Fargo Saga, GLOBAL TRADE
REV. (Sept. 5, 2017), https://www.gtreview.com/magazine/volume-15issue-5/post-truthreputational-risk-wells-fargo-saga/.
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withdraw 200,000 yuan ($32,200)."19 Although "[b]ankers and local
officials say it never happened," customers raced to the bank to
withdraw their money. 20 As word spread via social media, customers
began withdrawing money from the nearby Rural Commercial Bank
of Huanghai. 2 1 "In response, local officials and bank managers kept
branches open 24 hours a day and trucked in cash by armored
vehicle to satisfy hundreds of customers, some of whom brought
large baskets to carry their cash out of the bank." 22 Banks began
"stack[ing] piles of yuan behind teller windows" to bolster customer
confidence. 23 The run lasted three days. 24
Each instance illustrates that banks can suffer losses from
reputational damage. Since the 1990s, bank regulators have
increasingly focused their attention on reputation risk. 25 This
Article examines and assesses the regulation of reputation risk at
financial institutions in the United States. It argues regulation of
reputation risk is unlikely to prevent any of the previous examples
of reputational losses. Instead, regulating reputation risk threatens
to destabilize the banking industry by unnecessarily politicizing
bank supervision.
Today, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve (Federal Reserve), the
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the National Credit
Union Administration (NCUA), and state bank regulators have a
very broad conception of reputation risk. Regulators say it is present
in every aspect of banking. 26 Banks need not do something wrong to

.

19 John Ruwitch, How Rumor Sparked Panic and Three-Day Bank Run in Chinese City,
REUTERS (Mar. 25, 2014, 8:41 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-banking/how326
2 2
H 0140
rumor-sparked-panic-and-three-day-bank-run-in-chinese-city-idUSBREA2PO
20 Id.
21
See id. (noting that people gathered outside banks to withdraw cash).
22
Id.
23

Id.

Big but Brittle, ECONOMIST (May 5, 2016), https://www.economist.com/specialreport/2016/05/05/big-but-brittle ("On the third day of the panic[,] the China Banking
Association, an industry group, entered the fray and declared the rural banks to be healthyin effect, pledging to stand behind them. That ended the run. It had taken the full weight of
the nation's banks acting in concert to restore calm.").
25 See infra Section III.A (describing the emergence of reputation risk in bank regulation).
26 See NAT'L CREDIT UNION ADMIN., CREDIT UNION EXAMINER'S GUIDE, RISK FOCUSED
24

EXAMINATION,

RISK

CATEGORIES

(2002)

[hereinafter

NCUA

EXAMINER'S

GUIDE],

https://publishedguides.ncua.gov/examiner/Pages/default.htm#ExaminersGuide/RiskFocusedProgram/Risk%20Categories.htm%3FTocPath%3DRisk-Focused%2520
8 ("Reputation risk exposure appears throughout the credit union
Examination%7C
organization.");

OFFICE OF

THE

COMPTROLLER

OF

THE

CURRENCY,

COMPTROLLER'S
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spark reputation risk. Untrue rumorS 27 or third-party (customers,
suppliers, etc.) conduct unrelated to banking can generate negative
public opinion. 2 8 And anything that leads to a negative public
opinion of the bank presents reputation risk. 29 Regulators make it
clear that it is not just bank shareholders, counterparties,
employees, and customers whose perceptions matter; reputation
risk also arises when "regulators" or "the community" think
negatively about a bank.3 0
Despite this broad conception of reputation risk, most regulation
of reputation risk is superfluous. Reputation risk arises most often
as an ancillary risk to some other problem already addressed in
banking law. 3 1 For example, when a bank violates anti-money

HANDBOOK: LARGE BANK SUPERVISION 64 (Sept. 2019 ed. 2018) [hereinafter OCC, LARGE
BANK SUPERVISION HANDBOOK 2018] ("Reputation risk is inherent in all bank

activities... .").
27
See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., SR 95-51, RATING THE ADEQUACY OF
RISK MANAGEMENT PROCESSES AND INTERNAL CONTROLS AT STATE MEMBER BANKS AND
BANK HOLDING COMPANIES (Nov. 4, 1995) [hereinafter FED. RESERVE, RISK MANAGEMENT

PROCESSES] ("Reputational risk is the potential that negative publicity regarding an
institution's business practices, whether true or not, will cause a decline in customer base,
costly litigation, or revenue reductions.").
28

See FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., FINANCIAL INSTITUTION LETTER 44-2008, GUIDANCE FOR
[hereinafter FDIC, THIRD-PARTY RISK GUIDANCE]

MANAGING THIRD-PARTY RISK (2008)

("[A]ny negative publicity involving the third party, whether or not the publicity is related to
the institution's use of the third party, could result in reputation risk."); OFFICE OF THE
COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OCC BULL. No. 2013-29, THIRD-PARTY RELATIONSHIPS:
RISK
MANAGEMENT
GUIDANCE (Oct.
30, 2013)
[hereinafter
OCC, THIRD-PARTY

RELATIONSHIPS GUIDANCE] ("Publicity about adverse events surrounding the third parties
also may increase the bank's reputation risk.").
29
See FDIC, THIRD-PARTY RISK GUIDANCE, supra note 28 (defining reputation risk as
"arising from negative public opinion"); FED. RESERVE, RISK MANAGEMENT PROCESSES, supra

note 27 (defining reputation risk as "the potential [for] negative publicity"); NCUA
EXAMINER'S GUIDE, supra note 26 (defining reputation risk as "arising from negative public
opinion or perception").
20
See OCC, LARGE BANK SUPERVISION HANDBOOK 2018, supra note 26, at 64 (listing
"customers, counterparties, correspondents, investors, regulators, employees, and the
community" as relevant bank stakeholders); see also BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING
SUPERVISION, ENHANCEMENTS TO THE BASEL IT FRAMEWORK

1

47 (2009) (defining the

relevant stakeholders as "customers, counterparties, shareholders, investors, debt-holders,
market analysts, other relevant parties [and] regulators").
31 See infra Sections IV.C-D (describing formal and informal enforcement efforts
mentioning reputation risk); see also Sergio Scandizzo, An Asset-Liability View of Banks'
Reputation ("Most academic literature and corporate policies tend to treat reputation along
the same lines as brand, that is, as an intangible asset that can be impaired by operational
mistakes or inappropriate behaviour."), in REPUTATIONAL RISK MANAGEMENT IN FINANCIAL

INSTITUTIONS 21, 23 (Thomas Kaiser & Petra Merl eds., 2014); Clifford Rossi, Opinion,
Headlinesfrom Recent Bank Scandals Are Their Own Problem, AM. BANKER (Nov. 4, 2016,
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laundering laws, regulators might require the bank to consider
compliance and reputation risk when opening new accounts. 32 Or
regulators might instruct a bank with credit quality problems to
develop risk management plans considering reputation and other
risks. 33 In these kinds of cases, reputation risk regulation does little
work because regulators already have ample authority to address
the primary problem. Regulators do not need authority over
reputation risk to punish Wells Fargo for illegally opening customer
accounts.
When reputation is not tied to other risks, regulators cannot
reliably forecast and prevent it. Part of the reason reputation is
difficult to forecast is that each bank has a variety of stakeholders. 34
Actions that some stakeholders perceive positively, others may
perceive negatively. 35 Shareholders may like Bank of America's new
account fee, while customers do not. 3 6 Workers building the Dakota
Access Pipeline might have been happy for Wells Fargo's financing,
while some community groups were not.3 7 Regulators

are not

equipped to determine which stakeholders' views should be
prioritized. Another reason reputation risk is hard to predict is that
it is broad. Regulators have little way of knowing when untrue
rumors will circulate about a bank or when stakeholders will
attribute the non-banking actions of a third-party to a bank. 38 As

11:00 AM), https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/headlines-from-recent-bank-scandalsare-their-own-problem ("Reputation risk usually manifests itself by way of some other risk.").
32 See, e.g., U.S. Trust Corp., 2001 WL 855087, at *4 (Fed. Reserve Bd. July 12, 2001)
(requiring an enhanced customer due diligence program "to ensure effective management and
mitigation of reputational and legal risks and compliance with the [Bank Secrecy Act]").
3 See, e.g., Written Agreement Between Putman Cty. Nat'l Bank of Carmel and the OCC,
OCC EA No. 2006-76, 2006 WL 5432098, at *1 (July 12, 2006) (instructing a bank to develop
"action plans and time frames to reduce risks where exposure is high, particularly with regard
to credit risk, which impacts directly on liquidity, compliance, strategic, and reputation
risks").
34 See OCC, LARGE BANK SUPERVISION HANDBOOK 2018, supra note 26, at 64 (identifying
"customers, counterparties, correspondents, investors, regulators, employees, and the
community" as bank stakeholders).
35 See infra note 381.
3 See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text (discussing negative reaction to the
account fee).
37 See supra notes 12-18 and accompanying text (discussing negative reaction to the
funding of the Dakota Access Pipeline).
38 See infra notes 359-64, 360-65 and accompanying text.
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much as they might like to, regulators cannot reliably forecast runs
like the one at Jiangsu Sheyang Rural Commercial Bank. 39
Nevertheless, regulators do sometimes require banks to take
action not required to prevent violations of the law or serious
financial harm. The best known example of this aggressive
reputation regulation is Operation Choke Point-an initiative run
by the Department of Justice with help from banking regulators
aimed at pressuring banks to cut off services to payday lenders and
other high-risk customers. 40 But Operation Choke Point is not the
only instance of regulatory enforcement aimed primarily at
reputation risk. Before Operation Choke Point, the FDIC used
reputation risk to require a bank to end a payment processing
relationship with a company associated with payday lenders. 41 More
recently, the FDIC used Operation Choke Point-like tactics to force
banks to stop tax refund anticipation loans deemed reputationally
risky. 42 OCC and FDIC enforcement actions have required banks to
close all customer accounts posing reputation risk. 43 And the New
York state banking regulators urged banks to consider reputation
risk when offering banking services to the National Rifle
Association (NRA) and "similar gun promotion organizations." 4 4 The
NRA claims the regulator followed this guidance with "backroom
exhortations," pressuring banks to end banking relationships. 4 5
Reputation risk allows regulators to justify these regulatory
measures without identifying violations of the law or serious threats

3 See supra notes 19-24 and accompanying text (discussing the run sparked by untrue
rumors at two banks in rural China).
40 See Alan Zibel & Brent Kendall, Probe Turns Up Heat on Banks: Prosecutors Target
Firms that Process Payments for Online Payday Lenders, Others, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 7, 2013,
10:27
PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/probe-turns-up-heat-on-banks-1375923859
(discussing Operation Choke Point); see also infra Section IV.D.1.
41 See Bank of Agric. & Commerce, FDIC Order No. FDIC-08-408b, 2009 WL 998563, at
*4 (Feb. 19, 2009) (requiring a bank to end a payment processing relationship with a company
associated with payday lenders).
42
See infra notes 309-17 and accompanying text.
43 See infra notes 250-54 and accompany text (discussing money laundering enforcement
actions with broad remedial measures).
44 Letter from Maria T. Vullo, Superintendent, N.Y. Dep't of Fin. Servs., to the CEO or
Equivalents of N.Y. State Chartered or Licensed Fin. Insts. (Apr. 19, 2018) [hereinafter Vullo
Letter],
www.dfs.ny.gov/docs/legal/dfs/DFSGuidanceRiskManagement NRAGunManufacturer
s-Banking.pdf.
45 Original Complaint & Jury Demand at 1, 22, 25, 30, Nat'l Rifle Ass'n of Am. v. Cuomo,
350 F. Supp. 3d 94 (N.D.N.Y. 2018).
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to the financial integrity of the bank.46 Indeed, regulators seem to
believe reputation risk regulation is warranted because some
stakeholders (particularly the regulators) dislike payday lenders, 47
49
gun rights groups, 48 and tax refund anticipation loans.
These examples may only be the tip of the iceberg. A glut of
regulatory guidance pressures banks to reduce or eliminate a wide
range of reputation risks. 0 For example, the OCC warns: "Lending
to [oil and gas] companies . . perceived by the public to be negligent
in preventing environmental damage, hazardous accidents, or weak
fiduciary management can damage a bank's reputation."5 1 Because
banks are heavily regulated, they are incentivized to eliminate
identified risk rather than upset regulators. 5 2 Moreover, because
much of the regulatory process happens in secret,5 3 regulators can

See infra notes 199-206, 257-59 and accompanying text.
For example, in implementing Operation Choke Point, one FDIC official explained: "I
literally can not [sic] stand pay day lending. They are abusive, fundamentally wrong, hurt
people, and do not deserve to be in any way associated with banking." E-mail from Thomas
J. Dujenski, FDIC Reg'1 Dir., Atlanta Region, to Mark Pearce, FDIC Dir., Div. of Depositor
Consumer Prot. (Nov. 26, 2012, 4:47 PM), in STAFF OF H. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT & GOV'T
6

&

47

&

REFORM, 113TH CONG., FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION'S INVOLVEMENT IN
"OPERATION CHOKE POINT" 14 (Comm. Print 2014) [hereinafter H. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT
https://republicans-oversight.house.gov/wpFDIC],
STAFF REPORT,
GOV'T REFORM

content/uploads/2014/12/Staff-Report-FDIC-and-Operation-Choke-Point- 12-8-2014.pdf.
New York's gun promotion guidance was issued at the direction of Governor Andrew
48
Cuomo who contemporaneously called the NRA "an extremist organization." Andrew Cuomo
(@NYGovCuomo), TWITTER (Apr. 20, 2018, 8:58 AM), https://twitter.com/NYGovCuomo/
status/987359763825614848; Press Release, N.Y. Dep't of Fin. Servs., Governor Cuomo
Directs Department of Financial Services to Urge Companies to Weigh Reputational Risk of
2018),
19,
(Apr.
Similar Organizations
the NRA and
Ties to
Business
https://www.dfs.ny.gov/about/press/prl804191.htm.
49 The FDIC began its crackdown on tax refund anticipation loans after FDIC Chairman
Sheila Bair received a letter from consumer advocacy groups criticizing the loans. OFFICE OF
INSPECTOR GEN., FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., REPORT No. OIG-16-001, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY,
REPORT OF INQUIRY INTO THE FDIC's SUPERVISORY APPROACH TO REFUND ANTICIPATION
LOANS AND THE INVOLVEMENT OF FDIC LEADERSHIP AND PERSONNEL i n.2 (2016) [hereinafter
FDIC OIG REFUND ANTICIPATION LOANS REPORT]. Apparently convinced the loans were

problematic, she asked "why FDIC-regulated institutions would be allowed to offer [refund
anticipating loans]." Id. at i.

5o See infra Sections III.B-C.
51 OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, COMPTROLLER'S HANDBOOK: OIL AND
GAS EXPLORATION AND PRODUCTION LENDING 17 (Oct. 2018 ed. 2016) [hereinafter OCC, OIL

https://www.occ.treas.gov/publications-andHANDBOOK],
LENDING
GAS
AND
resources/publications/comptrollers-handbook/filesoil-gas-exploration-prod-lending/indexoil-gas-exploration-production-lending.html.
52
See infra Section IV.D.3.
53 See infra notes 261-67 and accompanying text.
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informally use guidance to pressure banks in ways that will never
receive public scrutiny.
This Article argues that regulation of reputation risk in the
absence of a violation of law or financial threat to the institution is
harmful because it unnecessarily politicizes bank regulation. Banks
rely not just on their own reputations, but also on those of their
regulators. Part of the reason people trust banks is that regulators
enact and enforce an extensive set of rules to keep banks financially
stable. 54 Regulators engender this trust by cultivating reputations
as technical experts who do not pander to political pressure.5 5
Regulation of reputation risk at banks undermines this by inviting
regulators to consider and sometimes resolve political questions
afield from banking.
Amid criticism of Operation Choke Point, federal regulators now
say they do not require banks to close accounts based solely on
reputation risk.5 6 This, however, is not enough to prevent regulatory
overreach. Indeed, before Operation Choke Point, regulators had
assured bankers that they did not actively supervise reputation
risk.5 7 Today, regulators maintain expansive definitions of
reputation risk,5 8 voluminous guidance cataloguing reputation
risks, 5 9 and an aggressive interpretation of their enforcement
authority.60 Little prevents regulators from using their enforcement
tools to stop a wide variety of bank activities they perceive as
reputationally risky. Instead, this Article recommends legislative
measures to limit regulatory authority over reputation risk.
The Article proceeds in five parts. Part II defines reputation risk
and explains why it is especially important to banks. Part III
surveys the explosion of reputation risk in regulatory guidance. Part
IV catalogues regulators' enforcement efforts involving reputation
risk. Part V argues that expansive regulation of reputation risk does
not improve banks and might harm them. It recommends Congress
act to limit regulatory authority over reputation risk. Part VI
concludes.

54
55
56
57
58

59
60

See
See
See
See
See
See
See

infra notes 94-100 and
infra notes 403-06 and
infra notes 231-33 and
infra notes 226-30 and
infra Section III.A.
infra Sections II.B-C.
infra Section IV.A.

accompanying
accompanying
accompanying
accompanying

text.
text.
text.
text.
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II. REPUTATION RISK AND BANKS

First, what is reputation risk and how does it impact banks?
A. REPUTATION RISK DEFINED

Every business has a reputation. "Customers have expectations
when they buy products or services, employees have them when
they accept jobs, vendors have them when they partner, creditors
and investors have them, and even regulators have them. Not to be
left out, members of society at large have expectations too." 6 1 When
banks do not live up to stakeholder expectations, stakeholders
change their behavior. "Customers stop buying, employees leave,
vendors lose interest in servicing, and regulators, litigators and
reporters inevitably pile on." 62 Reputation risk, then, is the risk that
"stakeholders [will negatively] change their expectations and
behaviors." 63
Stakeholders can negatively adjust their expectations for a
variety of reasons. "Any risk event, market, credit, operational, or
strategic, can have a reputational impact."64 For example, if a bank
suffers large losses on its mortgage loan portfolio (credit risk),
investors may become worried about the bank's future earnings and
sell or avoid stock. 65 If a bank illegally opens customer accounts
without authorization from the customer (legal and compliance
66
risk), customers might become upset and close their accounts. Or

Nir Kossovsky, How to Manage Reputation Risk, RISK MGMT., Apr. 2014, at 18.
Id.; see also Robert G. Eccles, Scott C. Newquist & Roland Schatz, Reputation and Its
Risks, HARv. Bus. REV., Feb. 2007, at 1, 3 ("When the reputation of a company is more positive
than its underlying reality, this gap poses a substantial risk. Eventually, the failure of a firm
to live up to its billing will be revealed, and its reputation will decline until it more closely
matches the reality.").
63 Kossovsky, supra note 61.
64 See Philippa X. Girling, ReputationalRisk and OperationalRisk, in OPERATIONAL RISK
61

62

MANAGEMENT: A COMPLETE GUIDE TO A SUCCESSFUL OPERATIONAL RISK FRAMEWORK 255

(2013); see also George Stansfield, Some Thoughts on Reputation and Challenges for Global
FinancialInstitutions, 31 GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK & INS. 470, 470 (2006) (listing a number
of potential sources of "reputational damage," including "poor compliance practices" and "poor
operating or financial performance over an extended period").
65 See Girling, supra note 64, at 259 (noting that significant credit losses can 'lead to
serious questions about the ability of the firm to operate effectively in the markets and this
can lead to loss of clients, and loss of share value").
66 See Hema Parekh, Reputational Risk in the Universe of Risks: Boundary Issues ("The
biggest threat to reputation is seen to be a failure to comply with regulatory or legal
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if a bank is the victim of a cyber-attack (operational risk), business
partners might avoid the bank because they are worried the
security breaches could impact them.6 7

When a risk event triggers a negative change in stakeholders'
behavior, the bank may lose money. 68 Reputation risk losses are
those losses beyond the loss directly attributable to the event
itself.69 The losses on the unpaid mortgage loans are credit losses,
but the losses attributable to the increased difficulty in attracting
investors are reputational losses. The losses due to theft in a
cyber-attack are operational losses, but the losses from a smaller
customer base are reputation losses. 70
In this sense, reputation risk is a derivative risk. It is a risk that
"arises as a result of something else and that potentially magnifies
the consequences of other exposures."7 1
But viewing reputation risk as a purely derivative risk masks
some of its nuance. Reputation losses can occur in the absence of
other identifiable risk. 72 Stakeholders may negatively adjust their
view of a bank when the bank engages in otherwise non-risky

obligations."), in REPUTATIONAL RISK MANAGEMENT IN FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, supra note

31, at 37, 45.
67 See Dante Disparte & Daniel Wagner, The Growing Severity of Cyber-Attacks and How
to
Protect Against Them,
HUFFINGTON POST (Dec.
14,
2016,
9:21 AM),
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/the-growing-severity-of-c-b13601810
(noting that for
businesses "cyber-attacks can pose an existential threat, not just operationally, but in terms
of reputation risk"). But see Daniel Wagner, Reputation Risk in Cyber Attacks Is a Myth,
SUNDAY
GUARDIAN
(Jan.
13,
2018,
10:45
PM),
https://www.sundayguardianlive.comlopinion/12369-reputation-risk-cyber-attacks-myth
(arguing that cyber-attacks "have become so commonplace that the general public has become
numb to their occurrence and impact").
68 Christian Eckert & Nadine Gatzert, Modeling Operational Risk Incorporating
Reputation Risk: An IntegratedAnalysis for FinancialFirms, 72 INS. 122, 124 (2017).
69 See
Ingo Walter, Reputation Risks and Large International Banks ("[A]
reputation-sensitive event might trigger an identifiable monetary decline in the market
capitalization of the bank. After subtracting from this market-cap loss the present value of
direct and allocated costs, such as fines and penalties and settlements under civil litigation,
the balance can be ascribed to the impact on the firm's reputation."), in THE FUTURE OF
LARGE, INTERNATIONALLY ACTIVE BANKS 29, 39 (Asli Demirguig-Kunt et al. eds., 2016).
7o See Eckert & Gatzert, supra note 68, at 124 (explaining the framework for identifying
"reputational losses" and "operational losses").
71 Scandizzo, supra note 31, at 23. Indeed, this nexus between reputation risk and other
risks has prevented scholars from converging on an accepted definition of reputation risk.
"Opinion is divided as to whether reputational risk is a category of risk in its own right, or
merely the consequence of a failure to manage other risks." Parekh, supra note 66, at 38.
72
Girling, supra note 64, at 259 ("In addition to reputational impact arising from other
risk types, it can also arise out of activities that are not risky in any other sense.").
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conduct that some stakeholders consider immoral or irresponsible. 73
For example, although Wells Fargo's funding of the Dakota Access
Pipeline did not violate the law or pose excessive credit risk, it was
nevertheless unpopular with some customers and community
groups.7 4 Stakeholder expectations "may go well beyond what a
bank is legally obliged to do and may encompass a very wide
spectrum of domains, from customer service to corporate citizenship
all the way to outright macroeconomic responsibility."7 5
Finally, because reputation is based on perception, "[r]eputation,
through no fault of one's own, can be tarnished." 76 Untrue rumors
about either a particular bank or banks in general can motivate
depositors to withdraw deposits.7 7 "Given that what external
audiences perceive about [a bank] is often filtered through third
parties (especially the media)," stakeholder perceptions of banks are
sometimes based on incomplete, inaccurate, or untruthful
information.7 8
B. BANK REPUTATION RISK

While all businesses have some exposure to reputation risk,
banks face unique reputation concerns: (1) their business is based
on reputation to a greater extent than other businesses, and (2) an
73 Walter, supra note 69, at 40-41; Scandizzo, supra note 31, at 25 ("[Rleputation can also
be seen as tied to a set of obligations, arising from the bank's dealings with its stakeholders,
which place on it duties and responsibilities to be fulfilled over time.").
7
See supra notes 12-18 and accompanying text.
75 Scandizzo, supra note 31, at 25.
76 Raskin, supra note 10, at 1.
7
See Annarita Trotta, Antonia Patrizia lannuzzi & Vincenzo Pacelli, Reputation,
Reputational Risk and Reputational Crisis in the Banking Industry: State of the Art and
Concepts for Improvements ("[Sicholars have noted that in the financial sector, particularly
when the economic condition is adverse, a contraction of the reputational capital of a bank
(particularly if it has systemic importance) can certainly affect the reputation and equities

prices of other financial intermediaries."),

in MANAGING

REPUTATION IN THE BANKING

INDUSTRY: THEORY AND PRACTICE 3, 17 (Stefano Dell'Atti & Annarita Trotta eds., 2016); Jack
Ewing & Georgi Kantchev, Feud Between OligarchsSeen as Cause of Bank Run in Bulgaria,
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/01/business/
2014),
30,
(June
TIMES
N.Y.
international/feud-between-oligarchs-seen-as-cause-of-bank-run-in-bulgaria.html
(explaining how social media rumors arising from a feud between two oligarchs led to runs at
a Bulgarian bank); supra notes 19-24 and accompanying text (explaining how untrue rumors
about a bank in rural China sparked a run at that bank and a neighboring bank).
7 Peter 0. Foreman, David A. Whetten & Alison Mackey, An Identity-Based View of
Reputation, Image, and Legitimacy: Clarifications and Distinctions Among Related
Constructs, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE REPUTATION 179, 183 (Michael L.

Barnett & Timothy G. Pollock eds., 2012).
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erosion of that reputation can be even more damaging to society. 79
Regulators address these concerns by providing deposit insurance
and monitoring banks to ensure they comply with the law.8 0 In

essence, the reputation of bank regulators acts as a partial
substitute for bank reputation.
Banks rely on reputation because people and businesses must be
willing to deposit money at a bank. This requires some level of trust
that the depositor will be able to withdraw the money later.8 1 But
there are a seemingly infinite number of ways unscrupulous
bankers can defraud customers. 82 The nature of finance can make it
difficult for even sophisticated depositors to know when they are
likely to be defrauded,8 3 or even to prove afterward that they have
been defrauded. 84
Although trust is vital, it is difficult for banks themselves to
effectively signal they can be trusted. A manufacturing firm might
signal its product can be trusted by offering a warranty.8 5 Buyers of
a refrigerator trust a manufacturer warranty because they believe

7
See Bel6n Ruiz, Juan A. Garcia & Antonio J. Revilla, Antecedents and Consequences of
Bank Reputation:A Comparison of the United Kingdom and Spain, 33 INT'L MARKETING REV.
781, 781 (2016) ("The intangible nature of banking services makes them difficult to assess
with more relevance being placed on reputation, whereas reputational losses, which are
negative in any industry, are particularly critical in banking." (citations omitted)); Trotta,
lannuzzi & Pacelli, supra note 77, at 6 ("Reputation is a concept related both to the 'raison
d'dtre' of banks and the special nature of banking business in the context of contemporary
financial intermediation theories.").
8 See infra notes 94-100 and accompanying text.
s1 See Eckert & Gatzert, supra note 68, at 123 ("In general, the potential impact of a bad
reputation on the financial situation of the company can be fatal, and reputation is even more
important in the financial industry, especially for banks and insurers, whose activities are
based on trust."); Paola Sapienza & Luigi Zingales, A Trust Crisis, 12 INT'L REV. FIN. 123,
124 (2012) ("While trust is fundamental to all trade and investment, it is particularly
important in financial markets, where people part with their money in exchange for
promises.").
82
JONATHAN R. MACEY, THE DEATH OF CORPORATE REPUTATION: How INTEGRITY HAS
BEEN DESTROYED ON WALL STREET 14 (2013) ("There are so many ways for unscrupulous

financial institutions to defraud their customers that it is difficult to list them all.").
8 See David T. Llewellyn, Trust and Confidence in Financial Services: A Strategic
Challenge, 13 J. FIN. REG. & COMPLIANCE 333, 341-42 (2005) (listing numerous
characteristics of financial transactions that make "the transaction costs for the consumer in
verifying the value of contracts" abnormally high).
84 See MACEY, supra note 82, at 26-27 (noting financial products "decline in value for
complex and opaque reasons, and it is not always clear whether the failure is the result of
dishonesty or of unavoidable factors").
8 See id. at 26 (noting that manufacturers "highlight their good reputations by offering
warranties").
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only a small number of refrigerators will turn out to be defective. 86
The warranty assures the buyer will not bear the loss for a defective
product. Bank deposits are different. When a bank experiences
difficulty, all of the bank's deposits are in peril. Thus, a bank
warranting that it will repay deposits gives the depositor little
additional comfort.8 7 In sum, although banking relies on reputation,
traditional tools for bolstering reputations are ineffective in
banking.
At the same time, trust in banking is fragile. Stakeholders adjust
their expectations and perceptions over time. For banks, negative
changes in reputation are dangerous because they can trigger a run
or panic.8 8 Banks' borrowing consists of deposits that customers can
withdraw at any time. Under normal circumstances this "demand"
nature of deposits poses no problems for banks because most
depositors leave their money in the bank.89 If, however, many
depositors suddenly "withdraw their money at the same time, then
the bank has a problem because it doesn't have the funds on hand." 90
Rather than keeping all deposits in a bank vault, banks lend money
to borrowers. Their loans typically have longer terms-for example,
a three-year car loan or a thirty-year mortgage. To satisfy
unexpected depositor demands, a bank may have to sell its assets
quickly at low fire-sale prices, until the bank is eventually unable
to meet depositor demands. 9 1
Because depositors "generally have a limited capacity to assess
the strength of any individual bank and cannot determine how their
own bank will withstand an economic shock," a bank run can spread
like a contagion from one bank to the next until a full-blown banking
86 See id. at 19-20 (explaining "one refrigerator can break while dozens of others work
perfectly," but financial products "do not fail one by one").
87 Id. at 19.
8 See Ingo Walter, Reputational Risk in Banking and Finance: An Issue of Individual
Responsibility?, 7 J. RISK MGMT. FIN. INSTS. 299, 301 (2014) (stating reputation risk is
"significantly more serious" for banks than for non-financial firms "because they deal with
other people's money, and .. . because problems that arise in financial intermediation trigger
serious external costs").
89

See MICHAEL S. BARR, HOWELL E. JACKSON & MARGARET E. TAHYAR, FINANCIAL

REGULATION: LAW AND POLICY 236 (2016) (explaining the generally justified assumption that
"not all depositors will demand their funds back at the same time").
90 RICHARD SCOTT CARNELL, JONATHAN R. MACEY & GEOFFREY P. MILLER, THE LAW OF
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 202 (6th ed. 2017).
91 See BARR, JACKSON & TAHYAR, supra note 89, at 236 (explaining that "because loans

are . . . hard to value, potential buyers can capitalize on this forced sale to purchase the assets
at a deep discount, often called a fire sale").
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panic occurs. 92 It is not just banks that suffer. Banking panics

damage economic output in the real economy. They can cause or
contribute to recessions or depressions. 93
Relying on bank reputation alone might create a sub-optimally
small and unstable banking market. Instead, banks rely at least
partly on government regulation to bolster their reputations and
attract stable deposits. 94 "Regulation. . . works by making fraud
illegal and then enforcing the rules against those who break
them." 9 5 Depositors need less trust in banks if they believe
regulators are keeping a close eye on banks. Regulation, however,
only works to bolster reputation when depositors believe the
regulator will effectively monitor banks for compliance with the law
and punish violations of the law. 9 6 If regulators are under-zealous
or over-zealous depositors will not trust them.9 7 Moreover, banks

92 Id. at 237; see also Charles W. Calomiris & Gary Gorton, The Origins ofBanking Panics:
Models, Facts, and Bank Regulation ("In an environment with asymmetric information, a
panic can occur as follows. Bank depositors may receive information leading them to revise
their assessment of the risk of banks, but they do not know which individual banks are most
likely to be affected. Since depositors are unable to distinguish individual bank risks, they
may withdraw a large volume of deposits from all banks in response to a signal."), in

FINANCIAL MARKETS AND FINANCIAL CRISES 109, 124 (R. Glenn Hubbard ed., 1991).
9
See generally Michael Bordo et al., Is the Crisis Problem Growing More Severe?, 16
EcoN. POL'Y 51 (2001) (studying banking crises in twenty-one countries over a 120-year
period); see also Andrew J. Jalil, A New History of Banking Panicsin the United States, 18251929: Construction and Implications, 7 AM. ECON. J. 295, 297 (2015) (showing "banking
panics have rapid, large, and strongly negative effects on both output and prices" in the real
economy).
9
Christopher McKenna & Rowena Olegario, Corporate Reputation and Regulation in
Historical Perspective ("Faith in the financial regulators [has] increasingly replaced
dependence on the corporate reputations of financial institutions."), in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE REPUTATION, supra note 78, at 260, 268; John C. Coffee, Jr.,
Systemic Risk After Dodd-Frank:Contingent Capital and the Need for Regulatory Strategies

Beyond Oversight, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 795, 815-16 (2011) ("[T]o maintain investor confidence

and avert runs, financial regulators have long engaged in 'safety and soundness' regulation
that is designed (at least in part) to convince creditors that their institution can handle
sudden increases in . . . the rate of depositor withdrawal .....
9

96

MACEY, supra note 82, at 10.
Hans Caspar von der Crone & Johannes Vetsch, Reputation and Regulation, in

REPUTATION CAPITAL: BUILDING AND MAINTAINING TRUST IN THE 21ST CENTURY 179, 182-83

&

(Joachim Klewes & Robert Wreschniok eds., 2009).
9
See Sharon Gilad, Moshe Maor & Pazit Ben-Nun Bloom, OrganizationalReputation, the
Content of Public Allegations and Regulatory Communication, 25 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES.
THEORY 451, 457-58 (2015) (noting that over-regulation and under-regulation are both
potentially damaging to a regulator's reputation); see also Ann-Marie Nienaber, Marcel
Hofeditz & Rosalind H. Searle, Do We Bank on Regulation or Reputation?A Meta-Analysis
and Meta-Regression of OrganizationTrust in the FinancialServices Sector, 43 INT'L J. BANK
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may reduce their efforts to comply with the law. 98 In essence, bank
regulators substitute their reputations for the reputation of banks.
Federal deposit insurance is also a substitute for bank
reputation. 99 Deposit insurance seeks to eliminate the incentive for
depositors to run because the government promises insured
depositors will receive their money whether they are the first to ask
for it or not. 100 As long as depositors believe the government will
honor the terms of the insurance, depositors have less incentive to
participate in a bank run.
Although financial regulation and deposit insurance act as
partial substitutes for bank reputation, they do so by relieving
depositors of the incentive to monitor their banks. 10 ' This creates
moral hazard.1 02 Banks may be more willing to take risks (perhaps
even reputation risks) because they know insured depositors are
unlikely to run.103 Consequently, regulators monitor banks' risk
profiles.1 04 In a sense then, much of banking regulation is aimed at
reputation risk. Capital rules, liquidity rules, anti-fraud rules, asset
MARKETING 367, 378 (2014) (concluding "[sitrong regulations and control mechanisms have
a greater effect on organizational trust in the financial industry than in other industries").
91 See MACEY, supra note 82, at 12 ("[I]f businesses think that the government will
undermine their reputations by charging them with fraud falsely or unfairly, they will be less
likely to invest in developing their reputations in the first place.").
99

See GARY GORTON, SLAPPED BY THE INVISIBLE HAND: THE PANIC OF 2007, at 159 (2010)

("Deposit insurance (possibly implicit) has been the (nearly) universal regulatory response to
the possibility of banking panics because it eliminates the motivation for depositors to
demand cash in exchange for deposits.').
109 Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, Bank Runs, DepositInsurance, and Liquidity,
91 J. POL. EcoN. 401, 402 (1983).
101 See CARNELL, MACEY & MILLER, supra note 90, at 223 ("When deposit insurance enters
the picture, depositors lose much of the incentive to monitor banks. They don't care very much
whether their bank is taking risks because they are certain to be paid even if the bank
closed."); John Crawford, The Moral HazardParadox of FinancialSafety Nets, 25 CORNELL
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 95, 97 (2015) ("Creditors who believe the government will make them whole
when the borrower defaults are unlikely to impose discipline on risky financial institutions
by, for example charging higher interest rates to compensate for the risk of default.").
102

See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIc ANALYSIS OF LAW 121 (5th ed. 1998) (describing

moral hazard as "[t]he tendency of an insured to relax his efforts to prevent the occurrence of
the risk that he has insured against because he had shifted the risk to an insurance
company").
See Ash Demirgiig-Kunt & Edward J. Kane, Deposit InsuranceAround the Globe: Where
103
Does It Work?, 16 J. ECON. PERSP. 175, 176 (2002) ("Banks can offer high interest rates to
depositors and in turn try to earn the money to pay those high interest rates by making highrisk loans. In this manner, both banks and depositors can engage in imprudent banking
practices, secure in the knowledge that if the high-risk loans do not pay off, deposit insurance
protects their principal.").
104 GORTON, supra note 99, at 160.
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concentration rules, insider lending rules, and many more are all
designed to give stakeholders confidence in banks and the banking
industry.
Of course, regulators' job is not to eliminate all risk, or even all
impossible
and
That
would
be
shareholder
loss.
counterproductive.1 0 5 Instead, regulators should focus on reducing
risks that would cause widespread negative externalities. Against
this backdrop, the question is not whether banks can be harmed by
reputation risk. They can. The relevant question is whether
regulating reputation risk directly enhances the regulatory
framework. Regulators should only focus on reputation risk
regulation if it can address harmful behavior that banking law
would otherwise ignore. Can regulation of reputation risk reduce
the likelihood that short-term debt holders will perceive the bank
negatively, thus averting a run or panic? Can regulation of
reputation risk reduce some of the moral hazard introduced by
deposit insurance? 10 6 If so, direct regulation of reputation may be
warranted. In claiming new responsibility, however, regulators
should be mindful of their own reputations. If they regulate in a way
that seems incompetent or unfair, they may destabilize the banking
system.
III. REGULATING REPUTATION RISK

Before evaluating the efficacy of reputation risk regulation, it is
useful to understand how it works. This Part describes how

105
See George J. Benston & George G. Kaufman, The AppropriateRole of Bank Regulation,
106 ECON. J. 688, 692 (1996) (arguing that even bank failures, "distressing though they may
be, are not externalities for which government intervention is justified"); Jennifer Shasky
Calvery, Dir., Fin. Crimes Enf't Network, Speech at Mid-Atlantic AML Conference (Aug. 12,
2014), https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/2016-08/20140812.pdf ("I think we can all
agree that it is not possible for financial institutions to eliminate all risk.").
106
Reputation risk regulation's ability to prevent panics might depend partly on the reason
for the panic. Scholars have disagreed about the precise cause of banking panics. See Kathryn
Judge, Guarantor of Last Resort, 97 TEx. L. REV. 707, 715-16 (2019) (discussing banking
panic theories). To the extent that a panic is rooted in "random deposit withdrawals unrelated
to changes in the real economy," prudential regulation of banks may have little impact.
Franklin Allen, Ana Babus & Elena Carletti, FinancialCrises: Theory and Evidence, 1 ANN.
REV. FIN. ECON. 97, 99 (2009). Similarly, a panic rooted in concerns about general economic
conditions might not be forestalled by reputation risk regulation aimed at individual banks.
See id. at 100 (discussing the view that "crises are not random events, but responses of
depositors to the arrival of sufficiently negative information on the unfolding economic
circumstances").
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reputation risk became part of the bank regulatory framework. Part
IV discusses how reputation risk regulation is implemented through
enforcement.
A. REGULATORS DEFINE REPUTATION RISK

As Part II illustrates, "[r]eputation[] risk in banking and finance
is nothing new."1 07 Nevertheless, regulators were slow to specifically

regulate reputation risk. Occasionally, policy makers would use
8
reputation risk to justify a new regulation1 0 or an administrative
decision, 109 but mostly it lurked in the background as regulators
110
concentrated on the banking basics of credit and market risk.
All of that changed in the mid-1990s with a shift toward
risk-focused regulation. Banks then had survived crises in the late
12
Most banks were
1980s. 111 The industry had consolidated.1
113
New technology and
financially stable and making money.

107 Walter, supra note 69, at 29-30 (noting that reputation risk "can be found in historical
accounts dating at least to biblical times, cementing the 'specialness' of banking in the public
discourse and engaging thinkers as diverse as Machiavelli, Adam Smith, Walter Bagehot,
Frederick the Great and Alexander Hamilton").
For example, in the mid-1980s, Congress considered and ultimately passed more
10
stringent money laundering laws. See Money Laundering Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No.
99-570, 100 Stat. 3207-18 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956-57). That legislation was
justified in part by the potential negative impact of money laundering on the reputation of
banks and the banking industry. See 131 CONG. REC. 4,541 (1985) (statement of Rep.
McCollum) ("Even if a financial institution is unwittingly made a conduit for laundering, the
mere fact that money launderers saw fit to use that institution may seriously affect the
public's perception of the institution." (quoting PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON ORGANIZED CRIME,
THE CASH CONNECTION: ORGANIZED CRIME, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, AND MONEY
LAUNDERING 62 (1984))).
109 See Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Interpretive Letter on Exercise of Trust
Powers: Collective Investment Funds (June 23, 1992), 1992 WL 486902 (denying a bank's
request not to disclose possible fluctuation in the value of a taxable common trust fund
because "prudent banking practices require the Bank to provide this information to limit legal
and reputational risk in the event a customer claimed he or she was misled about the nature
of the product").
110 See Rossi, supra note 31 ("In general the banking sector has not historically placed a
high priority on reputational risk-compared to credit, market or operational risks.").
n See Susan M. Phillips, Governor, Fed. Reserve Sys., Remarks at Houston Baptist
University: Trends and Challenges in Federal Reserve Bank Supervision (Oct. 30, 1997),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/1997/19971030.htm ("By the end of the
1980s, more than 200 banks were failing annually, and there were more than 1,000 banks on
the FDIC problem list.").
See id. ("The number of independent commercial banking organizations has declined 40
112
percent since 1980 to 7,400 in June of [1987].").
113
Id.
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financial products led to an evolution of the business of banking. 114
From credit cards to derivatives, banks were considering activities
and products with which they and their regulators had little
experience.11 5 Eye-popping derivative losses in other industries
emphasized that new financial products brought risk. 116 And
finance increasingly became an international industry.1 1 7
In response to this changing landscape, policymakers and
financial regulators across the globe focused on risk regulation.1 1 8
In the United States, the OCC and the Federal Reserve both
developed new "risk-focused" supervisory approaches. 1 19 The NCUA

Id
See Eugene A. Ludwig, Comptroller, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Remarks
at Georgetown University Center for Business-Government Relations (Sept. 26, 1995),
https://www.occ.treas.gov/news-issuances/speeches/1995/nr-occ-1995-1Ola.pdf
(discussing
the rise of Internet transactions, an increase in consumer lending through credit cards and
mortgages, and the development of mutual funds and major financial innovations); see also
Douglas E. Harris, Senior Deputy Comptroller for Capital Mkts., Office of the Comptroller of
the Currency, Remarks Before the Bankers Roundtable Lawyers Council on Bank Derivatives
Activities (May 18, 1995) (noting "the notional amount of U.S. banks' over-the-counter
derivatives had grown to $11.5 trillion" in 1993), in 14 OCC Q.J. no. 3, 1994-95, at 59.
116
In 1993, the German conglomerate Metallgesellschaft AG disclosed derivatives losses
in excess of $1 billion. See Narayanan Jayaraman & Milind Shrikhande, FinancialDistress
and Recovery at Metallgesellschaft AG: The Role of Corporate Governance and Bankruptcy
Laws, FIN. PRAC. & EDUC., Fall/Winter 1997, at 7-18. In 1994, Orange County declared
bankruptcy after its derivatives investments soured. Floyd Norris, Orange County's
Bankruptcy: The Overview, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 1994, at Dl. And in 1995, Barings Bank, the
oldest British investment bank, collapsed after a rogue derivatives trader racked up $2.2
billion in losses. See Laura Proctor, Note, The Barings Collapse: A Regulatory Failure, or a
Failureof Supervision?, 22 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 735, 737-42 (1997).
Other scholars have linked the international emergence of operational risk regulation to
these scandals. See Michael Power, The Invention of OperationalRisk, 12 REV. INT'L POL.
EcoN. 577, 579 (2005) (stating that the derivatives scandals of the 1990s were
"retrospectively constructed as an 'operational risk' management failure"). Because
reputation risk emerged alongside operational risk in the new risk-centered regulatory
approaches, it makes sense to consider these scandals as part of the landscape that
germinated reputation risk. Cf. Harris, supra note 115 (discussing prominent derivatives
scandals in the context of the OCC's risk-based derivative regulation).
117
See Ludwig, supra note 115 ("We see the increasing globalization of financial markets.
The foreign exchange market has evolved from a $1 billion-a-day business in 1974 to one
where $1 trillion is traded daily.").
118 See Power, supra note 116, at 582 (describing increased international attention in bank
risk management in the mid-1990s).
119 FED. RESERVE, RISK MANAGEMENT PROCESSES, supra note 27 (announcing examiners
would begin to assign "a formal supervisory rating to the adequacy of an institution's risk
management processes, including its internal controls"); Harris, supra note 115 (explaining
the Federal Reserve adopted a "risk-oriented supervisory approach for many new financial
instruments"); Ludwig, supra note 115 (announcing a "new program [called] 'supervision by
risk"').
114
115
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adopted its own risk-focused approach several years later. 120 Of the
four primary federal bank regulators, only the FDIC declined to
adopt risk-focused supervision.121
The first task for implementing risk-focused supervision was to
define a list of risks that would be monitored.1 22 Although each
regulator's list of risks was slightly different, each chose to include
reputation risk. According to the OCC:
Reputation risk is the risk to earnings or capital arising
from negative public opinion. This affects the
institution's ability to establish new relationships or
services, or continue servicing existing relationships.
This risk can expose the institution to litigation,
financial loss, or damage to its reputation. Reputation
risk exposure is present throughout the organization
and includes the responsibility to exercise an
abundance of caution in dealing with its customers and
community. This risk is present in such activities as
asset management and agency transactions.1 2 3
Later, the OCC broadened the definition in two ways. First, the
OCC lengthened the list of stakeholders beyond "customers and
community." Under the current definition, bank "management
should deal prudently with stakeholders, such as customers,
counterparties, correspondents, investors, regulators, employees,
and the community."1 24 The OCC also broadened the definition to
include risks beyond those to earnings and capital.1 25 Now

120

NAT'L CREDIT UNION ADMIN., LETTER NO. 02-FCU-09, RISK-FOCUSED EXAMINATION

PROGRAM (May 2002) [hereinafter NCUA, RISK FOCUSED EXAMINATION PROGRAM].
121 See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, THE REGULATORY RISK MANAGEMENT HANDBOOK 19

(2001-2002) ("Unlike the OCC and the [Federal Reserve], the FDIC has not developed a
catalog of named risks to which an institution may be exposed.").
See Ludwig, supra note 115 ("[Ilt was necessary for the OCC to define a common set of
122
risks for our supervision staff to focus on, or if you will a common vocabulary of risk.").
123
124

Id.
OCC, LARGE BANK SUPERVISION HANDBOOK 2018, supra note 26, at 64. The "prudently

manage" language was included in 2018. Earlier versions stated: "Reputation
risk ... requires management to exercise an abundance of caution in dealing with
stakeholders, such as customers, counterparties, correspondents, investors, regulators,
employees, and the community." OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY,
COMPTROLLER'S HANDBOOK: LARGE BANK SUPERVISION 65 (2017).
125 See OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OCC BULL. No. 2015-48, RISK
ASSESSMENT SYSTEM (Dec. 3, 2015) [hereinafter OCC, RISKASSESSMENT SYSTEM] (explaining
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"[r]eputation risk is the risk to current or projected financial
condition and resilience arising from negative public opinion." 126
The Federal Reserve's definition was less verbose: "Reputational
risk is the potential that negative publicity regarding an
institution's business practices, whether true or not, will cause a
decline in the customer base, costly litigation, or revenue
reductions." 12 7 Like the OCC's definition, it focused on harm from
"negative publicity," but unlike the OCC, the Federal Reserve
explicitly noted that the negative publicity need not be true. 128 The
Federal Reserve still uses this definition of reputation risk. 129
The NCUA's definition of reputation risk was the most succinct:
"Risk of negative public opinion or perception leading to a loss of
confidence and/or severance of relationships." 13 0 The NCUA later
revised its definition to more closely match the OCC's. Currently
the NCUA Examiner's Guide provides:
Reputation risk is the current and prospective risk to
earnings or net worth arising from negative public
opinion or perception. Reputation risk affects the credit
union's ability to establish new relationships or
services, or to continue servicing existing relationships.
This risk, which occurs in activities such as asset
management decisions and transactions, can expose the
credit union to litigation, financial loss, or a decline in
membership base. 13 1
The next step was for the regulators to develop a system for
evaluating reputation risk at financial institutions. The OCC armed
examiners with a non-exhaustive, non-mandatory checklist of items
the definition was broadened to include considerations of "the bank's ability to withstand
periods of stress"). This 2015 Bulletin is now incorporated into OCC, LARGE BANK
SUPERVISION HANDBOOK 2018, supra note 26, as stated in OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF
THE CURRENCY, OCC BULL. NO. 2018-18, COMPTROLLER'S HANDBOOK: REVISED AND UPDATED
BOOKLETS AND RECESSIONS (June 28, 2018).
126
OCC, LARGE BANK SUPERVISION HANDBOOK 2018, supra note 26, at 64.
127
FED. RESERVE, RISK MANAGEMENT PROCESSES, supra note 27.
128

Id.

129

BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., DIV. OF SUPERVISION & REGULATION,

COMMERCIAL BANK EXAMINATION MANUAL

§

1012.1 (May 2019 ed. 2016) [hereinafter FED.

RESERVE BANK EXAMINATION MANUAL).
130 NCUA, RISK FOCUSED EXAMINATION PROGRAM, supra note 120.

131 NCUA EXAMINER'S GUIDE, supranote 26 (click to second tab, then follow "Risk-Focused
Examination" hyperlink; click to fourth tab, then follow "Risk Categories" hyperlink).

2020]

REG ULATING BANK REPUTATION RISK

547

to consider for each type of risk.1 32 The OCC has adjusted the list
over the years and now requires that examiners, at a minimum,
consider:
*
*
*
*
*

*

*
*
*

The bank's core values and conduct of
employees.
Volume and types of assets and number of
accounts under management or administration.
Number and types of third-party relationships.
Merger and acquisition plans and opportunities.
Potential or planned entrance into new
businesses, product lines, or technologies
(including new delivery channels), particularly
those that may test legal boundaries.
Nature and amount of exposure from litigation,
monetary penalties, violations of laws and
regulations, and customer complaints.
The market's or public's perception of the bank's
financial stability.
The market's or public's perception of the quality
of the bank's products and services.
Effect of economic, industry, and market
conditions; legislative and regulatory change;
technological advances; and competition. 133

Recognizing that reputation risk was "less quantifiable" than
credit or market risk,1 34 OCC examiners initially only decided if the
132 OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, COMPTROLLER'S HANDBOOK: BANK
SUPERVISION AND EXAMINATION PROCESS: LARGE BANK SUPERVISION, Appendix A: Risk

Assessment System (Dec. 1995) [hereinafter OCC, LARGE BANK SUPERVISION HANDBOOK
1995]. The OCC established a similar set of factors for assessing reputation risk at small
banks. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, COMPTROLLER'S HANDBOOK: BANK
SUPERVISION PROCESS 24 (Apr. 1996) [hereinafter OCC, BANK SUPERVISION PROCESS

HANDBOOK 1996] (describing the evaluation process for large and small banks); OFFICE OF
THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, COMPTROLLER'S HANDBOOK: COMMUNITY BANK
SUPERVISION HANDBOOK 187-88 (July 2003) [hereinafter OCC, COMMUNITY BANK

SUPERVISION HANDBOOK 2003] (assessing, among other things, whether management
"adequately responds to changes of a market or regulatory nature" and "adequately
self-polices risks").
133

134

OCC, LARGE BANK SUPERVISION HANDBOOK 2018, supra note 26, at 30-31.
OCC, LARGE BANK SUPERVISION HANDBOOK 1995, supra note 132, at Introduction

(noting strategic risk and reputation risk "affect the bank's franchise value but are not direct
risks that examiners can precisely measure in an examination").
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composite reputation risk was high, moderate, or low and whether
reputation risk was increasing, decreasing, or stable. 135 In 2015,
however, the OCC revised its guidance to additionally assess the
quality of reputation risk management.1 3 6 When determining the
quality of reputation risk management, examiners consider the
bank's past performance in managing reputation risk, risk
management policies and procedures, responsiveness to changes
and
complaints,
and
stakeholder
and
social
media
communications. 13 7
Similarly, the Federal Reserve instructed its examiners to begin
assigning "a formal supervisory rating to the adequacy of an
institution's risk management processes, including its internal
controls." 38 Examiners assign a number on a 1 to 5 scale.1 39 A "1",
rating indicates "that management effectively identifies and
controls all major types of risk posed by the institution's activities,"
but a "5" "indicates a critical absence of effective risk management
practices." 140 In assigning the management rating, examiners
consider whether the bank has the following:
*
*
*
*

active board and senior management oversight;
adequate policies, procedures, and limits;
adequate risk measurement, monitoring, and
management information systems; and
comprehensive internal controls. 14 1

Unlike OCC examiners, Federal Reserve examiners do not
consider reputation risk independently. Rather, it is one of the types
of risk examiners consider in reviewing the institution's risk
management systems. 142 In 2016, the Federal Reserve revised the
review of risk management systems at institutions with assets less
135 Id. at app. B; OCC, BANK SUPERVISION PROCESS HANDBOOK 1996, supranote 132, at 2324; OCC, COMMUNITY BANK SUPERVISION HANDBOOK 2003, supra note 132, at 187.
13 See oCC, RISKASSESSMENT SYSTEM, supra note 125; see also supra note 125 (noting the

incorporation of this bulletin into the 2018 Handbook).
137 OCC, LARGE BANK SUPERVISION HANDBOOK 2018, supra note 26, at 31 (listing the core
assessment factors examiners are required to review to determine the quality of reputation
risk management).
13

FED. RESERVE, RISK MANAGEMENT PROCESSES, supra note 27.

139

Id.

140

Id.

141

Id.
Id.

142
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than $50 billion. 143 The new guidance for smaller institutions does
not discuss reputation risk. 144 Nevertheless, the earlier guidance
145
including reputation risk still applies to large institutions.
The NCUA's system considers each of seven risk categories,
including reputation risk, individually. Examiners assess whether
the level of each risk is low, moderate, or high. 146 The examiners
also assess the "direction of risk (increasing, decreasing, or
unchanged)." 14 7 The NCUA provides its examiners with a guidance
document containing a list of factors and characteristics that would
classify a credit union as low, moderate, or high risk. 14 8 For
example, if "[v]iolations, noncompliance, or litigation are
insignificant, as measured by their number or seriousness," the
credit union could be rated a low reputation risk. 149 But if
"[v]iolations, noncompliance, or litigation expose the credit union to
significant impairment of reputation, value, earnings, or business
opportunity" the credit union should be rated as a high reputation
risk. 15 0 The NCUA also considers, among other things, a credit
union's ability to respond to change, implement risk management
policies and procedures, address complaints and errors, and train
its employees. 15 1
B. FEDERAL REGULATION

Once federal regulators included reputation risk in the lists of
official risks, it became ubiquitous. Regulators warn reputation risk
is everywhere.1 52 They began adding references to reputation risk
in all types of agency guidance.
143 See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., SR 16-11, SUPERVISORY GUIDANCE
FOR ASSESSING RISK MANAGEMENT AT SUPERVISED INSTITUTIONS WITH TOTAL CONSOLIDATED
ASSETS LESS THAN $50 BILLION (June 8, 2016).

14

Id. (identifying only credit, market, liquidity, operational, compliance and legal risk).

145

Id. (stating that OCC, RISK MANAGEMENT PROCESSES,

supra note

27, "remains

applicable to state member banks and bank holding companies with $50 billion or more in
total assets until superseding guidance is issued for these institutions").

148

NCUA EXAMINER'S GUIDE, supra note 26.
Id.
NCUA, RISK FOCUSED EXAMINATION PROGRAM, supra note 120.

149

Id.

146
147

1so Id.
151

Id.

152 See NCUA EXAMINER'S GUIDE, supra note 26 ("Reputation risk exposure appears
throughout the credit union organization."); OCC, LARGE BANK SUPERVISION HANDBOOK

2018, supra note 26, at 64 ("Reputation risk is inherent in all bank activities . . . ."); OFFICE
OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE Sys., FED.
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In 1996 alone, the OCC issued four bulletins with significant
discussion of reputation risk. The bulletins covered stored value
cards, 153 data communications networks, 154 securitization, 155 and
credit derivatives. 156 In each bulletin, the OCC explained how the
product or service posed reputation risk. For example, the OCC
warned:
Because credit derivatives are new and take many
different forms, the OCC is concerned that dealer banks
may enter into transactions with counterparties that do
not fully understand the terms and risks of the
transactions. These risks could expose the bank to
litigation, financial loss, or damage to its reputation.1 5 7
In 1996, the OCC re-wrote portions of its examination manuals
covering credit card lending, mortgage banking, and allowances for
loan and lease losses to include detailed discussions of reputation
risk in those contexts. 15 8
The other federal regulators also began integrating reputation
risk into their supervisory framework. Even the FDIC, who had not
adopted a risk-centered regulatory approach, 15 9 started referencing

DEPOSIT INS. CORP. & OFFICE OF THRIFT SUPERVISION, INTERAGENCY STATEMENT ON THE
PURCHASE AND RISK MANAGEMENT OF LIFE INSURANCE (Dec. 7, 2004) [hereinafter
INTERAGENCY
STATEMENT
ON
LIFE
INSURANCE],
https://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/srletters/2004/SRO419al.pdf
(noting
that
reputation risk "arises from virtually all bank products and services").
153 OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OCC BULL. NO. 96-48, STORED VALUE
CARD SYSTEM: INFORMATION FOR BANKERS AND EXAMINERS (Sept. 10, 1996) [hereinafter
OCC, STORED VALUE BULLETIN].
154
OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OCC BULL. No. 96-39, DATA
COMMUNICATIONS NETWORKS (July 24, 1996).
155
OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OCC BULL. NO. 96-52,
SECURITIZATION (Sept. 25, 1996).
156
OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OCC BULL. NO. 96-43, CREDIT
DERIVATIVES: GUIDELINE FOR NATIONAL BANKS (Aug. 12, 1996).
157

Id.

158 OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, COMPTROLLER'S HANDBOOK: ASSETS,
ALLOWANCE FOR LOAN AND LEASE LOSSES, RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH THE ALLOWANCE (June
1996); OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, COMPTROLLER'S HANDBOOK: ASSETS,
CREDIT CARD LENDING, RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH CREDIT CARD LENDING (Oct. 1996); OFFICE
OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, COMPTROLLER'S HANDBOOK: OTHER INCOME
PRODUCING ACTIVITIES, MORTGAGE BANKING, RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH MORTGAGE BANKING

(Mar. 1996).
159

See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
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reputation risk in its guidance.1 6 0 Together, the federal regulators
revamped the uniform system for rating the safety and soundness
of financial institutions. 16 1 The revised system kept the long-used
CAMELS (capital, assets, management, earnings, liquidity, and
sensitivity to market risk) rating factors, but clarified that
reputation risk should be considered when rating asset quality and
management. 162 Later the regulators collaborated on guidance for
reverse mortgage products and social medial management. 163 Both
guidance documents emphasized reputation risk. 164
Now when regulators offer guidance on bank products or
practices, the guidance often includes a discussion of reputation
risk. For example, bank-owned life insurance poses reputation risk
particularly if the bank materially gains from the death of an officer
or employee. 165 Offering overdraft protection on deposit accounts
poses reputation risk because "[b]anks may be subject to negative
news coverage and public scrutiny from reports of high fees and
customers taking out multiple advances to cover prior advances and
everyday expenses." 16 6 Selling foreclosed residential property poses
reputation risk, especially when "disposition practices ...

favor, as

160 See, e.g., FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., FIL-48-97, NEW EXAMINATION PROCEDURES FOR
RETAIL NONDEPOSIT INVESTMENT PRODUCT SALES (May 7, 1997) (explaining "poor

disclosures, inappropriate investment recommendations, or even fraudulent practices" can
lead to reputation risk in a bank's marketing of mutual funds, annuities, and other
nondeposit investment products).
161 Uniform Financial Institutions Rating System, 61 Fed. Reg. 67,021, 67,027 (Dec. 19,
1996).
162 Id.
163 Reverse Mortgage Products: Guidance for Managing Compliance and Reputation Risks,
74 Fed. Reg. 66,652 (Dec. 16, 2009); Social Media: Consumer Compliance Risk Management
Guidance, 78 Fed. Reg. 76,297 (Dec. 17, 2013).
Social Media: Consumer Compliance Risk Management Guidance, 78 Fed. Reg. 76,297,
16
76,303 (Dec. 17, 2013) ("Privacy and transparency issues, as well as other consumer
protection concerns, arise in social media environments. Therefore, a financial institution
engaged in social media activities is expected to be sensitive to, and properly manage, the
reputation risks that arise from those activities."); Reverse Mortgage Products: Guidance for
Managing Compliance and Reputation Risks, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,652, 66,657 (Dec. 16, 2009)
(explaining that because reverse mortgages are "offered to borrowers who typically have
limited income and few assets other than the home securing the loan . . . lenders must
institute controls to protect consumers and to minimize the . . . reputation risks").
165
166

INTERAGENCY STATEMENT ON LIFE INSURANCE, supra note 152.
OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, COMPTROLLER'S HANDBOOK: DEPOSIT-

RELATED CREDIT 8 (Mar. 2015).
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purchasers of foreclosed properties, investors (paying cash) over
owner-occupants (paying with financing)."16 7
Regulators also warn about third-party reputation risk; they
worry that if a bank does business with a third party with a bad
reputation, the bad reputation might rub off on the bank. 168 For
example, selling delinquent consumer debt to debt buyers poses
reputation risk "if consumers continue to view themselves as bank
customers" and the debt purchaser engages in "abusive
practices." 169 Similarly, offering stored value cards poses reputation
risk because stakeholders might blame the bank if the issuer of the
cards goes bankrupt or if the cards experience "malfunctions or
security breaches."1 7 0
Regulators raise reputational risk concerns even when the third
party's bad reputation is not directly related to banking. For
example, "[liending to [oil and gas] companies found or perceived by
the public to be negligent in preventing environmental damage,
hazardous accidents, or weak fiduciary management can damage a
bank's reputation." 17 1 The FDIC sums up third-party reputation
risk this way: "any negative publicity involving the third party,
whether or not the publicity is related to the institution's use of the
third party," could damage the reputation of the bank.1 72
Slowly but surely, reputation risk worked its way into nearly
every aspect of banking regulatory guidance. Today, the Federal
Reserve's bank examination
manual uses "reputation" or
"reputational" 184 times. 173 The FDIC's risk management manual

167
OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, COMPTROLLER'S HANDBOOK: OTHER
REAL ESTATE OWNED 15 (Sept. 2013).
16s
See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., SR 13-19 / CA 13-21, GUIDANCE ON

MANAGING OUTSOURCING RISK (Dec. 5, 2013) ("Reputational risks arise when actions or poor
performance of a service provider causes the public to form a negative opinion about a
financial

institution.");

OCC,

THIRD-PARTY RELATIONSHIP

GUIDANCE,

supra note

28

("Third-party relationships that do not meet the expectations of the bank's customers expose
the bank to reputation risk. Poor service, frequent or prolonged service disruptions,
significant or repetitive security lapses, inappropriate sales recommendations, and violations
of consumer law and other law can result in . .. negative perceptions in the marketplace.").
169
OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OCC BULL. NO. 2014-37, CONSUMER
DEBT SALES: RISK MANAGEMENT GUIDANCE (Aug. 4, 2014).
170 OCC, STORED VALUE CARD BULLETIN, supra note 153.
171
OCC, OIL AND GAS LENDING HANDBOOK, supra note 51.
172
FDIC, THIRD-PARTY RISK GUIDANCE, supra note 28.
173
FED. RESERVE BANK EXAMINATION MANUAL, supra note 129.
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uses "reputation" 51 times. 174 The OCC's large bank examination
manual uses "reputation" 58 times. 7 5 The NCUA's examination
76
manual uses "reputation" more than 125 times.1 Even specialized
77
examination manuals, like those for information technology' and
178
are replete with references to reputation.
anti-money laundering
This is impressive considering that reputation risk was hardly
mentioned twenty-five years ago.
While references to reputation risk are most prevalent in federal
agency guidance, reputation risk has also worked its way into some
banking rules. OCC rules governing banks' investment in securities
require that banks consider reputation risk.1 79 The NCUA's rules
governing capital planning require that credit unions consider
reputation risk. 8 0 And rules requiring that financial institutions
maintain programs to detect and prevent identity theft discuss
accounts that pose reputation risk.181
C. STATE REGULATION
Because financial institutions in the United States can be
chartered by either the federal or state government, states can also
regulate bank reputation risk. 182 A survey of reputation risk

174

FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP, RISK MANAGEMENT MANUAL OF EXAMINATION POLICIES (Dec.

2019

ed.),

https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/safety/manuall

[hereinafter

FDIC,

RISK

MANAGEMENT MANUAL].
175 OCC, LARGE BANK SUPERVISION HANDBOOK 2018, supra note 26.
176 The NCUA Examiner's Guide is currently in a state flux spread partly between chapters
in Portable Document Format and a new online web-linked version. The total count includes
both portions of the guide. NCUA EXAMINER'S GUIDE, supra note 26; NAT'L CREDIT UNION
ADMIN.,

EXAMINER'S

GUIDE

(2002),

https://www.ncua.gov/regulation-

supervision/Pages/manuals-guides/examiners-guide.aspx (linking to PDF chapters).
177 The interagency information technology examination handbook uses variants of the
word "reputation" 103 times. FED. FIN. INST. EXAMINATION COUNCIL, IT EXAMINATION

HANDBOOK (2016), https://ithandbook.ffiec.gov/it-booklets.aspx.
178 The interagency anti-money laundering examination handbook mentions "reputation"
ten times. FED. FIN.
LAUNDERING

INST. EXAMINATION COUNCIL,
HANDBOOK

BANK SECRECY ACT/ANTI-MONEY
(2014),

https://bsaaml.ffiec.gov/docs/manual/BSAAML-Man_2014_v2-CDDBO.pdf.
179 12 C.F.R. § 1.5 (2018).
180 12 C.F.R. § 702.504 (2018).
1s1 12 C.F.R. § 41.90 (2018) (OCC); 12 C.F.R. § 222.90 (2018) (Federal Reserve); 12 C.F.R.
§ 334.90 (2018) (FDIC); 12 C.F.R. § 717.90 (NCUA).
§ 1813(a)(2) (2012) (defining the term "[s]tate bank" as "any
182 See 12 U.S.C.
the law of any state"); 12 C.F.R. § 5.20 (2018) (describing the
under
...
incorporated
bank
OCC's process for chartering a national bank); Cassandra Jones Havard, "Goin' Round in
Circles". . . and Letting the Bad Loans Win: When Subprime Lending Fails Borrowers: The
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regulation in each state is beyond the scope of this article. Still, the
New York bank regulator's approach is instructive. 18 3 Of the state
banking regulators, New York's arguably has the most influence
because it regulates the most financial institution assets.1 84
Moreover, it has a reputation as an aggressive regulator. 8 5
As federal regulators began to integrate reputation risk in the
regulatory framework, so did New York. For foreign bank branches,
the New York Department of Financial Services conducts its
examinations jointly with the Federal Reserve and generally follows
its procedures. 8 6 Thus, when the Federal Reserve began
considering reputation risk, so did New York.1 87
New York's regulatory guidance also discusses reputation risk.
For example, when New York considers a bank's application to offer
a new financial product, the regulator expects the bank to address

Need for Uniform Broker Regulation, 86 NEB. L. REV. 737, 766 (2008) (describing the
supervisory authority of both federal and state regulators).
183 Prior to 2011, New York-chartered financial institutions were regulated by the State of
New York Banking Department. In 2011, the New York State Legislature consolidated the
Banking Department and the Insurance Department into a single entity called the New York
State Department of Financial Services. N.Y. FIN. SERVS. LAW § 102 (McKinney 2018).
184
See Ken Sweet, Wells Fargo under Fire, This Time for Insurance:At Least 3 Lawsuits
FiledAgainst Bank over CarPractices, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 8, 2017, at C2 (calling the New York
Department of Financial Services "a banking regulator with an outsized role in overseeing
the industry because of the number of banks based in New York"); State-CharteredBanks by
State, CONF. OF ST. BANK SUPERVISORS (Oct. 17, 2019), https://www.csbs.org/state-charteredbanks-state (noting New York has 87 state-chartered banks with collectively more than $900
billion in total assets). In addition, New York regulates foreign banking organizations with
U.S. branches or offices located in New York. N.Y. DEP'T OF FIN. SERVS. ANNUAL REPORT 22
(2017), https://www.dfs.ny.gov/docs/reportpub/annual/dfs-annualrpt.2017.pdf
185 See Kristin Broughton, Bad Actors, Beware: N.Y Gov. Cites Wells Fargo in Calling for
'Bold Steps,' AM. BANKER (MAGAZINE), Feb. 1, 2017, at 8 (stating the New York State
Department of Financial Services is "widely viewed as one of the nation's most aggressive
state regulators").
186
See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., EXAMINATION MANUAL FOR U.S.
BRANCHES AND AGENCIES OF FOREIGN BANKING ORGANIZATIONS § 1000.1 (Sept. 1997) (noting

the Federal Reserve's manual was prepared with assistance from the New York regulator
and "reflects general policies and procedures to be used in conducting examination of
individual branches and agencies of foreign banking organizations"); see also Client Update:
The Rise in ForeignBank Enforcement Actions in New York, DEBEVOISE & PLIMPTON, L.L.P.
(July
1,
2013),
https://www.debevoise.com/-/medialfiles/insights/publications/2013/07/the%20rise%20in%2
Oforeign%20bank%20enforcement%20actions%20in%20 /files/view%20client%20update/flI
eattachment/theriseinforeignbankenforcementactionsinnewyork.pdf ("DFS does not have a
separate examination manual, but rather generally follows the approach of the FRB.").
187

See generally BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., supra note 186 (using the

word "reputation" or "reputational" 21 times).
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the reputation risk posed by the product. 188 New York has issued
guidance that subprime mortgage products, 189 derivative
arrangements, 19 1
compensation
incentive
transactions, 190
bank-owned life insurance, 192 cyber fraud,1 93 and debit cards 194 pose
reputation risk.
Consistent with its reputation as an aggressive regulator, some
of the New York regulator's guidance uses a zealous tone. For
example, on payday lending, the guidance states:
Banks that offer [payday] loans may export the interest
rate permitted in their home state. However, banks that
choose to offer this type of loan product at exorbitant
interest rates are blatantly abusing this authority.
These types of actions, when judged in the court of
public opinion, can lead to a groundswell of outrage
resulting in reputational harm and safety and
soundness problems. 195
Similarly, on providing services to gun rights groups, the
guidance states:

188 See generally STATE OF N.Y. BANKING DEP'T, ALL INSTITUTIONS LETTER CONCERNING
BANKING DEPARTMENT PROCEDURES FOR REVIEW AND/OR APPROVAL OF CERTAIN NEW
PRODUCTS OF BANKING ORGANIZATIONS (Jan. 10, 2007), 2007 WL 7950795.
189 See STATE OF N.Y. BANKING DEP'T, STATEMENT ON SUBPRIMEV MORTGAGE LENDING (July

30, 2007), 2007 WL 7950804 (criticizing adjustable rate mortgages targeted to subprime
borrowers with little documentation of borrowers' income).
190 See STATE OF N.Y. BANKING DEP'T, SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE OF PROCEDURE FOR
REVIEW AND/OR APPROVAL OF CERTAIN NEW PRODUCTS/ACTIVITIES OF BANKING

ORGANIZATIONS (Oct. 25, 2010), 2010 WL 9444769 ("[O]ffering and trading complex products
such as derivatives . . . can easily subject the institution to undue risks, including litigation
or reputation risk.").

1n

See STATE OF N.Y. DEP'T OF FIN. SERVS., RE: GUIDANCE ON INCENTIVE COMPENSATION

ARRANGEMENTS (Oct. 11, 2016), 2016 WL 6141359 (explaining, in the aftermath of the Wells
Fargo fake account scandal, that rewarding employees for sales could pose compliance and
reputation risks).
192

See STATE OF N.Y. BANKING DEP'T, GUIDANCE ON BANK OWNED LIFE INSURANCE (BOLI)

PROGRAMS (Jan. 6, 2003), 2003 WL 26454151 (instructing that when a bank purchases
bank-owned life insurance as part of a management compensation program, the amount of
the insurance should be "appropriate" and adequately disclosed to shareholders).
193

See STATE OF N.Y. BANKING DEP'T, INDUSTRY LETTER: ALERT TO INCREASED CYBER

FRAUD THROUGH WEB-BASED PAYMENT SERVICES (Sept. 23, 2010), 2010 WL 9444765 (noting
new FDIC guidance on cyber fraud and its reputational risk).
19

See STATE OF N.Y. BANKING DEP'T, BEST PRACTICES FOR ISSUERS OF DEBIT CARDS (Jan.

1, 2004), 2004 WL 6219932.
195 STATE OF N.Y. BANKING DEP'T, PAYDAY LOANS (June 13, 2000), 2000 WL 36094619.

GEORGLA LAW REVIEW

556

[Vol. 54:523

[T]he Department encourages its chartered and
licensed financial institutions to continue evaluating
and managing their risks, including reputational risks
that may arise from their dealings with the NRA or
similar gun promotion organizations, if any, as well as
continued assessment of compliance with their own
codes of social responsibility. The Department
encourages regulated institutions to review any
relationships they have with the NRA or similar gun
promotion organizations, and to take prompt actions to
manage these risks and promote public health and
safety. 196
In these instances, New York's regulatory guidance discourages
controversial, but otherwise legal, practices due to reputation risk.
IV. ENFORCING REPUTATION RISK

As Part III explains, federal and state bank regulators see
reputation risk throughout banking. Regulators' guidance
recommends that banks consider and manage the reputation risk of
various products, services, and practices. Regulators, of course, do
not just offer helpful tips for running a profitable bank-regulators
are tasked with enforcing the law. In banking, it is especially
important to understand how regulators exercise their enforcement
powers. Enforcement sometimes diverges from regulations1 9 7 and
guidance.198

This Part first discusses regulators' authority to bring
enforcement actions based on reputation risk as well as their public
statements about when enforcement is warranted. It then examines
formal and informal enforcement efforts discussing reputation risk.
This Part concludes that although authority to regulate reputation
is ambiguous, regulators sometimes regulate nonetheless. In most
Vullo Letter, supra note 44.
For example, regulators allow some banks to service state-legal marijuana businesses
even though accepting those funds likely violates anti-money laundering laws. See Julie
Andersen Hill, Banks, Marijuana,and Federalism, 65 CASE WESTERN RES. L. REV. 597, 60717, 632-33 (2015).
198 Julie Andersen Hill & Douglas K Moll, The Duty of Careof Bank Directorsand Officers,
68 ALA. L. REV. 965, 1007-10 (2017) (explaining the FDIC brings negligence claims against
directors of failed banks even though its guidance suggests it does not bring such negligence
claims).
196

197
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enforcement actions, reputation risk is an ancillary consideration to
other practices that violate the law or are financially risky.
Regulators, however, sometimes use reputation risk to justify
enforcement measures when they have no other legal basis for the
action.
A. ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITY

Regulators claim broad enforcement authority over anything
that presents an abnormal risk. Yet courts might overturn
enforcement actions aimed at reputation risk when there is no
significant threat to the financial integrity of the bank.
When regulators want to correct a bank's action they have a
199
to
spectrum of enforcement tools, from cease-and-desist orders,
20 1
200
Regulators can only
to informal actions.
written agreements,
wield these powers when they find an "unsafe or unsound" practice
at the bank, when they find a violation of a statute or regulation, or
when they find a violation of an agreement between the institution
and the regulator. 202 As described in Part III, most regulatory
references to reputation risk are in guidance documents rather than
statutes or regulations. Technically, regulatory guidance is not
203
legally binding and should not be the basis for enforcement.

199 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b)(1) (2012); N.Y. BANKING LAW § 39 (McKinney 2018).
200
12 U.S.C. §§ 1818(b)(1), 1818(e)(1)(A)(i)(IV), 1818(i)(2)(A)(iv), 1818(u)(1)(A) (2012); 12
C.F.R. § 325.2(z) (2018). The New York Department of Financial Services also regularly
enters written agreements, sometimes in conjunction with one of the federal regulators.
201 The regulators acknowledge they have informal regulatory powers outside the formal
tools granted by banking statutes. See FDIC, RISK MANAGEMENT MAN-UAL, supra note 174, at
§ 15.1 (stating that "examiners can use examination comments and supervisory
recommendations

or informal agreements

to correct problems");

FED. RESERVE BANK

EXAMINATION MANUAL, supra note 129, § 5040.1, at 5-6 (noting the regulator can seek
commitments, board resolutions, and memoranda of understanding from regulated
institutions);

OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY,

PPM

5310-3:

BANK

ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS AND RELATED MATTERS 4 (2018) ("The OCC typically first cites a
violation or documents a concern in [a matter requiring attention] in a formal written
communication to address a bank's deficiencies."). For a more comprehensive look at federal
regulators' enforcement tools, see Julie Andersen Hill, Bank Capital Regulation by
Enforcement: An Empirical Study, 87 IND. L.J. 645, 658-63 (2012).
202
12 U.S.C. §1818(b)(1) (2012); see also N.Y. BANKING LAW § 39 (McKinney 2018) (allowing
enforcement orders for violations of law and unauthorized or "unsafe and unsound" practices).
203 See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., NAT'L
CREDIT UNION ADMIN. & OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, FRB SR 18-5 / CA
18-7, FDIC FIL-49-2018, OCC NR 2018-97, INTERAGENCY STATEMENT CLARIFYING THE ROLE
OF SUPERVISORY GUIDANCE (Sept. 11, 2018) [hereinafter INTERAGENCY STATEMENT
CLARIFYING THE ROLE OF SUPERVISORY GUIDANCE] (stating regulators do not take
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Therefore, most enforcement actions aimed at reputation risk would
have to be justified by an "unsafe or unsound" practice. This term
introduces ambiguity.
"The meaning of unsafe or unsound banking practices has been
the subject of some debate because Congress never provided a
comprehensive definition." 204 The federal regulators rely on a
definition provided by John Horne, then-Chairman of the Federal
Home Loan Bank Board:
Generally speaking, an "unsafe or unsound practice"
embraces any action, or lack of action, which is contrary
to generally accepted standards of prudent operations,
the possible consequences of which, if continued, would
be abnormal risk or loss or damage to an institution, its
shareholders, or the agencies administering the
insurance funds. 205
In the OCC's view, there is no requirement that the "abnormal
risk" threaten the viability of the financial institution. 206 Under this
interpretation, regulators can bring enforcement actions for
violations of accepted standards of prudent operations even when
the only harm is increased reputation risk.
Not all courts, however, interpret the phrase "safety and
soundness" so broadly. Some find an unsafe or unsound practice
only if the practice threatens the stability of the financial
institution. In the early 1980s, a federal regulator issued a cease

enforcement actions based on regulatory guidance); see also Nina A. Mendelson, Regulatory
Beneficiariesand Informal Agency Policymaking, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 397, 407 n.58 (2007)
("Courts have struck down agency attempts to bind a regulated entity through a policy or
guidance because those documents failed to conform with APA rulemaking provisions." (citing
Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 208 F.3d 1015, 1020-21 (D.C. Cir. 2000); McLouth Steel
Prods. Corp. v. Thomas, 838 F.2d 1317, 1323 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Cmty. Nutrition Inst. v. Young,
818 F.2d 943, 949 (D.C. Cir. 1987))).
204
Heidi Mandanis Schooner, Big Bank Boards: The Case for Heightened Administrative
Enforcement, 68 ALA. L. REV. 1011, 1021 (2017).
205
FinancialInstitutions Supervisory and InsuranceAct of 1966: Hearingson S. 3158 and
S. 3695 before the H. Comm. on Banking and Currency, 89th Cong. 50 (1966) (memorandum
submitted by John Horne, Chairman of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board) (emphasis
added); see also Gulf Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Fed. Home Loan Bank Bd., 651 F.2d 259, 264
(5th Cir. 1981) (citing the Horne definition).
206
Adams, OCC Docket No. AA-EC-11-50, OCC EA No. N12-001, 2014 WL 8735096, at *3
(Sept. 30, 2014) ("The OCC and the other Federal banking agencies consistently have relied
on [the Horne] definition in bringing enforcement cases in the decades since then.").
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and desist order to Gulf Federal Saving and Loan for failing to
calculate interest on loans in the manner specified in the loan
contracts. 207 The contracts stated that interest would be computed
as if there were 365 days in a year, when in fact interest was
computed as if there were 360 days in a year. 208 Nevertheless, the
contracts had correctly disclosed both the interest rate and the
monthly payments. 20 9 The regulator argued that "entering into
contracts and, thereafter, breaching them was an 'unsafe or
unsound practice"' because the bank faced potential liability for
overcharged interest, and because the practice might result in a
"loss of public confidence" in the bank. 210 The court found that of the
borrowers impacted, "only one noticed the discrepancy," none
"threatened to sue," and "most either signed or were willing to sign
agreements amending the original contract and approving use of the
[365 day] method." 2 11 This left only the potential "loss of public
ssentially reputation risk-to justify the action.
confidence"
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that an
"undifferentiated" increase in reputation risk did not justify an
enforcement action. 2 12 The court explained that the regulator's
interpretation of the safety and soundness standard "would permit
[the regulator] to decide, not that the public has lost confidence in
Gulf Federal's financial soundness, but that the public may lose
confidence in the fairness of the association's contracts with its
customers." 213 Allowing regulators to bring enforcement for
increases in reputation risk without any evidence of reputational
loss would make the regulator "the monitor of every activity of the
association in its role of proctor for public opinion." 2 14
Acceptance of the Gulf Federal holding is mixed. The Third,
Fifth, and District of Columbia Circuit Courts of Appeals have

207

GulfFed., 651 F.2d at 261.

208

Id.

Id. at 262.
Id. at 263-64.
211 Id. at 262.
212 Id. at 264.
213 Id. at 265.
214 Id. The Gulf Federal court left open the possibility that a large loss of confidence like
the one that "engendered the bank failures of the 1930s" would be sufficient to justify an
enforcement action. Id.
209
210
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adopted the Gulf Federal standard. 2 15 They require some threat to
the financial condition of a bank before finding an unsafe or
unsound practice. In addition, the Ninth and Tenth Circuits have
both offered a definition of unsafe or unsound practices requiring "a
reasonably direct effect" on a bank's financial soundness. 216 On the
other hand, the Second, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits have
concluded that Horne's "abnormal risk or loss" definition does not
require a financial threat to the bank. 217
Banks, however, have some control over which circuit decides
their appeals. Appeals of cease and desist actions can be brought "in
the court of appeals of the United States for the circuit in which the
home office of the depository institution is located, or in the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit." 2 18
Because the D.C. Circuit follows Gulf Federal,2 19 banks can choose
to require that regulators have evidence of a threat to the financial
viability of the bank. 220
Notwithstanding the D.C. Circuit's adoption of a standard
requiring a financial threat to the bank, regulators continue to
assert they can bring enforcement actions for increased risk
alone. 22 1 Under an expansive view of the term "unsafe or unsound
215
E.g., Johnson v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 81 F.3d 195, 204 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Seidman
v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 37 F.3d 911, 928 (3d Cir. 1994); First Nat'1 Bank of Bellaire v.
Comptroller of the Currency, 697 F.2d 674, 681 (5th Cir. 1983).
216
See Frontier State Bank Okla. City v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 702 F.3d 588, 604 (10th
Cir. 2012); Simpson v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 29 F.3d 1418, 1425 (9th Cir. 1994).
217
See Gully v. Nat'l Credit Union Admin. Bd., 341 F.3d 155, 165 (2d Cir. 2003); Greene
Cty. Bank v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 92 F.3d 633, 636 (8th Cir. 1996); Cavallari v. Office of
the Comptroller of the Currency, 57 F.3d 137, 142 (2d Cir. 1995); Doolittle v. Nat'l Credit
Union Admin., 992 F.2d 1531, 1538 (11th Cir. 1993); First Nat'l Bank of Eden v. Dep't of the
Treas., 568 F.2d 610, 611 n.2 (8th Cir. 1978).
218
12 U.S.C. § 1818(h)(2) (2012).
219
See Dodge v. Comptroller of the Currency, 744 F.3d 148, 156 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (requiring
evidence that banker misconduct "threaten[ed] the financial integrity of the [Bank]" (quoting
Johnson, 81 F.3d at 204)); Landry v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 204 F.3d 1125, 1138 (D.C. Cir.
2000) ("[A] loss, without more, does not prove that an act posed an abnormal risk ..... (citing
Johnson, 81 F.3d at 204)); Johnson, 81 F.3d at 204 (holding that "[t]he 'unsafe or unsound
practice' provision . . . refers only to practices that threaten the financial integrity of the
association" (quoting GuifFed., 651 F.2d at 267)).
220
See Eric M. Fraser, David K Kessler, Matthew J.B. Lawrence & Stephen A. Calhoun,
The Jurisdiction of the D.C. Circuit, 23 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 131, 147 (2013) (noting
that when there is a non-exclusive jurisdiction statute like the one here "a litigant is likely to
opt for the D.C. Circuit when he believes that Circuit is more likely to reverse an agency
decision than the other available circuits").
221
See Adams, OCC Docket No. AA-EC-11-50, OCC EA No. N12-001, 2014 WL 8735096
(Sept. 30, 2014) (rejecting "Gulf Federal'srestrictive gloss, which requires that a practice
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practice," regulators could eliminate any condition that increases
reputation risk. Indeed, the OCC definition of reputation risk does
not require direct financial harm; it only requires the bank be less
resilient to other risk events in the future. 222
Because regulators make the initial decision about whether to
institute enforcement actions, activities that pose "abnormal"
reputation risk may result in enforcement actions without any
showing of significant risk to the financial condition of the
institution. A bank may be able to successfully appeal such an
enforcement action in the D.C. Circuit, but not all banks will have
the resources or stomach for a protracted legal battle with
regulators that are constantly supervising the bank.2 2 3
B. ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE

Perhaps the ambiguity of regulators' enforcement authority has
tempered regulators' statements about when reputation risk merits
enforcement. Federal regulators have consistently stated that the
focus of reputation risk enforcement is procedural; banks should
monitor and consider reputation risk. 2 2 4 Regulators have even
sometimes promised that, in contrast to other risks, reputation risk
alone will not result in enforcement actions. 22 5

&

produce specific effects that threaten an institution's financial stability"); Keith R. Fisher,
Nibbling on the Chancellor's Toesies: A 'Roguish" Concurrence with ProfessorBaxter, 56 L.
CONTEMP. PROBS. 45, 66 (1993) (noting that banking agencies have not always followed the
Gulf Federal standard in bringing enforcement actions); Thomas L. Holzman, Unsafe or
Unsound Practices:Is the Current Judicial Interpretationof the Term Unsafe or Unsound?,
19 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 425, 440-41 (2000) (arguing that in the personal view of the FDIC
attorney author, the banking agencies are justified in their practice of "hew [ing] closely to the
definition of unsafe and unsound practice articulated in the Horne memorandum").
Regulators may apply an even more lenient standard than "abnormal risk or loss."
Professor Heidi Mandanis Schooner observes that "[s]ome administrative orders depart from
the 'abnormal risk or loss' language and replace it with 'unacceptable risk of loss or damage,'
'undue risk,' 'unnecessary risk,' or any risk 'other than those inherent in doing business,
whether in a bank or elsewhere."' Heidi Mandanis Schooner, FiduciaryDuties' Demanding
Cousin:Bank Director Liability for Unsafe or Unsound Banking Practices, 63 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 175, 195-96 (1995) (citations omitted).
222 See supra notes 125-26 and accompanying text.
223 See infra notes 331-42 and accompanying text (explaining why banks might be hesitant
to challenge their regulators).
224
See infra notes 226-35 and accompanying text.
225
See infra notes 231-35 and accompanying text.

562

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54:523

When federal regulators first adopted risk-based assessments,
they assured banks no major changes were required. 226 Instead the
OCC and the NCUA emphasized that the risk assessment would
help them tailor each institution's examination to its unique risk
profile. 22 7 The Federal Reserve explained its risk review was
designed primarily to ensure banks had adequate risk management
systems consisting of oversight, policies, monitoring, and internal
controls. 228 These, of course, were measures regulators expected of
banks even before the new risk-focused examinations. 229 The OCC
even clarified its examiners would just monitor-not "actively
supervise"-reputation risk. 230
More recently, federal regulators have offered statements
suggesting reputation risk alone will rarely warrant enforcement.
The NCUA's statement is the most definitive. In 2014,
then-NCUA-Chairman Debbie Matz stated the "NCUA neither
pursues enforcement nor otherwise takes action against supervised
federally insured credit unions based on reputation risk alone." 2 3 1
The other federal regulators emphasize banks should consider
reputation risk, but most decisions about reputation risk are

226
See, e.g., Ludwig, supra note 115 ("1 want to be clear ... that we are not requiring banks
to adopt our risk vocabulary or do anything particular with it. The vocabulary is for the use
of our examination team. Armed with the new risk definitions, our examiners will evaluate
the risks present in each national bank.").
227 Id. (explaining the risk evaluations would "feed into the examination strategy for each
bank and allow [the OCC] to focus future supervision on what we deem to be the higher risk
areas within the bank, while limiting our examination of lower-risk areas that bank

management is addressing effectively"); NCUA, RISK FOCUSED EXAMINATION PROGRAM,

&

supra note 120 (explaining that because "[e]xaminers allocate time and apply the most
scrutiny to activities posing the highest risk," regulators may spend less examination time at
the credit union).
228
Risk Assessment: Hearing before the H. Comm. on Banking & Fin. Servs., 104th Cong.
12-14 (1996) (testimony of Richard Spillenkothen, Dir., Div. of Banking Supervision
Regulation, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.).
229
See id. at 13 (explaining that Federal Reserve examiners "have long reviewed internal
controls").
230
Susan F. Krause, Senior Deputy Comptroller for Bank Supervision Pol'y, Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency, Remarks Before the Robert Morris Associates Risk
Management Conference: On Risk Management in Bank Supervision (Dec. 11, 1995) ("We
have had a lot of questions about the identification of strategic and reputation risk as
separate risks. These risks are included in order to have a set of risk categories that represent
the entire risk profile of a bank. We do not actively supervise these two risks, but we need to
consider them in order to do a complete risk assessment."), in 15 OCC Q.J. no. 1, 1996, at
125, 127.
231
Letter from Debbie Matz, Chairman, Nat'l Credit Union Admin., to Jeb Hensarling,
Chairman, H. Comm. on Fin. Servs. (June 12, 2014).
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business decisions to be made by the bank, not the regulator. 232 In
2015 litigation, the OCC explained it "does not prohibit national
banks and federal savings associations from engaging in
transactions and relationships that it identifies as involving greater
reputation risk."2 3 3 Rather, it seeks to ensure banks are properly
monitoring reputation risk.2 34

In litigation, the New York Department of Financial Services
asserts that its strongly worded guidance does not imply it will
punish banks that do business with the NRA. 2 3 5
C. FORMAL ENFORCEMENT

A review of formal enforcement actions mentioning reputation
risk reveals that most are aimed at correcting other problemsoften violations of law or excessive credit risk. When an enforcement
action requires the bank to take remedial measures related to
reputation risk, those remedial measures typically require new risk
management policies or monitoring of reputation risk. There are
some enforcement actions, however, that require remedial action
based on reputation risk alone-one enforcement action is focused
232 The Department of Justice's "Operation Choke Point" Hearing before the Subcomm. on
Oversight & Investigation of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 113th Cong. 13 (2014) [hereinafter
DOJ's Operation Choke Point Hearing] (testimony of Daniel Stipano, Deputy Chief Counsel,
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency) ("We expect banks to assess the risks posed by
individual customers on a case-by-case basis and to implement appropriate controls to
manage their relationships."). On the specific question of reputation risk presented by
customer accounts, the OCC has stated that it only requires banks to cease activity where
"the bank cannot properly manage the risk presented by a customer, or a customer has
engaged in suspected criminal or other illegal activity." Id.; see also id. at 33 (testimony of
Richard J. Osterman, Acting General Counsel, FDIC) ("[A]s long as banks have appropriate
risk mitigation measures in place, we are not going to prohibit or discourage them from doing
business with anyone with whom they want to do business."); id. at 9 (testimony of Scott
Alvarez, Gen. Counsel, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.) ("The decision to establish,
limit or terminate a particular customer relationship is a decision for the banking
organization .... It is not the Board's policy to discourage banking organizations from
offering services to any class of law-biding [sic] financial services customers.").
233 Defendants OCC & Thomas J. Curry's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief at 8, Cmt'y Fin. Servs.
Ass'n of Am., Ltd. v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 132 F. Supp. 3d 98 (D.D.C. 2015) (No. 14-CV00953-TNM).
234
DOJ's Operation Choke Point Hearing, supra note 232, at 13 (testimony of Daniel
Stipano).
235
Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the First Amended
Complaint Pursuant to FRCP 12(B)(6) at 13, Nat'l Rifle Ass'n of Am. v. Cuomo, 350 F. Supp.
3d 94 (N.D.N.Y. 2018) (noting the guidance "did not include or imply any threats of State
action of any kind, whether regulatory or criminal").
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nearly exclusively on reputation risk. 2 36 These latter enforcement
measures are inconsistent with the regulatory statements discussed
above.

The FDIC, Federal Reserve, OCC, and NCUA have all issued
formal enforcement actions involving reputational risk. 2 3 7 These
enforcement actions can be largely grouped into four types.
First, some enforcement actions mention reputation risk, but
require no specific corrective action aimed at reputation risk. In
these cases, enforcement is justified because the bank violated or
was likely to violate the law, or because the bank engaged in some
other unsafe or unsound behavior. In the NCUA's only action
mentioning reputation risk, the Charleston County Teachers
Federal Credit Union made large loans to insiders and then made
little effort to collect them. 2 3 8 Noting this posed reputation risk, the
enforcement action required the credit union to comply with laws
prohibiting lending to officers under terms more favorable than
those offered to the general public. 239 In another instance, the FDIC
entered a cease and desist order to First Asian Bank in Las Vegas,
Nevada. 240 The order criticized the bank for unsatisfactory loan
underwriting, operating losses, inadequate capital, and "operating
with inadequate provisions for liquidity in relation to the bank's
reputation risk in the community." 241 Among other things, the
enforcement action required the bank to hire new management,
appoint independent directors, improve capital ratios, and develop
new lending policies. 242 A number of enforcement actions criticize
banks for failing to maintain adequate procedures to prevent money

236
Bank of Agric. & Commerce, FDIC Order No. FDIC-08-408b, 2009 WL 998563, at *2
(Feb. 19, 2009).
237 To identify enforcement actions involving reputation risk, I searched Westlaw's
database of enforcement decisions for each regulator using variants of the word "reputation."
Because "reputation risk" did not emerge as a regulatory term until 1995, I limited my review
to enforcement decisions after 1994. I manually reviewed the results to sort those involving
reputation risk from others that use the word "reputation." The FDIC, Federal Reserve, and
OCC all have multiple enforcement actions mentioning reputation risk. See infra notes 24363 and accompanying text (providing representative examples of these enforcement actions).
I located only one NCUA action involving reputation risk. See Letter of Understanding and
Agreement by and between the NCUA and Charleston Co. Teachers Fed. Credit Union, 2003
WL 25488457 (June 6, 2003) [hereinafter Letter of Understanding].
238 Letter of Understanding, supra note 237.
239 Id. (citing 12 C.F.R. § 701.21 (2019)).
240
First Asian Bank, FDIC Order No. FDIC-08-239b, 2008 WL 4899137 (Sept. 25, 2008).
241 Id. at *1.
242 Id. at *2.
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laundering, possibly leading to legal, compliance, and reputation
risk. These actions require improved policies and procedures, but do
not specifically mention reputation risk policies. 243 In these types of
enforcement actions, reputation risk is ancillary to the focus of the
order. While the corrective measures might indirectly impact
reputation risk, they are not aimed at reputation risk. These
enforcement actions reinforce the derivative nature of reputation
risk. Indeed, it is hard to imagine a type of enforcement action that
could not plausibly include reputation risk in this manner.
Nevertheless, not all enforcement actions discuss reputation risk.
Although Wells Fargo's practice of opening unauthorized accounts
is widely cited as an example of reputation risk, 244 none of the
enforcement orders it spawned mention reputation risk. 2 4 5
Second, some enforcement actions not aimed at reputation risk
nevertheless require improved policies or monitoring of reputation
46
risk as part of a larger risk management strategy. 2 When the OCC
243 See, e.g., Citigroup Inc., FRB Docket No. 13-004-B-HC (Mar. 21, 2013) (stating the
financial holding company 'lacked effective systems of governance and internal controls to
adequately oversee the activities of the Banks with respect to legal, compliance, and
reputational risk related to the Banks' respective BSA/AML compliance programs"); U.S.
Bancorp, FRB Docket No. 11-027-B-HC (Feb. 28, 2013) (noting the enforcement action was
entered because of the bank and Federal Reserve's common goal "that [the Bank] and its
subsidiaries effectively manage their legal, reputational, and compliance risks"); ABN Amro
Bank N.V., FRB Docket No. 05-035-CMP-FB (Dec. 19, 2005) (stating the Bank "lacked
effective systems of governance, audit, and internal control to oversee the activities of the
Branches with respect to legal, compliance, and reputational risk, and failed to adhere to
those systems that it did have, especially those relating to anti-money laundering policies
and procedures").
e.g., Jonas Sickler, What Is Reputation Risk and How to Manage It,
244 See,

REPUTATIONMANAGEMENT.COM

(Feb.

8,

2019),

(citing the Wells Fargo
https://www.reputationmanagement.com/blog/reputational-risk/
account scandal as "the best example of the impact of reputational risk").
245 See Wells Fargo & Co., FRB Docket No. 18-007-B-HC (Feb. 1, 2018); Wells Fargo Bank,
N.A., OCC Docket No. AA-EC-2016-67, OCC No. 2016-079 (Sept. 6, 2016). The OCC's Office
of Enterprise Governance and the Ombudsman reviewed the OCC's supervision of Wells
Fargo and found the OCC's supervision of reputation risk was lacking because it did not
adequately "considera[ the nature and amount of exposure from customer complaints." OFFICE
OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OFFICE OF ENTERPRISE GOVERNANCE AND THE
OMBUDSMAN, LESSONS LEARNED REVIEW OF SUPERVISION OF SALES PRACTICES AT WELLS

https://www.occ.gov/publications-and2017),
19,
(Apr.
10
FARGO
resources/publications/banker-education/files/lessons-learned-review-of-sup-of-salespractices-at-wells-fargo.html.
246 See, e.g., J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., FRB Docket Nos. 16-22-B-HC, 16-22-CMP-HC (Nov.
17, 2016) (requiring "measures to ensure that senior management periodically reassesses
risks associated with the Firm's Referral Hiring Practices to proactively identify practices
vulnerable to legal and reputational risks" after discovering evidence the firm was hiring
government officials and their relatives in violation of anti-bribery laws); Lender Processing
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brings an enforcement action for credit quality problems, it is
common for the action to require the bank to develop "action plans
and time frames to reduce risks where exposure is high, particularly
with regard to credit risk, which impacts directly on liquidity,
compliance,

strategic,

and reputation risks." 2 4 7

In

other

enforcement actions, banks are instructed to develop liquidity
management plans that will, among other things, "monitor[] the
projected impact on reputation, economic and credit conditions in
the [banks'] market(s)." 248 Finally, in some anti-money laundering
actions, banks are instructed to "consider closing any existing
account of a customer if the information available to the [b]ank
indicates that the customer's relationship with the [b]ank would
be detrimental to the reputation of the [b]ank." 249 In this type of
Servs., Inc., FRB Docket Nos. 11-052-B-SC-1, 11-052-B-SC-2, 11-052-B-SCO3, FDIC Order
No. FDIC-11-204b, OCC Docket No. AA-EC-11-46, OCC EA No. 2011-054, OTS Order
DC-11-039 (Apr. 13, 2011) (requiring a mortgage servicer to develop a risk assessment
program that considers reputation risk after it was discovered the servicer robo-signed
mortgage foreclosure documents); Harvest Bank of Md., FDIC Order No. FDIC-10-349b (July
2, 2010) (requiring that before the bank engages in new activities the board conduct an
assessment that "include[s] identification and monitoring of credit, operating, transaction,
liquidity, market, reputation, strategic, compliance, legal, and other risks"); Written
Agreement by and between Bank of Am., N.A. and the OCC, OCC Docket No. AA-EC-04-35,
OCC EA No. 2005-10 (Feb. 9, 2005) (requiring the bank to develop policies that consider
reputational risk after an investigation into the bank's market timing and late trading
practices); First Bank of N. Ky., Inc., FDIC Order No. FDIC-03-215b (Jan. 6, 2004) (requiring
a strategic plan that identifies "existing credit, interest rate, liquidity, transaction,
compliance, strategic, reputation, price, and foreign currency translation risks, if any, and a
written analysis of those risks to the extent they exist"); Written Agreement by and between
Citibank, N.A. and the OCC, OCC EA No. 2003-77 (July 28, 2003) (requiring the bank to
"[i]mplement
an
appropriate,
formal
internal
process
to
independently
assess reputational and legal risks of each complex structured finance transaction" after a
review of the bank's complex structured finance transactions with Enron).
247
See, e.g., Agreement by and between the Putnam Cty Nat'l Bank of Carmel and the
OCC, OCC EA No. 2006-76 (July 12, 2006); Agreement by and between First Nat'l Bank of
Gonzales and the OCC, OCC EA No. 99-113 (Sept. 9, 1999).
248
Goldwater Bank, N.A., OCC Docket No. AA-EC-10-32, OCC EA No. 2010-092 (May 11,
2010); see also First Nat'l Bank of Edinburg, Tex., OCC Docket No. AA-EC-09, OCC EA No.
2012-004 (Jan. 18, 2012); Amcore Bank, N.A., OCC Docket No. AA-EC-09-46, OCC EA No.
2009-080 (June 25, 2009).
249
Agreement by and between City Nat'l Bank of Fla. and the OCC, OCC EA No. 2010-076
(Apr. 19, 2010) (emphasis added); see also Agreement by and between Citic Ka Wah Bank
Ltd. and the OCC, OCC EA No. 2007-007, 2006 WL 5440479 (Dec. 20, 2006); FirstMerit Bank,
N.A., OCC EA No. 2006-134 (Nov. 20, 2006); Agreement by and between Big Lake Nat'l Bank
and the OCC, OCC EA No. 2005-146 (Oct. 19, 2005). Cf. SunFirst Bank, FDIC Order No.
FDIC-10-845b (Nov. 9, 2010) (requiring a full risk assessment, including reputation risk for
each third-party payment processing account); Regal Fin. Bank, FDIC Order No. FDIC-09558b (Nov. 30, 2009) (requiring a risk assessment, including reputation risk, for each
customer using automated clearinghouse payments); U.S. Trust Corp., 2001 WL 855087 (Fed.
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action, regulators reaffirm reputation risk should be considered
part of the bank's overall risk management strategy. The changes
required by these enforcement actions are essentially procedural, as
opposed to substantive, in nature. This is the most common type of
enforcement action addressing reputation risk.
Third, some enforcement actions not aimed at reputation risk
nevertheless require that banks take remedial action based only on
reputation risk. All of the enforcement actions of this type focus on
money laundering. 250 For example, the OCC found deficiencies in
anti-money laundering policies and practices at Pacific National
Bank, a subsidiary of Ecuador's state-owned Banco del Pacifico. The
enforcement order required the bank to close any customer accounts
that are "detrimental to the reputation . .. of the Bank." 2 5 1 The
FDIC has also required that banks close accounts based on
reputation risk.2 52 Although there are anti-money laundering laws
and detailed regulatory guidance, 253 no statute, regulation, or
agency guidance requires the closure of customer accounts that pose
reputation risk. 2 5 4 These enforcement actions require banks to take
action not required by other law based entirely on reputation risk.

Reserve Bd. July 12, 2001) (requiring an enhanced customer due diligence program "to ensure
effective management and mitigation of reputational and legal risks and compliance with the
BSA and the applicable BSA and SAR reporting provisions").
250 See, e.g., N. Am. Say. Bank, FSB, OCC Docket No. AA-EC-2012-160, OCC EA No. 2013010 (Feb. 1, 2013); United Ams. Bank, N.A., OCC Docket No. AA-EC-10-85, OCC EA No.
2010-210 (Oct. 7, 2010); E. Nat'l Bank, OCC EA No. 2008-038 (June 4, 2008).
251 Pac. Nat'l Bank, OCC Docket No. AA-EC-10-106, OCC EA No. 2010-253 (Dec. 15, 2010)
("The Bank shall not open any account for a customer and shall close any existing account of
a customer if the information available to the Bank indicates that the customer's relationship
with the Bank would be detrimental to the reputation or safety or soundness of the Bank.").
252 For example, the FDIC found Bank Secrecy Act compliance problems with Meridian
Bank's electronic payments program. Meridian Bank, FDIC Order No. FDIC-12-367b (Oct.
22, 2012). The FDIC ordered the bank to develop policies and procedures governing electronic
payments that "include a comprehensive list of entities that present elevated risk or potential
for consumer harm and for which the bank will not process transactions." Id. Earlier in the
action, the FDIC identified legal, compliance, reputation, and fraud as the relevant risks. Id.
Thus, the enforcement action requires policies that require the bank to close accounts
presenting elevated reputation risk.
253
See generally Greg Dekermenjian, Note, Anti-Money Laundering, 25 ANN. REV.
BANKING & FIN. L. 137 (2006) (providing a primer on U.S. anti-money laundering laws and
noting the OCC's anti-money laundering examination manual is more than 300 pages long).
254 This is confirmed by other enforcement actions where the OCC affords the bank more
leeway in deciding whether to close accounts posing reputation risk. See supra note 249 and
accompanying text (discussing enforcement actions where the bank is instructed to "consider"
reputation risk in closing accounts).
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Finally, one enforcement action seems aimed directly at
reputation risk. The FDIC brought an enforcement action against
the Bank of Agriculture and Commerce in Stockton, California
based on the bank's relationship with Petz Enterprises, Inc. 2 5 5
Together, Petz and the Bank "provid[e] electronic deposits for
consumers receiving benefit payments (such as Social Security
payments and other benefit payments) through a direct deposit
program." 256 Petz's account at the Bank received electronic deposits
from the government for consumers. The Bank then provided a
check to the consumer, less fees, that the consumer could pick up at
a payday lender, check casher, or retail merchant. The FDIC's
problem with this practice was that the payday lenders and check
cashers (not the Bank) also provided short term loans. The
consumers would sometimes use nearly the entire benefits check to
pay the loans. "[N] either [Petz] nor the Bank monitored these short
term lending practices related to the consumers in [Petz's] direct
deposit program run through the Bank." 2 5 7 The FDIC stated this
failure to monitor exposed the Bank to "reputational and legal
risk." 2 5 8 While the FDIC mentioned legal risk, the only specific "law"
the FDIC cited was the FDIC's Guidance for Managing Third-Party
Risk. 2 59 The enforcement action does not suggest the Bank lost any
money in connection with the program. Thus, the enforcement
action seems primarily driven by the idea that the Bank's
reputation could be tarnished by doing business with a customer
that does business with payday lenders and check cashers. The
FDIC action ultimately required the Bank to "unwind[] ...

its

benefit payment deposit account business with [Petz]."260
D. INFORMAL ENFORCEMENT

Reviewing public formal enforcement actions gives an incomplete
view of enforcement. Not all enforcement actions are public.
Regulators can keep formal enforcement actions confidential if

255 Bank of Agric. & Commerce, FDIC Order No. FDIC-08-408b, 2009 WL 998563 (Feb. 19,
2009).
256
Id. at *1.
257
Id. at *2.

258

Id.

259

Id.

260

Id. at *4.
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revealing the action "would be contrary to the public interest." 261
Other informal enforcement efforts take place through the
examination proceSS 262-a process that is entirely confidential. 2 6 3 As
part of the examination process, regulators routinely identify
"matters requiring attention," "supervisory recommendations," or
"examiner's findings." 264 Bankers know they "ignore [these
examination statements] at their peril." 2 6 5 Failing to respond to
informal enforcement can lead to formal enforcement. 266 In some
12 U.S.C. § 1818(u) (2012).
See supra notes 132-51 and accompanying text (discussing the reputation risk
evaluations conducted as part of bank examinations).
263 See 12 C.F.R. §§ 4.32(b)(2), 4.36 (2014) (OCC); §§ 261.2(c)(1), 261.20(g), 261.22(e)
(Federal Reserve); §§ 309.5(g)(8), 309.6(a), 350.9 (FDIC); § 792.30 (2014) (NCUA); BD. OF
261
262

GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., OFFICE OF THE
COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OFFICE OF THRIFT SUPERVISION, FRB SR 05-4, FDIC
FIL-13-2005, OCC BULL. No. 2009-15, INTERAGENCY ADVISORY ON THE CONFIDENTIALITY OF
THE SUPERVISORY RATING AND OTHER NONPUBLIC SUPERVISORY INFORMATION (Feb. 28,

&

(citing the criminal
https://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2005/prl805a.html
2005),
penalties associated with revealing examination reports in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 641); see
also Kenneth Culp Davis, Administrative Procedure in the Regulation of Banking, 31 L.
CONTEMP. PROBS. 713, 713 (1966) ("The banking agencies of the federal government have
long maintained systems of secret evidence, secret law, and secret policy."); Margaret E.
Tahyar, Are Bank Regulators Special?, 6 BANKING PERSP., no. 1, 2018, at 23 (noting that
Professor Davis's observation about secrecy in banking regulations "remains fresh today").
264 BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., SR 13-13 / CA 13-10, SUPERVISORY
CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE COMMUNICATION OF SUPERVISORY FINDINGS (June 17, 2013)

("[Matters requiring attention] constitute matters that are important and that the Federal
Reserve is expecting a banking organization to address over a reasonable period of
time....");

FDIC, RISK MANAGEMENT

MANUAL,

supra note

174,

§

16.1

("The

term

'supervisory recommendation' refers to FDIC communications with a bank that are intended
to inform the bank of the FDIC's views about changes needed in its practices, operations or
financial condition."); NCUA EXAMINER'S GUIDE, EXAMINATION REPORT WRITING, supra note

26 ('The Examiner's Findings reflect problems that management must address, but can do
so in the normal course of business."); OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY,
COMPTROLLER'S HANDBOOK: BANK SUPERVISION PROCESS 46-48 (Sept. 2019 ed. 2018)

-

[hereinafter OCC, BANK SUPERVISION PROCESS HANDBOOK 2018] ("The OCC uses [matters
requiring attention] to communicate concerns about a bank's deficient practices.").
Kiah Lau Haslett & Carolyn Duren, Reconsidering Regulatory Warnings, BANKING
266
38
EXCHANGE (Jan. 31, 2018, 2:35 PM), http://m.bankingexchange.com/news-feedlitem/73
reconsidering-regulatory-warnings (quoting banking attorney Jeffery Smith); Guidance,
Supervisory Expectations, and the Rule of Law: How Do the Banking Agencies Regulate and
Supervise Institutions?:Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs,
116th Cong. (2019) (written testimony of Greg Baer, President and CEO, Bank Policy
Institute) (describing how matters requiring attention are "treated as binding regulations or
orders"); FDIC, RISK MANAGEMENT MANUAL, supra note 174, § 16.1-2 (acknowledging
"bankers take seriously supervisory recommendations made by FDIC personnel").
266

See OCC, BANK SUPERVISION PROCESS HANDBOOK 2018, supra note 264, at 49-50

("When a bank's deficiencies are severe, uncorrected, repeat, or unsafe or unsound, or
negatively affect the bank's condition, the OCC may use formal enforcement actions to
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cases, regulators do not even need to document enforcement efforts
to persuade banks to change course. "[T]hreats of prosecution, [or]
even raised eyebrows" can sometimes be "equally effective" as
formal enforcement actions. 267 Only in unusual circumstances will
the public learn about these informal enforcement measures.
In two cases, third parties have sued bank regulators alleging
informal reputation risk enforcement harmed their banking
relationships. Payday lenders sued the FDIC arguing that, as part
of Operation Choke Point, the regulator used reputation risk to
pressure banks to end relationships with payday lenders without
due process of law in violation of the Fifth Amendment. 268 In
addition, the NRA sued the New York Department of Financial
Services, arguing that it used reputation risk to pressure banks to
stop providing services to gun rights advocacy groups in violation of
the NRA's First Amendment free speech rights. 269 Documents in
these cases (and, in the payday lending case, additional disclosures
partly prompted by the publicity of the government's actions)
provide a rare look into the private world of informal reputation risk
regulation. When viewed in combination with the glut of reputation
risk guidance, there is reason to believe that informal enforcement

support the agency's supervisory objectives."); Nicholas R. Parrillo, FederalAgency Guidance
and the Power to Bind: An EmpiricalStudy of Agencies and Industries, 36 YALE J. ON REG.
165, 192-93 (2019) ("If problems caught during the examination are sufficiently bad and go
uncorrected, the agency can bring a public enforcement action that may result in fines,
removal of officers, or ultimately the shutdown of the bank by revocation of its charter.").
267
Jerry L. Mashaw, Reinventing Government and Regulatory Reform: Studies in the
Neglect and Abuse of Administrative Law, 57 U. Pir. L. REV. 405, 420-21 (1996) ("[T]he
banking regulatory agencies can probably be equally effective through threats of prosecution,
even raised eyebrows.").
268 See Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief at 4, 7, Cmty. Fin. Servs. Ass'n of Am.
v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 132 F. Supp. 3d 98 (D.D.C. 2015) (No. 14-CV-953-GK) ("[Tihe
Defendant agencies have . .. pressure[d] the institutions to sever their long-standing and
mutually beneficial banking relationships with members of CFSA and other payday
lenders."); see also Advance Am., Cash Advance Ctrs., Inc. v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 251 F.
Supp. 3d 78, 79 (D.D.C. 2017) (explaining that the plaintiffs alleged federal banking
regulators participated in "a campaign . . . to force banks to terminate their business
relationships with payday lenders"); Cmty. Fin. Servs., 132 F. Supp. 3d at 120 ("Plaintiffs
allege that Defendants engaged in a campaign of backroom pressure against banks and
payday lenders, relying on the definition of 'reputation risk' outlined in the Agency
Documents.").
269
See First Amended Complaint & Jury Demand, supra note 45, at 19-20 ("Defendants'
unlawful exhortations to New York ... banks ... that they, among other things, 'manag[e]
their risks, including reputational risks, that may arise from their dealings with the
NRA .. . constitute[s] a concerted effort to deprive the NRA of its freedom of speech . . . .").
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is used to police reputation risk in the absence of significant
financial harm or violation of law. 2 7 0
1. Operation Choke Point.
In 2014, a group of payday lenders sued the FDIC alleging the
"regulatorf[ . . . with active support from the Department of
Justice[,] ...

engaged in a concerted campaign to drive them out of

business by exerting back-room pressure on banks and other
regulated financial institutions to terminate their relationships
with payday lenders." 271 The complaint asserted that as part of a
DOJ initiative dubbed "Operation Choke Point," the regulators
"target[ed] a variety of lawful businesses that are disfavored by [the
coin
such as firearms and tobacco sales,
regulators],
272
The
dealers, . . . dating services, [and] the payday loan industry."
plaintiffs explained "[t]he ostensible basis of [the regulator's]
campaign against the payday lending industry (and other lawful but
disfavored industries) is that providing financial services to such
273
industries exposes the banks to 'reputation risk."'

The FDIC eventually settled the case by admitting "certain
employees acted in a manner inconsistent with FDIC policies with
respect to payday lenders in what has been generically described as
'Operation Choke Point,' and that this conduct created
misperceptions about the FDIC's policies." 274 Investigations by the
FDIC Office of Inspector General and Republican-led House
Committee on Oversight and Reform similarly found evidence the

See infra Section IV.D.3.
Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief, supra note 268, at 3. The plaintiffs
originally included the Federal Reserve and the OCC as defendants but later dismissed them
from the suit. See Stipulation of Dismissal at 1, Advance Am. Cash Advance Ctrs., Inc. v. Fed.
Deposit Ins. Corp., No. 14-953-TNM (D.D.C. Sept. 24, 2018) (stipulating to the dismissal of
the Federal Reserve); Press Release, OCC, "Operation Choke Point" Lawsuit Dismissed, NR
2019-53 (May 23, 2019) (stating that "the OCC has not entered into any settlement agreement
or made any other concessions to plaintiffs in exchange for their agreement to dismiss all
claims against the agency"). The other federal regulator, the NCUA, was never included in
the suit and categorically denied participating in Operation Choke Point. See Letter from
Debbie Matz to Jeb Hensarling, supra note 231 ("NCUA has not and will not participate in
Operation Choke Point or any similar operation.").
272 Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief, supra note 268, at 3.
273 Id. at 40.
274 Letter from Floyd Robinson, Deputy Gen. Counsel, FDIC, to David H. Thompson,
2019),
22,
(May
PLLC
Kirk,
&
Cooper
Attorney,
https://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2019/prl9O4Oa.pdf.
270

271
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FDIC, citing reputation risk, pressured banks to stop doing business
with payday lenders. 2 75
By all accounts, Operation Choke Point investigations were
spearheaded by the DOJ.276 The goal of the investigations was "to
attack Internet, telemarketing, mail, and other mass market fraud
against consumers, by choking fraudsters' access to the banking
system." 2 7 7 The DOJ issued more than sixty subpoenas to financial

institutions. 2 7 8 It hoped the investigations would cause all banks "to
scrutinize their account relationships and, if warranted, to
terminate fraud-tainted processors and merchants." 2 79
But the DOJ's subpoenas were not without bank regulators'
fingerprints. In fact, a copy of FDIC and OCC guidance on
third-party
payment processing was included with the
280
subpoenas.
These guidance documents emphasized the
reputation risk presented by third-party payment processing. 281 The
275
See generally H. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT & GOV'T REFORM STAFF REPORT, FDIC, supra
note 47; STAFF OF H. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT & GOV'T REFORM, 113TH CONG., THE DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE'S "OPERATION CHOKE POINT": ILLEGALLY CHOKING OFF LEGITIMATE BUSINESSES?
(Comm. Print 2014) [hereinafter H. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT & GOV'T REFORM STAFF REPORT,

DOJ],

https://republicans-oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/Staff-Report-

Operation-Choke-Pointl.pdf; OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., AUD-15008, THE FDIC's ROLE IN OPERATION CHOKE POINT AND SUPERVISORY APPROACH TO
INSTITUTIONS THAT CONDUCTED BUSINESS WITH MERCHANTS ASSOCIATED WITH HIGH-RISK

&

ACTIVITIES (2015) [hereinafter FDIC OIG CHOKE POINT REPORT], https://www.oversight.gov
/sites/default/files/oig-reports/15-008AUD.pdf.
276
See Memorandum from Michael S. Blume, Dir. Consumer Prot. Branch, Dep't of Justice,
to Stuart F. Delery, Ass't Att'y Gen., Civ. Div., Dep't of Justice (Sept. 9, 2013), in H. COMM.
ON OVERSIGHT & GOV'T REFORM, DOJ, supra note 275, at app. 1 HOGR-3PPP000329 to
HOGR-3PPP00340. FIRREA allows the U.S. Attorney General to seek civil penalties from
entities and individuals that have committed fraud "affecting a federally insured financial
institution." Id. (citing 12 U.S.C. § 1833a(c)(2) (2012)).
277
Memorandum from Joel M. Sweet, Ass't U.S. Att'y, to Stuart F. Delery, Acting Ass't
Att'y Gen. (Nov. 5, 2012) (proposing Operation Choke Point), in H. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT
GOV'T REFORM STAFF REPORT, DOJ, supra note 275, at app. 1 HOCR-3PPPOO017.
278 FDIC OIG CHOKE POINT REPORT, supra note 275, at 3 (showing the DOJ issued these
subpoenas "to entities for which the Department determined it had evidence of potential
consumer fraud").
279
Memorandum from Joel M. Sweet to Stuart Delery, supra note 277, at HOGR3PPPOO019.
280
FDIC OIG CHOKE POINT REPORT, supra note 275, at 14 ("DOJ employees informed us
that many of the subpoenas issued pursuant to Operation Choke Point contained copies of
publicly available guidance on payment processors that was issued by the FDIC, the
Department of the Treasury's Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), and the
OCC.").

281

FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., FIIL-3-2012, PAYMENT PROCESSOR RELATIONSHIPS REVISED

GUIDANCE (Jan. 31, 2012) [hereinafter FDIC, PAYMENT PROCESSOR GUIDANCE] ("Deposit
relationships with payment processors expose financial institutions to.. . legal, reputational,
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FDIC's guidance listed "credit repair services, debt consolidation
and forgiveness programs, online gambling-related operations,
government grant or will-writing kits, payday or subprime loans,
pornography, online tobacco or firearms sales, pharmaceutical
sales, sweepstakes, and magazine subscriptions" as high-risk
businesses. 282 The FDIC had also published an article in its
Supervisory Insights journal listing thirty types of high-risk
businesses, including dating services, firearms sales, home-based
charities,
payday
loans,
pornography,
racist
materials,
2 83
telemarketing, and tobacco sales.

Reports soon surfaced that banks, in response to regulatory
pressure about reputation risk, had closed accounts of lawful
businesses. Payday lenders, 284 firearms retailers, 285 porn stars, 286

and other risks, including risks associated with a high or increasing number of customer
complaints . . . ."); OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OCC BULL. No. 2008-12,
PAYMENT PROCESSORS: RISK MANAGEMENT GUIDANCE (Apr. 24, 2008) ("Banks should also

consider carefully the legal, reputation, and other risks presented by relationships with
processors including risks associated with customer complaints, returned items, and
potential unfair or deceptive practices.").
282

FDIC, PAYMENT PROCESSOR GUIDANCE,

supra note 281

(noting the list is "not

all-inclusive").
Deposit Ins. Corp., Managing Risks in Third-Party Payment Processor
283 Fed.
Relationships, SUPERVISORY INSIGHTS, Summer 2011, at 6 (warning that "[i]n those instances
where examiners determine that a financial institution fails to have an adequate program in
place to monitor and address risks associated with third-party payment processor
relationships, formal or informal enforcement actions may be appropriate").
284 See Danielle A. Douglas, Banks to Payday Lenders: Quit the Business or We'll Close Your
Account, WASH. POST, Apr. 11, 2014, at A13 (reporting two instances where a bank told a
payday lender its account would be closed due to regulatory pressure); Zibel & Kendall, supra
note 40 (noting regulators were pressuring banks to discontinue payment processing services
for payday lenders citing reputation risk).
285
See Chuck Ross, Audio Tapes Reveal How Federal Regulators Shut Down Gun Store
PM),
2:51
2015,
14,
(Jan.
CALLER
DAILY
Accounts,
Bank
Owner's
http://dailycaller.com/2015/01/14/audio-tapes-reveal-how-federal-regulators-shut-down-gunstore-owners-bank-accounts/ (reporting NCUA pressure to close the account of a gun store).
28
See Andy Peters, Porn Account Closures Show Banks Erring on Far Side of Caution,
AM. BANKER (May 12, 2014, 4:01 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/porn-accountclosures-show-banks-erring-on-far-side-of-caution (detailing the stories of at least two porn
stars whose accounts were closed because of federal regulators' pressure).
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churches, 2 87 coal mines, 288 and condom companies complained. 289
Payday lenders, who appeared to be at the center of the enforcement
target, sued. 290 Members of Congress became concerned that bank
regulators were working with the DOJ to cut off banking access to
legal industries. They held hearings, 29 1 collected documents, 292 and
requested that the FDIC Office of Inspector General conduct an

investigation. 2 9 3
Documents gathered in the investigations reveal the FDIC's
strategy to get banks to end third-party payment processing
relationships with risky industries. The first step was to write the
Supervisory Insights article identifying risky businesses. 294 The
next step was to issue guidance-a Financial Institutions Letter. 295
The letter would be followed with additional instruction for

287
See Sheila Tendy, Opinion, De-Risking Threatens Religious Access to Banking Services,
AM. BANKER (Jan. 27, 2015, 12:00 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/de-riskingthreatens-religious-access-to-banking-services (reporting that a bank had closed the account
of a church with cash donations and some cross-border transactions because the church "'just
didn't fit with the model of the kind of entity' that the bank wanted to do business with").
288 See DOJ's Operation Choke Point Hearing, supra note 232, at 29-30 (statement of Rep.
Andy Barr reading correspondence from a landowner whose bank, citing regulatory pressure
over reputation risk, was closing an account because the landowner leased property to a
surface coal mine).
289
See Zach Carter, What Do ChaseBank, Condoms, The Tea Party, and Petty FraudHave
in
Common,
HUFFINGTON
POST
(Mar.
29,
2014,
5:58
PM),
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/bank-petty-fraud-n_5055720
(reporting JPMorgan Chase
had declined to open an account for a condom company citing federal regulations on what
kind of businesses they could work with).
290
Advance Am., Cash Advance Ctrs., Inc. v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 257 F. Supp. 3d 56,
56 (D.D.C. 2017).
291 E.g., DOJ's Operation Choke Point Hearing, supra note 232, at 29-30; see also The
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation'sRole in Operation Choke Point: Hearing before the
Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 114th Cong. (2015)
[hereinafter FDIC'sRole in Operation Choke Point Hearing].
292

H. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT & GOV'T REFORM STAFF REPORT, FDIC, supra note 47, at 2-3

(noting that at Congress's request "the Justice Department produced 853 pages of internal
memoranda, communications, and presentations on Operation Choke Point" and the FDIC
"provid[ed] over 7,500 pages of internal communications, memoranda, and official
correspondence with supervised institutions").
293 Letter from Blane Luetkemeyer, et al., Members of Congress, to Fred W. Gibson, Acting
Inspector
General,
FDIC
(Oct.
23,
2014),
https://1uetkemeyer.house.gov/
uploadedfiles/10_23_14_fdicletter.pdf.
294
E-mail from Frank A. Hartigan, Deputy Reg'l Dir., FDIC, to Mark Pearce, Dir. Div. of
Depositor & Consumer Protection, FDIC and Sylvia H. Plunkett, Sr. Deputy Dir. Div. of
Depositor & Consumer Prot., FDIC (Apr. 17, 2011), in H. CoMM. ON OVERSIGHT & GOV'T
REFORM STAFF REPORT, DOJ, supranote 275, at app. 1 FDICHOGRO002582.
295 See id.
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examiners and a telephone conference call with banks discussing
the guidance. 296
Documents also show that the FDIC used reputation risk to
pressure banks to end relationships with payday lenders. 29 7 In one
instance, a bank asked regulators about its relationships with a
payday lender. The FDIC Field Supervisor in the Atlanta Region
noted the relationships would trigger "in-depth" Bank Secrecy Act
and information technology reviews by the FDIC. 2 9 8 The Field
Supervisor also warned that "[e]ven under the best circumstances,
if this venture is undertaken with the proper controls and strategies
to try to mitigate risks, since your institution will be linked to an
organization providing payday services, your reputation could
suffer." 299 This suggests that the FDIC did not think there were
ways for the bank to adequately mitigate reputation risk while still
providing services to payday lenders. 300
The documents show the informal enforcement efforts to stop
banking services to payday lenders were not focused on violations
of law or significant financial consequences to banks. If they had
been, there would have been no need to justify them on the basis of
reputation risk. The FDIC relied on reputation risk because it had
no other justification. 301 As one field supervisor wrote: "In the end
we are getting [a bank] out of [ACH processing for a payday lender]
through moral persuasion and as you know from a legal perspective

296

See id.

297

See H. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT & GOV'T REFORM STAFF REPORT, FDIC, supra note 47, at

1, 8 (finding the FDIC had "targeted legal industries," particularly payday lenders); see also
FDIC OIG CHOKE POINT REPORT, supra note 275, at 12 (finding "two instances in which the
FDIC [cited reputation risk to] discourage[] institutions from providing ACH processing to
payday lenders in written communications to the institutions"). Admittedly, the number of
instances of reputation risk enforcement uncovered by the Office of Inspector General Report
is small, which is not surprising given the limited scope of the investigation. See id. at 48
(noting the investigation was limited to reviewing regulatory efforts at twenty-three banks
that provided services to "high-risk" customers). Moreover, because "[t]he FDIC does not
centrally track its written communications to financial institutions that involve ACH
processing concerns," the Office of Inspector General was "unable to determine how often"
communication discouraging ACH processing had occurred. Id. at 12.
298 See H. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT & GOV'T REFORM STAFF REPORT, FDIC, supra note 47, at
13 (highlighting the problems regarding relationships with payday lenders).
299

Id.

See id. (noting the troubles banks face in mitigating payday lender risk).
See FDIC OIG CHOKE POINT REPORT, supra note 275, at 27 (noting that the payday
lender relationship "posed no significant risk to the institution, including financial,
reputation, or legal risk").
300
301
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we don't have much of a position, if any." 3 0 2 In another e-mail, an
FDIC official explained that officials in San Francisco had hoped to
bring more formal enforcement actions against banks with
third-party payment processing relationships; the effort had stalled,
however, because "[l]egal was a major obstacle." 303
The FDIC turned to informal enforcement of reputation risk
because it did not like payday lenders. One FDIC official wrote: "I
literally can not [sic] stand pay day lending. They are abusive,
fundamentally wrong, hurt people, and do not deserve to be in any
way associated with banking." 304 Others described payday lending
as "unsavory"3 0 5 and "a particularly ugly practice."3 0 6
How far the FDIC's informal enforcement extended beyond
payday lending is unclear. Initially, the FDIC Office of Inspector
General did not find evidence of reputation risk enforcement aimed
at accounts of other high-risk businesses. 30 7 But it did find "a
perception among some bank executives ... that the FDIC
discouraged institutions from conducting business with [high-risk]
merchants." 308 The Office of Inspector General also announced it
would conduct a follow-up investigation examining tax refund
anticipation loans. 309 Although refund anticipation loans "were not
on the [FDIC's] high-risk list," the Office of Inspector General
"observed that the FDIC's supervisory approach to institutions that
offered this type of credit product involved circumstances that were
similar to those that prompted" the Operation Choke Point
investigation. 3 1 0
The follow-up investigation found FDIC examiners had used
Operation Choke Point-like tactics to coerce banks to stop offering
302

Id.

E-mail from Frank A. Hartigan to Mark Pearce, supra note 294.
E-mail from Thomas Dujenski to Mark Pearce, supra note 47.
30 See E-mail from Redacted, Counsel, Legal Div., Consumer Enft Unit, FDIC, to
Marguerite Sagatelian, Senior Counsel, Consumer Enft Unit, FDIC (Aug. 28, 2013)
(comparing payday lending to pornography and gambling), in H. COMm. ON OVERSIGHT
GOV'T REFORM STAFF REPORT, FDIC, supra note 47, at 11.
306
E-mail from Redacted, Counsel, Legal Div., Consumer Enft Unit, FDIC, to Marguerite
Sagatelian, Senior Counsel, Consumer Enft Unit, FDIC (Mar. 8, 2013), in H. COMM. ON
303

&

3

OVERSIGHT & GOV'T REFORM STAFF REPORT, FDIC supra note 47, at 10.
307 See FDIC OIG CHOKE POINT REPORT, supra note 275, at 11 ("We found no evidence that
the FDIC used the high-risk list to target financial institutions.").
308 Id. at 11-12 (noting that "[t]his perception was most prevalent with respect to payday
lenders").
3
Id. at 14.
310

Id. at 13.
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tax refund anticipation loans. 311 In letters to three banks, the FDIC
warned:
We find that [refund anticipation loans] are costly and
offer limited utility for consumers as compared to
traditional loan products. They also carry a high degree
of risk to an institution, including third-party [,]
reputation[,] compliance[,] and legal exposures. These
risks may expose the bank to individual and class
actions by borrowers and local regulatory authorities.
Consequently, we find [refund anticipation loans]
unacceptable for the bank. 312
The FDIC followed the letters with "what it termed 'strong moral
suasion' to persuade . . . the banks to stop offering [refund

anticipation loans]. What began as persuasion degenerated into
meetings and telephone calls where banks were abusively
threatened by an FDIC attorney." 313 After two of the three banks
had already stopped offering tax refund anticipation loans, the
FDIC "deploy[ed] an unprecedented 400 examiners to examine 250
tax preparers throughout the country and the remaining bank
offering [refund anticipation loans]."314 This show of strength was
"used as leverage in negotiations to get the final bank to exit [refund
anticipation loans], . . . but for little else."31 5
The FDIC pursued this aggressive enforcement strategy even
though refund anticipation loans "were, and remain, legal

a1, FDIC OIG REFUND ANTICIPATION LOANs REPORT, supra note 49, at iii (describing the
FDIC's use of "strong moral suasion" and threats). The FDIC Office of Inspector General did
not release its report on tax refund anticipation loans, citing the "sensitive information" it
contained. Instead, the Office of Inspector General released an executive summary of the
report. Id. Additional information about the Office of Inspector General's tax refund
anticipation loan investigation can be gleaned from a congressional hearing on the topic. See
generally The FDIC's Targeting of Refund Anticipation Loans, Hearing before the Subcomm.
on Oversight & Investigationsof the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 114th Cong. (2016) [hereinafter
Refund Anticipation Loan Hearing].
312 Refund Anticipation Loan Hearing, supra note 311, at 22 (statement of Rep. Randy
Hultgren quoting letter language). This language is very similar to language sent to banks
pressuring them to end relationships with payday lenders. Compare id. with FDIC OIG
CHOKE POINT REPORT, supra note 275, at 26 (examining a letter sent from the Chicago
Regional office to a bank regarding the need to end relationships with payday lenders).
313

FDIC OIG REFUND ANTICIPATION LOANS REPORT, supra note 49, at iii.

314

Id.

315

Id.
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activities" and, as the FDIC Office of Inspector General found, there
was no "significant examination-based evidence of harm caused by
the [refund anticipation loan] programs." 316 Somewhat ironically,
the Office of Inspector General concluded that the FDIC's
enforcement tactics caused "reputational damage to the banks"
involved. 3 17
The investigations surrounding Operation Choke Point show
that regulators sometimes rely on reputation risk as an enforcement
tool when a bank is not violating the law. They also show that
regulators sometimes turn to reputation risk even when the
regulator does not believe the financial institution faces a serious
financial threat.
2. Gun Advocacy Groups.
The other lawsuit involving informal regulation of reputation
risk was brought by the NRA after the New York Department of
Financial Services issued a guidance letter instructing banks to
consider reputation risk when providing banking services to gun
rights groups. 318 According to the lawsuit, the New York regulator
"coerce[d] .

.

. banks into terminating business relationships with

NRA." 3 19

the
The complaint alleges the guidance letter and
"accompanying backroom exhortations" made it clear that banks
must terminate relationships with the NRA and other gun rights
groups.320

The NRA also noted that the press releases accompanying the
gun advocacy guidance praised "businesses [that] have ended
relationships with the NRA." 3 2 1 New York Governor Andrew Cuomo
made it clear he had directed the Department of Financial Services
to issue the guidance calling "gun safety . .. a top priority for every
individual, company, and organization that does business across the
state." 3 2 2

He

later

emphasized:

"The

NRA

is

an

extremist

organization. I urge companies in New York State to revisit any ties

316

Id. at ii.

317

Id.

318

Vullo Letter, supra note 44.

319

Original Complaint & Jury Demand, supra note 45, at 17.
Id. at 1, 22, 25, 30.
Press Release, N.Y. Dep't of Fin. Servs., supra note 48.
Id. (quoting Governor Cuomo).

320
321
322
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and

responsibility to the public." 32 3

The New York Department of Financial Services denies it
engaged in any "backroom exhortations" aimed at chilling the
NRA's gun rights advocacy. 324 It claims the guidance letter is not
binding and was "plainly intended to convince companies to work
toward 'positive social change' without threat of regulatory
action." 325

The case has not yet reached a resolution. 326 It remains to be seen
whether the NRA can prove its allegations of informal reputation
risk enforcement. The New York Department of Financial Services
does not seem eager to provide information about its regulatory
activities in discovery. 327 Even if there is significant discovery, we
may not learn much more about the regulatory process because the
parties have agreed to a protective order. 328
3. Guidance as Evidence of Informal Enforcement.
It is not surprising there is little direct evidence regarding
informal reputation risk enforcement. Informal enforcement is, by

.

323 Andrew
Cuomo (@NYGovCuomo),
TWITTER (Apr. 20, 2018, 11:58 AM),
48
https://twitter.com/NYGovCuomo/status/9873597638256148
324 Answer at 30, 33-34, 36-37, 47, Nat'l Rifle Ass'n of Am. v. Cuomo, 350 F. Supp. 3d 94
(N.D.N.Y. 2018).
325 Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the First Amended
Complaint Pursuant to 12(B)(6), supra note 235, at 36.
See Nat'? Rifle, 350 F. Supp. 3d at 119 (denying New York's motion to dismiss the NRA's
326
First Amendment freedom of speech claim and stating that "[w]hile the NRA may not be able
to establish the factual predicates for these claims, it has presented sufficient allegations to
allow them to go forward"). The court dismissed claims that the NRA brought under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 and claims for money damages against the Division of Financial Services and Governor
Cuomo and Superintendent Vullo in their official capacities. Nat'l Rifle Ass'n of Am. v.
Cuomo, No. 18-CV-0056, 2019 WL 2075879 (N.D.N.Y. May 10, 2019).
327 For example, the New York Department of Financial Services sought to prevent the
NRA from deposing Maria Vullo, the former Superintendent at the New York Department of
Financial Services who had issued the guidance letter, but U.S. Magistrate Judge Christian
Hummel ruled Ms. Vullo could be deposed. Nat'l Rifle Ass'n of Am. v. Cuomo, No. 18-CV00566-TJM-CFH, 2019 WL 2918045, *5 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 2019). The regulator also to seeks
prevent the NRA from discovering documents related to "research, analyses, models, or
estimates developed or complied by DFS regarding 'reputational risks."' Nat'l Rifle Ass'n of
Am. v. Cuomo, No. 18-CV-0056-TJM-CFH, 2019 WL 3765929 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 8, 2019)
(concluding the requested documents are relevant and ordering the Division of Financial
Services to produce the documents for in camera review so that the court can determine
whether attorney-client or work product privileges apply).
328 Nat'l Rifle Ass'n of Am. v. Cuomo, No. 18-CV-00566-TJM-CFH, slip op. at 1 (N.D.N.Y.
Apr. 24, 2019).
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design, private. 329 It receives public scrutiny only in unusual
circumstances. But the lack of direct evidence does not mean that
informal reputation risk enforcement does not routinely occur. In
fact, it is likely that the deluge of ostensibly unenforceable
reputation risk guidance operates as de facto reputation risk
enforcement.
Bankers frequently complain that regulators treat unenforceable
guidance as binding. 330 As part of a recent study, Professor Nicholas
Parrillo interviewed bank regulators, banking attorneys, and a
former consultant in the consumer finance industry.3 3 1 He found
that banks' "intense" and ongoing interactions with their regulators
provide powerful motivation to comply with even non-binding
guidance. 332 Banks are repeat players with their regulators. 333 They
need to maintain good relationships with regulators to be
profitable. 334 A former regulator who now advises banks recalled an
examiner who "criticized [a] .

.

. bank for a regulatory violation by

citing an article that he (the examiner) had written in the Federal
Reserve's magazine. The interviewee and her colleagues thought
this was improper. But the bank opted not to resist, saying, 'we don't
want to fight with our examiner."' 335 She explained regulators "can
'make life miserable' for a bank in all sorts of ways, and
noncompliance on one dimension can have bad consequences on
other dimensions." 336
See supra notes 262-63 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., John Heltman, Next on Banks' Reg Relief Wish List: More Consistent Exams,
AM. BANKER (Nov. 19, 2018, 2:03 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/next-onbanks-reg-relief-wish-list-more-consistent-exams ("Greg Baer, CEO of the Bank Policy
Institute, said banks routinely complain that supervisors flag things amounting to
organization preferences, not safety and soundness threats. Examiners cite guidance as the
basis for 'Matters Requiring Attention' or 'Matters Requiring Immediate Attention,' Baer
said, even though agency leaders insist disobeying guidance is not grounds for punitive
action.").
331
See Parrillo, supra note 266, at 192-95 (describing interviews with these people).
33
Id. at 194.
333 Id. at 192-93; Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Turning a Blind Eye: Why Washington Keeps
Giving in to Wall Street, 81 U. CIN. L. REV. 1283, 1418 (2013).
334 A former Federal Reserve official who now counsels banks told Professor Parrillo: "If I
am a depository institution . . . I have a great need to make sure that [the regulators] like
329
330

me . . . . If you lose the trust of the regulations nothing else matters[;] . . . there is no salvaging

that." Parrillo, supra note 266, at 194.
33
Id. at 195.
336 Id. Another banking attorney explained it this way:
[R]egulators can possess the memories of elephants. Even if they allow you
to escape the axe today, they can nip and scratch at you over an extended
period of time, worrying you with criticisms small and large. You can die
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Moreover, banks operate in a regulatory system where perfect
compliance is unattainable. As Professor Parrillo explains:
The rationale for generally following guidance, said [a
former Federal Reserve official], is that it is practically
impossible for a bank to comply with all legislative rules
all the time, so you want the examiner to think that any
mistakes you make were made in a good-faith effort to
comply. In particular, the bank must show that it has
internal procedures in place to check itself, the presence
of which can show that any problems the bank has are
not systemic; these internal procedures are patterned
on agency bulletins (guidance), but it doesn't matter if
these bulletins are "guidance or [legislative rules] or
what."

337

Another of Professor Parrillo's interviewees explained that
guidance itself is a way for regulators to change bank behavior,
short of formal enforcement. 338 Just as "parents can often get their
children to change behavior by informal means ('raising an eyebrow'
rather than 'spelling out rules'), . . . an agency can [change bank
behavior] through guidance."3 3 9 Personnel throughout the agency
then reinforce the guidance's message informally through the bank
examination process. 340

from a saber thrust through the throat, or you can slowly bleed to death of a
thousand tiny cuts. It can be decades before your supervisory personnel are
ready to retire on their government pensions ....
Kevin Funnell, Martyrdom Postponed, BANK L. BLOG (Oct. 29, 2012, 9:47 PM),
https://www.banklawyersblog.com/3_bank_1awyers/2012/10/martyrdom-postponed.html.
331 Parrillo, supra note 266, at 195.
33

Id.

339

Id.
In interagency guidance, regulators have stated they "do not take enforcement action

340

based on supervisory guidance." INTERAGENCY STATEMENT CLARIFYING THE ROLE OF
SUPERVISORY GUIDANCE, supra note 203. However, the guidance further explains that

[d]uring examinations and other supervisory activities, examiners may
identify unsafe or unsound practices or other deficiencies in risk
management, including compliance risk management, or other areas that do
not constitute violations of law or regulation. In some situations, examiners
may reference (including in writing) supervisory guidance to provide
examples of safe and sound conduct, appropriate . . . risk management
practices, and other actions for addressing compliance with laws or
regulations.
Id. This use of the guidance reinforces the message that banks should follow the guidance.
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This is not to say that banks never challenge guidance. Still, this
is rare unless there is "a lot of money at stake and following the
guidance would .

.

. constrain the bank on something core to its

model." 34 1

Even the process of departing from guidance is
business
"delicate" because in escalating the matter up the examination
chain of command, the bank risks the "bad consequences" of "ticking
off' its examiner. 342
Professor Parrillo's observations about bank guidance accurately
describe how both regulators and banks view reputation risk
guidance. Indeed, the OCC's definition of reputation risk identifies
"regulators" as important stakeholders whose perceptions
matters. 343 This emphasizes the danger in departing from
regulators' wishes. 344 Furthermore, the Operation Choke Point
documents show that bank fears about escalating informal
enforcement are valid. Banks that did not cut off relationships with
payday lenders or end tax refund anticipation loans after reading
regulatory guidance faced follow-up warnings and intensified
regulatory scrutiny. 345
In this regulatory environment, reputation risk guidance serves
as an informal enforcement measure. When guidance warns banks
about the reputation risk of lending to oil and gas companies, or
providing payment services to payday lenders, or dealing with gun
promotion organizations, we can expect most banks to get the
message and cut off services. If they do not, examination staff may
emphasize the guidance using other informal enforcement means.
Banks will be especially unwilling to fight regulators over

Professor Parrillo identifies a number of factors that encourage regulators to be
inflexible in their application of guidance. Among them are pressures for consistency, costs
associated with evaluating departures, costs of obtaining agency approval for departure, and
superiors' institutional motivations to affirm subordinates. See Parrillo, supra note 266, at
231-57.
341 Parrillo, supra note 266, at 195.
342
Id. at 255.
OCC, LARGE BANK SUPERVISION HANDBOOK 2018, supra note 26, at 64.

Bank regulators are likely aware of guidance's coercive power. Certainly, the regulators
and former regulators Professor Parrillo interviewed seemed aware of the power of guidance.
Parrillo, supra note 266, at 178, 192-95. Nevertheless, Professor Parrillo concludes that "even
when regulated parties are strongly pressured, or when officials are inflexible, this is
normally not because agency officials are engaged in some sort of bad-faith effort to coerce
the public without the legally required [administrative] procedures." Id. at 174. Regardless
of regulators' intent, the result is the same: regulatory guidance about reputation risk coerces
banks into taking action they would not otherwise take. Id.
345 See supra notes 297-300, 313-15 and accompanying text.
3"
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third-party reputation risk when the third parties impacted are
small industries with whom the bank does little business. The
coercive power of guidance combined with the power dynamic
within the regulatory relationship compels this result.
V. AGAINST REPUTATION REGULATION

As regulators see it then, the concept of reputation risk is quite
expansive and, consequently, the power to regulate is quite broad.
Reputation risk exists in every aspect of banking. 346 Regulators
claim authority to regulate reputation risk even when there is no
significant financial harm and no violation of statute or
regulation. 347 By defining themselves as one of the relevant
stakeholder groups, regulators may raise reputation risk even if
348
In
they are the only ones troubled by a particular practice.
addition, regulators note reputation risk might be caused by untrue
349
or
information beyond the control of the financial institution
3 50
While publicly
third-party conduct unrelated to banking.
available enforcement actions do not show that regulators routinely
exercise the full range of power they claim, there are examples of
enforcement aimed at reputation risk without further justification
35 1
and without significant threat of serious financial consequence.
In addition, the rapid deployment of reputation risk throughout
federal regulatory guidance 352 and recent regulatory efforts aimed
354
and gun
at payday lenders, 353 tax refund anticipation loans,
355
suggest that regulators may be more aggressive in
rights groupS
their regulation of bank reputation in the future.

See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
See supra note 221 and accompanying text.
See Peter Weinstock, Opinion, Bank Think: Examiners'Growing Misuse of 'Reputation
34
AM),
2013,
9:00
2,
BANKER
(July
AM.
Risk,'
https://www.americanbanker.com/opinionlexaminers-growing-misuse-of-reputation-risk
(noting that "parties outside the bank (examiners?) can define reputation risk by their
perceptions"); supra note 124 and accompanying text (discussing the OCC's expansive
definition of relevant stakeholders).
349 See supra notes 127-28 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 171-72 and accompanying text.
350
35
See supra notes 257-62, 298-307 and accompanying text.
346
34

352

See supra Part III.

363

See supra Section IV.D.1.
See supra notes 309-17 and accompanying text.
See supra Section IV.D.2.

354
355
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This is the wrong path for regulators. First, regulation focused
specifically on reputation risk does little to alleviate panics or
reduce moral hazard. In most cases, reputation risk is derivative to
other risks directly addressed by banking law. When reputation risk
occurs without other risks, regulators have difficulty accurately
predicting when it will arise. Second, by expansively regulating
reputation risk, regulators could damage their own reputations and
introduce systemic risk. This makes regulation less effective as a
substitute for bank reputation and makes the entire banking
industry less stable.
Regulators, courts, and legislatures can all take measures to
limit the regulation of reputation risk. Of these, Congress is best
positioned to broadly and permanently curtail bank reputation
regulation.
A. REPUTATION REGULATION IS INEFFECTIVE

The nature of reputation risk makes it difficult to regulate in a
way that adds meaningful value to the regulatory system.
Reputation risk is often a derivative risk.3 5 6 Because bank
regulators have broad powers over other more direct risks,
reputation risk often does little work. When Wells Fargo employees
illegally opened unauthorized accounts, they violated the law and
created reputation risk.3 5 7 When banks violate anti-money
laundering laws, they create reputation risk. 35 8 When banks have
credit quality problems, they create reputation risk. 359 Enforcement
actions in those situations do not need to be grounded in reputation
risk. Enforcement can be grounded in other law. Reputation risk
adds little to the regulatory toolbox.
If reputation risk regulation is going to have a useful impact, it
must operate in areas not already covered by existing banking law.
The trouble is that the nature of reputation risk makes it difficult
for regulators to assess. 360 Regulators themselves sometimes
See supra notes 64-71 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 1-8, 244-45 and accompanying text.
38
See supra notes 108, 243, 250-54 and accompanying text.
359
See supra notes 65, 241, 247 and accompanying text.
36o
See Rolland Johannsen, Opinion, ReputationalRisks Are Heightened by Tense Political
Climate, AM.
BANKER
(Feb. 22,
2017),
https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/
reputational-risks-are-heightened-by-tense-political-climate ("Of all the risks facing banks,
reputational risk is the most difficult to anticipate, measure and manage."); Viveca Ware,
Questioning
?Reputational' Risk,
INDEP.
BANKER
(Sept.
26,
2014),
356
3
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36
acknowledge reputation risk is difficult to identify and measure. 1
The most difficult of all reputation losses to predict and avoid are
probably those caused by untrue statements. These days
"consumers, competitors, disgruntled former employees" need
362
nothing more than the internet to quickly spread misinformation.
While banks and their regulators are well aware of this type of
threat, there is little they can do to predict or prevent it. There are
laws to discourage third-parties from lying about banks, 363 but these
measures do not allow regulators to peer into the minds of third
parties to determine when they might lie. Even armed with
reputation risk regulation as a tool, regulators will be unable to
prevent runs like the one at Jiangsu Sheyang Rural Commercial
Bank in China. Certainly, as Jiangsu Sheyang did, a bank can take
measures to ameliorate harm after an incomplete, inaccurate, or
false statement is discovered. 364 However, once liquidity concerns
arise, regulators have other tools to manage liquidity risk.3 6 5 Again,
reputation risk regulation adds little value.
Even in circumstances where the reputation risk arises from
accurate information, it is not clear that regulators are able to
effectively forecast reputational losses. Reputation is based on ever
changing stakeholder values and social expectations. Values can

http://independentbanker.org/2014/09/reputation-reputation/ ("Unlike other types of risk
(credit, market, liquidity, operational and legal), reputational risk is highly subjective and
difficult to measure.").
361 See, e.g., OCC, RISK ASSESSMENT SYSTEM, supra note 125 (noting that "measuring the
quantity of [reputation] risk remains difficult"). This 2015 Bulletin was incorporated into
OCC, LARGE BANK SUPERVISION HANDBOOK 2018, supra note 26, and other OCC publications,
but this particular language does not appear to have been retained. See OFFICE OF THE
COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OCC BULL. NO. 2018-18, COMPTROLLER'S HANDBOOK:
REVISED AND UPDATED BOOKLETS AND RECESSIONS (June 28, 2018).
362 Whitney Gibson & Jordan Cohen, Internet Defamation and the Banking Industry,
32
.html.
BANKERS' STATEMENT (Winter 2016), https://www.vorys.com/publications-16
crime to make a
it
a
making
by
banks
about
lies
discourage
363 Louisiana and Mississippi
false statement that is "calculated to injure" a bank's "reputation or businesses." LA. STAT.
ANN. § 6:930 (2017); MISS. CODE ANN. § 81-12-199 (2017). Defamation laws may also
discourage third parties from making untrue statements. Robert F. Somers, Slander? Prove
It: Why a Two Hundred-Year-Old Defamation Law Should Be Changed, 19 SW. J. INT'L L.
133, 173 (2012).
See supra notes 19-24 and accompanying text (discussing the Jiangsu Sheyang bank
3

run).

a65 See 12 C.F.R. § 50.2 (2015) (allowing the OCC to require additional liquidity based on
the circumstances of an individual bank). The availability of other regulatory tools once losses
manifest themselves probably explains why the regulators have focused their reputation risk
guidance on anticipating and preventing harm rather than on remediating reputational
harm. See supra Parts III & IV (discussing reputation risk guidance and enforcement).
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''evolve" slowly or expectations may adjust abruptly under the
spotlight of media attention. 366 When Bank of America sparked
Bank Transfer Day by instituting a $5 monthly fee for debit cards,
Wells Fargo had already instituted a $3 fee. 3 6 7 Nevertheless, "Bank
of America received the brunt of the criticism." 368 It seems unlikely
that Bank of America's regulators could have accurately predicted
the negative press and reputational impact. As one bank industry
consultant explains, "[t]here's almost no way to predict how
customers are going to react" to corporate scandals or negative
press. 369
Anticipating reputation losses may be even more difficult for
regulators when the negatively perceived behavior is not directly
attributable to the bank. Regulatory guidance cautions that banks
may incur reputational harm if they do business with gun rights
groupS 37 0 or oil companies that might be "perceived by the public to
be negligent in preventing environmental damage."3 7 1 Indeed,
regulators
warn that any third-party
relationship poses
reputational risk, even when the perceived negative actions of the
third party do not relate to the banking relationship. 3 72
Transferring reputation risk from third parties to banks in these
circumstances is a three-step process. First, the third party must be
perceived negatively. Second, bank stakeholders must transfer that
negative perception from the third party to the bank. Third, the
negative stakeholder perception must not be offset by other benefits
from the relationship. Regulators have trouble assessing the risk in
each of these steps.
Certainly, regulators can identify some industries subject to
frequent public criticism (although the reputational risk to these
industries themselves has yet to drive them from the market). If the
aim of regulators, however, is to warn banks about any potentially

Walter, supra note 69, at 42.
Aaron Passman & Palash Ghosh, Bank TransferDay Returns, but Will LightningStrike
Twice?, CREDIT UNION J., Oct. 3, 2016, at 1.
368 Id.
369 Tom Groenfeldt, Calculating Elusive Reputation Risk-A Task for a Dartboard?,
FORBES
(Mar.
13,
2018,
1:41
PM),
https://www.forbes.comlsites/tomgroenfeldt/2018/03/13/calculating-elusive-reputationalrisk-a-task-for-a-dartboard/#3e313d6b2951 (quoting Danielle Tierney, senior analyst at Ait6
Group).
370 See Vullo Letter, supra note 44; supra note 196 and accompanying text.
366

367

371
372

See OCC, OI AND GAS LENDING HANDBOOK, supra note 51, at 17.
See e.g., FDIC, THIRD-PARTY RISK GUIDANCE, supra note 28, at 3.
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problematic customer or industry, the guidance falls short. Some
controversial groups have, so far, escaped regulatory attention. 373
Furthermore, any industry or third-party partner could at some
point be perceived negatively. 374 A restaurant might serve tainted
food. An airline might have a fatal crash. A once-thought-safeproduct may be found to cause cancer. Banks and regulators would
expend insurmountable resources to monitor every third-party
customer or partner for possible reputation risk to the bank. Both
must make some assessment that many businesses and people with
their own reputational risks do not pose significant risk as a bank
customer or partner.
Bank regulators, though, are not well suited to determine when
a third party's reputational damage will be transferred to a bank.
In areas where regulators have indicated broad reputational
concerns arising from third parties, like fossil fuels, guns, and
payday loans, there is little evidence that reputation risk alone has
ever caused a bank material loss-let alone a run or panic. If
third-party reputation risk caused material bank losses, we would
likely see some evidence of it in the press, in regulatory
enforcement, and perhaps in studies of bank failures. We do not.
Instead, press reports tend to show some unhappy stakeholders, but
no material impact on bank health. 375 Regulatory enforcement
373 See William M. Isaac, Opinion, DOJ's 'Operation Choke Point': An Attack on Market
AM),
10:00
2014,
21,
(Mar.
BANKER
AM.
Economy,
https://www.americanbanker.comlopinion/dojs-operation-choke-point-an-attack-on-marketeconomy (noting the same justifications for regulating third-party relationships with payday
lenders could be used to choke off banking services to "convenience stores selling large sugary
sodas, restaurants offering foods with high trans-fat content or family planning clinics
performing abortions"); Todd Zywicki, "OperationChoke Point,"WASH. POST (May 24, 2014,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokhPM),
2:17
(noting the FDIC's list of high-risk
conspiracy/wp/2014/05/24/operation-choke-point/
businesses did not include "abortion clinics, radical environmental groups, or ... marijuana
shops").
374 Derek E. Bambauer, Against Jawboning, 100 MINN. L. REV. 51, 123 (2015) ("Reputation
risk is seemingly boundless: any entity that suffers bad publicity and that does business with
a depository institution potentially creates legally actionable risk for that bank.").
37
On the issue of fossil fuels, Well Fargo's financing of the Dakota Access Pipeline is
probably the most criticized action, but it did not jeopardize Well Fargo's financial condition.
A "Defund DAPL" webpage encouraged individuals, cities, and tribes to move money from
banks financing the pipeline. #DEFUNDDAPL, www.defunddapl.org (last visited Jan. 24,
2020). It asked those that closed accounts to provide information about the size of accounts
closed, and reports banks lost $4.324 billion in city deposits. Id. Other sources report that the
Defund DAPL webpage gathered information suggesting individuals moved $86.2 million

&

from the participating banks. CARLA F. FREDERICKS, MARK MEANEY, NICHOLAS PELOSI
KATE R. FINN, FIRST PEOPLES WORLDWIDE U. COLO. BOULDER, SOCIAL COST AND MATERIAL
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officials sometimes tepidly acknowledge there is no reason to
suspect financial loss from third-party activities. 376 And bank
failure reports do not mention reputation risk.3 7 7 While past

performance does not necessarily predict future results, it seems
that material reputational losses from third-party relationships are
so rare that regulators have few guideposts to help them predict
future loss.
Finally, regulators are not well-positioned to determine whether
the reputational harm might be offset by benefits, or whether the
reputational harm of one course of action is less than the
reputational harm of alternative actions. Each bank has many
different stakeholder groups. 378 These stakeholder groups do not
necessarily have the same public perception of the bank or its

Loss: THE DAKOTA ACCESS PIPELINE 39 (Nov. 2018),

https://www.colorado.edulproject/

fpiep/sites/default/files/attached-files/social cost and material loss.pdf. It is not clear
whether this crowd-sourced data gathered by an advocacy group is reliable. For example,
although the City of Seattle initially intended to close its account, it ended up maintaining
its account with Wells Fargo. See Ashley Stewart, Back on the Wagon: Here's Why Wells Fargo
Continues to Be Seattle's Best Banking Option, PUGET SOUND Bus. J. (Feb. 8, 2019, 6:00 AM),
https://www.bizjournals.com/seattle/news/2019/02/08/city-council-wells-fargo-contract-dappublic-bank.html (noting few banks qualified for the contract and other banks were worried
about the vague social responsibilities set by Seattle). However, even assuming the data is
reliable and the closures were entirely attributable to Wells Fargo, the result -is not material.
In 2017, Wells Fargo reported $1.3 trillion in average total deposits. Wells Fargo & Co. (Form
10-K), at 1 (2017).
Even Wells Fargo's account scandal does not appear to have "led to serious financial
harm that imperiled [the] bank's solvency." Greg Baer, Rethinking Safety and Soundness
Supervision, 5 BANKING PERSP. no. 3, 2017, at 42, 44. One way to see this is to look at Wells
Fargo's credit default swap spread. As Greg Baer explains:
Over the past 10 years, Wells Fargo's [credit default swap] spreads, like those
of other companies, have varied based on economic and financial conditions.
However, the "reputational risk" of the [account] scandal clearly has proven
immaterial to those spreads. At all points since the issue first came to light
on September 8, 2016, however, spreads have remained significantly below
their 10-year average. Indeed, they remain near their 10-year lows.
Id.
376
See supra notes 302-03 and accompanying text.
377 A search of the FDIC Office of Inspector General reports prepared after bank failures
does not yield any instances where the failure of the bank was attributed to reputation risk,
let alone third-party reputation risk. Reports ofBank Failures,FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE
CORPORATION OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, https://www.fdicoig.gov/reports-bank-failures

(last visited Jan. 24, 2020).
378 See, e.g., OCC, LARGE BANK SUPERVISION HANDBOOK 2018, supra note 26, at 64
(identifying "customers, counterparties, correspondents, investors, regulators, employees,
and the community" as bank stakeholders).
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decisions.379 For example, shareholders might like a fee that
generates income, while customers would prefer not to pay the fee.
Even individuals within the same stakeholder group do not
necessarily perceive the bank in the same manner. 380 This means a
bank might face criticism regardless of the course of action it
takes. 38 1 Moreover, all banks do not have the same stakeholder
bases. The depositors of some banks may care about things quite
different from the depositors of another banks. 382 Shareholders of
one bank might be troubled by a practice that shareholders of
another bank endorse.
Lending to the fossil fuel industry provides one example of how
difficult it can be to assess the reputational impact of various
decisions. As we see with the criticism over Wells Fargo's financing
of the Dakota Access pipeline, lending for fossil fuel projects can
sometimes spark negative stakeholder backlash. 383 But the opposite
is also true. In 2018, Bank of the West announced it would not
finance a variety of fossil fuel projects. 384 Although the Sierra Club
(an environmental advocacy group) immediately praised the
379 Violina P. Rindova & Luis L. Martins, Show Me the Money: A Multidimensional
Perspective on Reputation as an Intangible Asset ("[T]he same firm can have different
reputations for different attributes with different stakeholders because specific types of
actions are perceived and valued differently by different stakeholder groups."), in THE

OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE REPUTATION, supra note 78, at 16, 20; Eccles, Newquist

& Schatz, supra note 62, at 4 ("Of course, different stakeholders' expectations can diverge
dramatically, which makes the task of determining acceptable norms especially difficult.").
Cf. CLAIRE A. HILL & RICHARD W. PAINTER, BETTER BANKERS, BETTER BANKS:
3
PROMOTING GOOD BUSINESS THROUGH CONTRACTUAL COMMITMENT 2-3 (2015) (suggesting

institutional bank customers view "some sorts of problematic behavior [as] a sign of
intelligence and skill," while individual customers do not).
381 For example, after liberal groups criticized advertisers on Sean Hannity's Fox News
Channel program, USAA (parent company of USAA Bank) announced it was pulling its
advertising there. David Bauder, USAA Reverses Course, Puts Ads Back on 'Hannity,'
HOUSTON CHRON., May 31, 2017, at B2. USAA's decision led to "heavy criticism . . . from
many of the military members and veterans that it serves." Id. USAA eventually reversed
course and reinstated the advertising. Id.
382 See Chris Nichols, Is Your Bank a Democrat or Republican?, CENTERSTATE
CORRESPONDENT DIVISION (Nov. 7, 2016), https://csbcorrespondent.com/blog/your-bankdemocrat-or-republican (explaining that because "[p]ockets of Republicans and Democrats
are not evenly dispersed and neither are [bank] branches," it is likely that different banks
skew Republican or Democrat).
383 See supra notes 12-18 and accompanying text.
384 Bank Dropping Oil, Gas Investment, Bos. HERALD, Aug. 13, 2018, at 15 (stating that
Bank of the West will "no longer finance oil and gas exploration or production projects in the
Arctic," "coal mines or coal-fired power plants that are not actively involved in the energy
transition," and "companies whose main activity is tied to oil and gas from shale or tar
sands").
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decision, 385 many with economic ties to fossil fuels were not happy.
In Craig, Colorado, Bank of the West branch manager Stacy
Razzano resigned because she was worried about the impact of the
bank's move on her community. 386 The Wyoming state government
and some cities announced plans to end deposit relationships with
Bank of the West. 3 8 7 Some retail depositors in Wyoming were also
upset. The Wyoming press reported that Bank of the West's
competitors were 'crazy busy' opening new accounts." 388 Reliant
Federal Credit Union, a four-branch financial institution based in
Casper, Wyoming, 389 put up a large sign welcoming energy
workers. 390
On controversial issues, bank regulators are ill-equipped to
determine which course of action will result in the least negative
reputational impact for any particular financial institution. Wells
Fargo, Bank of the West, Reliant Federal Credit Union, and other
financial institutions talk with their customers and employees
every day. Banks interact with their shareholders, business
partners, community members, and local press. When they need
more information about customers or potential customers, they
might conduct market research. This gives banks some basis for
assessing the reaction of stakeholders and making decisions about
whether actions are likely to harm the overall reputation of the
bank. In contrast, regulators rarely talk to customers, employees,

sK Sarah Skidmore Sell & Mead Gruver, Bank of the West's Environmental Stand Faces
Blowback,
ASSOCIATED
PRESS
(Aug.
10,
2018),
https://apnews.com/Oe7dlb7aad3b4a4c994c89893cO2e3e7 ("Ben Cushing, campaign manager
for the Sierra Club's Beyond Dirty Fuels campaign, said this is an example of the growing
movement to defund fossil fuels. 'Banks that continue with business as usual will soon be left
behind,' he said.").
38
See Valerie Richardson, Bank of the West's Climate Change Mission Fuels Coal Country
Backlash,
WASH.
TIMES
(Aug.
14,
2018),
https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2018/aug/14/bank-west-climate-change-stancefossil-fuel-reject/ (noting Ms. Razzano was "a self-described 'coal miner's daughter"').
387
Sell & Gruver, supra note 385 ("State Treasurer Mark Gordon threatened ...
to stop
depositing with the bank certain state funds intended to encourage local lending. The state
has deposited $63 million with Bank of the West in Wyoming through the program over the
years.").
388 Mary Stewart, War over Coal, Gas Hits Bank: Bank of the West Parent'sPolicy Faces
Backlash,
DOUGLAS
BUDGET
(Aug.
15,
2018),
http://www.douglasbudget.com/news/articleacee32a6-aOd3-1 1e8-9ca8-63497eca806d.html.
m9 About Us, RELIANT FED. CREDIT UNION, https://www.reliantfcu.comlaboutlindex.shtml
(last visited Jan. 24, 2020).
89 Stewart, supra note 388.
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shareholders, or community members. 39 1 Thus, banks are better
positioned than regulators to make already difficult decisions about
the reputation risks posed by their activities.
This is not to suggest that banks, if left to their own devices, will
always make the correct calculation with respect to reputation risk.
They will not. Banks make incorrect decisions for a variety of
reasons, some rather innocent 392 and others more corrupt. 393 To the
extent banks make incorrect decisions because they failed to
adequately consider reputation risk, regulatory guidance and
enforcement encouraging banks to consider reputation risk might
be helpful. 394 Beyond this, though, regulation of reputation risk does
little to prevent bank runs and panic or reduce moral hazard.
Regulators already have a variety of tools to stop corrupt and

s91 Of all the types of examinations, those for compliance with the
Reinvestment Act ("CRA") are the ones most focused on customers and
experiences. As part of that exam, regulators conduct interviews with "local
contacts" to, among other things, "[u]nderstand perceptions on the performance

Community
community
community
of financial

institutions in helping to meet local credit needs." See OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE
CURRENCY, COMPTROLLER's HANDBOOK: COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT EXAMINATION

https://www.occ.treas.gov/publications/publications-by8
(May 1999),
PROCEDURES
type/comptrollers-handbook/cra-exam-procedures/pub-ch-cra-exam-procedures.pdf.
Regulators "conduct CRA exams for banks with assets above $250 million once every two
or three years. Banks with assets below $250 million undergo CRA exams once every four or
five years." John Taylor & Josh Silver, The Community Reinvestment Act at 30: Looking Back
and Looking to the Future, 53 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 203, 205 (2008/09). Credit unions are not
examined for CRA compliance. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 2902-03 (2012) (excluding credit unions from
the definition of financial institutions covered by the CRA).
392 As previously explained, reputation risk is difficult to predict. Therefore, even diligent,
well-meaning managers will sometimes make incorrect decisions. It would not be reasonable
for banks to avoid every action that might result in some harm to reputation. See Michael
Alix, Senior Vice President, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Remarks at the Risk USA 2012
2012),
14,
(Nov.
Conference
2
(noting that banks
1114
https://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/2012/alixl
should not have "a zero tolerance for reputational damage [because] it is impossible to operate
without absorbing some reputational risk").
39 See Walter, supra note 69, at 44 (noting that "[p]erformance-driven managers, through
compensation and other incentives, it is argued, have sometimes encouraged behavior that
has inflicted major reputational damage on their firms and destroyed some of them").
394 Even warning about reputation risk may not help the stability of the banking industry.
Evidence from other fields suggests that when people are repeatedly warned about situations
posing little risk, they might discount all warnings, including warnings of serious dangers.
See Lisa A. Robinson, W. Kip Viscusi & Richard Zeckhauser, Consumer WarningLabels Aren't
Working, HARV. Bus. REV. (Nov. 30, 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/11/consumer-warning-labelsarent-working (discussing warnings about mercury in seafood). If this held true for banks,
repeated regulatory warnings about reputation risk might distract banks from adequately
managing more serious risks.
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financially dangerous conduct. 395 When reputation risk arises in
situations not covered by other regulatory tools, it is unlikely
regulators will be able to accurately predict reputation risk.
B. DANGERS OF POLITICIZATION

Regulation of bank reputation risk is not just ineffective; it is
dangerous. Recall that bank regulation acts as a partial substitute
for bank reputation. Regulation, however, only works when
regulators have a reputation for effectiveness. 39 6 Regulators, like
the banks they regulate, can tarnish their reputation through action
or inaction that causes stakeholders to negatively adjust their
perception of the regulator. 397 And because the banking industry is
relying on the reputation of its financial regulators to attract
deposits, regulator reputation risk can hurt the industry.
Regulating bank reputation risk can hurt regulators' reputations by
politicizing them. Stakeholders who previously thought of
regulators as apolitical experts might have less confidence in a
politicized regulator.
Although the structure of bank regulators varies somewhat, each
has features providing insulation from political pressure. 3 98 For
example, regulators set their own budgets and do not rely on
legislative appropriations. 399 Most top officials can only be removed
for cause. 400 The FDIC and NCUA are led by boards with members
6 See supra notes 357-59 and accompanying text.

See supra notes 94-98 and accompanying text.
Moshe Maor, Theorizing BureaucraticReputation, in ORGANIZATIONAL REPUTATION IN
THE PUBLIC SECTOR 12, 24 (Anid Weraas & Moshe Maor eds., 2014).
398 See HENRY B. HOGUE, MARC LABONTE & BAIRD WEBEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
R43391, INDEPENDENCE OF FEDERAL FINANCIAL REGULATORS: STRUCTURE, FUNDING, AND
OTHER ISSUES (2017) (noting regulator independence is designed to "make policy making
more technical and less 'political' or 'partisan"'); see also Neil Devins & David E. Lewis, NotSo-Independent Agencies: Party Polarizationand the Limits of InstitutionalDesign, 88 B.U.
L. REV. 459, 463 (2008) (noting that political insulation is "intended to facilitate a
non-political environment where regulatory experts can apply their knowledge to complex
policy problems").
399 The FDIC and NCUA are funded primarily by deposit insurance premiums. HOGUE,
LABONTE & WEBEL, supra note 398, at 27. The OCC is funded with fees paid by regulated
banks. Id. The Federal Reserve also charges fees and earns income from securities and loans
that it holds. Id. State bank regulators are also funded through fee assessments on banks,
rather than with appropriations. Christine E. Blair & Rose M. Kushmeider, Challenges to the
Dual Banking System: The Fundingof Bank Supervision, 18 FDIC BANKING REV. 1, 6 (2006).
400 According to statute, the President may remove members of the Federal Reserve Board
of Governors "for cause." 12 U.S.C. § 242 (2012). Statutes governing the FDIC and NCUA do
not specify grounds for removal, but it is generally thought that these officials can only be
3

397
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from both political parties. 4 0 1 These designs are intended "to free
policymaking from political interests, allow it to be set in reliance
on objective scientific facts, and avoid the delays and distortions of
politics." 4 0 2 The structures bolster regulators' credibility as
apolitical experts.
Federal bank regulators value being perceived as apolitical and
work to cultivate reputations as technocratic experts that do not
pander to political pressures. 403 The OCC, for example, instructs:
The integrity and effectiveness of the examination
process depends upon its being kept completely free
from any appearance of being influenced by political
considerations ... . Thus, OCC employees should have
no communications with national banks or federal
savings associations that could be perceived as
suggesting that the examination process is in any way
influenced by political issues or considerations, or that
the bank or savings association should take a particular
position on political or legislative issues. 404

removed for cause. See HOGUE, LABONTE & WEBEL, supra note 398, at 16 ("In other cases, the
for cause removal standard for independent agency heads was not explicitly set out by
Congress, but is understood to exist under legal precedent." (citing Weiner v. United States,
357 U.S. 349 (1958))); Charles Kruly, Essay, Self-Funding and Agency Independence, 81 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1733, 1747 (2013) (noting that "it is unclear whether the absence of a statutory
for-cause removal provision would bar a court from assuming that such protection exists").
Of the federal regulators, only the Comptroller serves at the pleasure of the President. See 12
U.S.C. § 2 (2012) (stating that the Comptroller may be "removed by the [P]resident, upon
reasons to be communicated by him to the Senate").
401 12 U.S.C. §§ 1752a(b), 1812(a)(2) (2012). The Federal Reserve does not have a bipartisan
balance requirement. Id. § 242. But the multi-member board structure of the Federal Reserve
may nevertheless "limitf] the President's power to immediately remake the agency in his or
her own image." Kruly, supra note 400, at 1748.
402
Adam J. Levitin, The Politics of FinancialRegulation and the Regulation of Financial
Politics:A Review Essay, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1991, 2038 (2014).
40 Id. at 2000.
404

See OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OCC ETHICS RULES-A PLAIN

https://careers.occ.gov/careers/apply/occ-ethics-rules-a-plain-englishGUIDE,
ENGLISH
guide.html#ethics-rules (last visited Nov. 6, 2019); see also FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., RMS
MANUAL OF EXAMINATION POLICIES § 1.1 (2018) ("FDIC employees should avoid any form of
political communication with insured depository institutions that could be perceived as
suggesting the examination process is influenced by political considerations, or that the bank
should take a particular position on legislative issues. Examinations must be kept free from
political considerations, or the appearance of being influenced by political considerations, in
order to maintain the integrity and effectiveness of the examination process.").
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FDIC Chairman Jelena McWilliams recently stated that under
her leadership, "the FDIC's oversight responsibilities will be
exercised based on our laws and our regulations, not on personal or
political beliefs." 40 5 After Federal Reserve Chairman Jerome Powell
had dinner at the White House, the Federal Reserve issued a
statement reaffirming its independence. 4 0 6
Regulating reputation risk threatens to upset the reputation of
regulators as apolitical. Broad definitions of reputation risk invite
regulatory scrutiny of political factors not directly related to bank
safety and soundness. This is especially true when regulators take
action based on regulatory risk alone (without a violation of the law
or the likelihood of serious financial impact). One need not look far
for examples of reputation risk regulation perceived as political.
Payday loans, guns, and fossil fuels are all hot button political
topics. Regulators' use of reputation risk to address these issues has
drawn accusations of political abuse. 407 When regulators "throw
themselves into highly emotional debates," they incur reputational
damage. 408
If bankers perceive regulators as politicized, banks may be more
difficult to regulate. To properly supervise banks, regulators rely on
bankers' willingness to share information. Nevertheless, bankers
who believe that regulation is clouded by partisanship may be less
willing to share information. 409 Bankers who believe that regulation
40
Letter from Jelena McWilliams, Chairman, FDIC, to Blaine Luetkemeyer, Member,
House
of
Representatives
(Nov.
15,
2018),
https://1uetkemeyer.house.gov/uploadedfiles/fdic-response-to rep._1uetkemeyer.pdf.
40
Gina Heeb, Janet Yellen Is Concerned about Trump's Public Criticism of the Fed. She's
Not
the
Only
One,
BUS.
INSIDER
(Feb.
8,
2019,
10:09
AM),
https://markets.businessinsider.comlnews/stocks/trump-fed-criticism-concerns-janet-yellenothers-2019-2- 1027937340.
4
See Examining Regulatory Relief Proposalfor Community FinancialInstitutions, Part
II: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. & Consumer Credit of the H. Comm. on Fin.
Servs., 113th Cong. 149, 156 (2014) (statement of William M. Isaac, Senior Managing
Director, FIT Consulting, Inc., former chairman FDIC) (noting reputation risk has "been a
major factor in shifting the banking agencies from their primary role as guardians of the
safety and soundness and stability of the financial system to amorphous financial social
welfare agencies"); see also Letter from Jeb Hensarling, Chairman, H. Comm. on Fin. Servs,
to Janet Yellen, Chair, Bd. of Governors Fed. Reserve Sys. (May 22, 2014) ("The introduction
of subjective criteria like 'reputational risk' into prudential bank supervision can all too easily
become a pretext for the advancement of political objectives, which can potentially subvert
both safety and soundness and the rule of law.").
408 See Maor, supra note 397, at 24.
409

See GARY J. MILLER & ANDREW B. WHITFORD, ABOvE POLITICS: BUREAUCRATIC

DISCRETION AND CREDIBLE COMMITMENT 176 (2016) (observing that regulators use their
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is driven by politics may also be less willing to follow regulatory
rules and guidance without significant regulatory oversight.4 1 0 In a
politicized environment, regulators may have to spend more
resources to achieve the same level of compliance with bank safety
and soundness laws.
At the same time, regulating reputation risk diverts resources
from banking safety and soundness to reputation. 411 At regulators
headed by bipartisan boards, polarization of some regulation might
impede decision-making as a whole. 4 12 This may also lead to worse
regulatory outcomes. 413 Over time, this could result in a loss of
confidence in bank regulators and the banking system, followed by
destabilization, and even runs and panics. 4 14 In a politicized
regulatory environment, banks may also have to divert resources
from safety and soundness concerns (or customer service) to instead
adjust operations to the reputational concerns of each new
presidential administration. 4 15
Finally, reputation risk regulation may force banks to take
positions that increase their reputation risk. In the past, many
banks chose to minimize reputation risk by maintaining customer

reputations as 'long-term, culture-bound professionals" to gather needed information from
financial institutions).
410 See Ephraim Clark & Octav Jokung, The Role of Regulatory Credibilityin Effective Bank
Regulation, 50 J. BANKING & FIN. 506, 509 (2015) (noting that "[wihen the regulatory system
is perceived as credible, intervention dictates will be observed with a minimum of oversight").
411 See Sharon Gilad, Political Pressures, OrganizationalIdentity and Attention to Tasks:
Illustrations from Pre-Crisis Financial Regulation, 93 PUB. ADMIN. 593, 594-95 (2015)
(noting that when regulators have multiple tasks they must choose how to prioritize those
tasks).
412 See generally Brian D. Feinstein & M. Todd Henderson, Pathways of Power: The Rise of
Hill Staffers-Turned-Commissioners (Univ. of Chi., Working Paper No. 703, 2019),
https://papers.ssrn.comlsol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=3338092 (noting anecdotal evidence of a
more dysfunctional decision-making process at regulatory boards after an increase in
politicization).
See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Bank Failure:The Politicizationofa Social
413
Problem, 45 STAN. L. REV. 289, 292 (1992) ("As regulatory agencies become more responsive
to popular opinion, the regulatory process becomes more guided by political expediency than
by economic reality.").
414
Cf. MILLER & WHITFORD, supra note 409, at 191 (concluding that politicization of the
Office of Thrift Supervision caused "the loss of belief in the agency's willingness and ability
to make professional decision" and ultimately resulted in the four largest institutions
supervised by the regulator failing in the same year).
415
See Edward J. Balleisen & Melissa B. Jacoby, Consumer Protection after the Global
Financial Crisis, 107 GEO. L.J. 813, 814 (2019) (noting that the "controversial" Operation
Choke Point "was particularly vulnerable to a change in presidential administration and
political climate").
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privacy and avoiding political statements on issues not directly
related to banking. 416 Bank stakeholders largely seemed content
with the arrangement. 4 17 But when regulators begin scrutinizing
reputation risk, banks are forced to rethink their risk calculus.
Banks must weigh the possibility of damaging their reputation with
regulatorS 418 against the possibility of reputational harm from
taking a political position. And because regulators are not as well
situated as banks themselves to evaluate competing reputation
risks, 419 complying with reputation risk guidance or regulation may
increase reputation risk for some banks.
Some may discount the harm from politicization caused by
reputation risk regulation. They may note that financial regulators
are not in fact politically neutral. 420 Even seemingly technical rules
(for example bank capital requirements) can have politically
important consequences, such as influencing the price and
accessibility of banking services. 42 1 If all banking laws are to a
certain extent political, what is the harm of reputation risk
regulation that explicitly considers political consequences? Why
allow bank regulators to make some politically important decisions
but not others?
The answer is that we allow bank regulators to make decisions
with politically important consequences when the decisions are
416 Rolland Johannsen, Opinion, Reputational Risks Are Heightened by Tense Political
Climate,
AM.
BANKER
(Feb.
22,
2017,
12:00
PM),
https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/reputational-risks-are-heightened-by-tensepolitical-climate ("[B] anks have avoided taking public positions on broader political ... issues.
Instead, they have focused their political activity on those issues that directly impact the
bank or the industry. The reasons are straightforward. Most banks serve a broad, politically
diverse customer base, and have an equally diverse group of employees.").
417 See Rolland Johannsen, Opinion, Managing Reputation Risk Is Getting More
Complicated,
AM.
BANKER
(Apr.
22,
2019,
10:28
AM),
https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/managing-reputation-risk-is-getting-morecomplicated ("Historically, few people have known, or even cared, if a particular bank was
doing business with a specific company or financing a specific project.").
418
See supra notes 332-42 and accompanying text (explaining why banks want to avoid
damaging relationships with their regulators).
419
See supra notes 378-91 and accompanying text.
420
See Levitin, supra note 402, at 2036 ("[T]here are hard political decisions underlying
bank regulatory policy."); see also Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Response, PresidentialControl Is
Better than the Alternatives, 88 TEX. L. REV. 113, 124 (2009) (noting administrative decision
making is "invariably complicated and inherently political").
421
See Shekhar Aiyar, Charles W. Calomiris & Tomasz Wieladek, Bank Capital
Regulation: Theory, Empirics, and Policy, 63 IMF ECON. REV. 955, 958 (2015) (noting that
requiring banks to hold more capital might result in "costs borne by ... nonfinancial sectorsespecially by would-be bank borrowers").
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clearly within the scope of the regulators' unique authority and
competence. 422 For example, if a bank regulator did not set or
enforce capital rules, it would be abdicating responsibility assigned
by Congress, 423 and may not be able to effectively protect depositors
or the deposit insurance fund. 4 2 4 Nevertheless, we should be
skeptical of politicized decisions that are afield from regulators'
authority and competence. As explained in Section IV.A, there is
little reason to think regulators will be good at regulating
reputation risk. Moreover, when reputation risk occurs in the
absence of any other violations of law and without serious financial
consequences, the risk is outside the regulators' recognized
authority. 425 Bank regulators have not been charged with deciding
whether oil pipelines can be built, whether people can purchase
firearms, or whether non-banks can offer payday loans.
Transforming regulators into what the Gulf Federal court called
"proctor[s] for public opinion" 426 threatens to upset the trust that
banks and the public have in them.
C. LIMITING REPUTATION REGULATION

If bank reputation regulation is dangerous, what is the best way
to limit it? Regulators, courts, and legislative bodies all have some
ability to constrain reputation regulation. Of these, Congress is best
positioned to adopt meaningful reform.
422 Professors Sharon Gilad and Tamar Yogev describe regulators' management of their
own reputation risk like this:
Regulators seek to demarcate for themselves a reputation for the
proficient execution of a unique role, which is consistent with their
internal identity. They might further seek to avoid tasks that carry high
risk of reputation damage. However, they will not/cannot forgo tasks that
fall squarely within their constructed identity reputation, even when the
execution of these tasks carries a high risk of failure and reputation
damage. Resisting such tasks can itself damage their reputation.
Sharon Gilad & Tamar Yogev, How Reputation Regulates Regulators:Illustrationsfrom the

Regulation of Retail Finance, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE REPUTATION, supra

note 78, at 320, 334.
423
See 12 U.S.C. § 3907 (2012) (requiring minimum levels of capital).
424
See CARNELL, MACEY & MILLER, supra note 90, at 238-43 (explaining that capital acts
as a cushion to prevent depositors and other creditors of the bank from loss).
See Balleisen & Jacoby, supra note 415, at 820 (noting that Operation Choke Point
425
"pressed the limits of legitimate regulatory authority"); Bambauer, supra note 374, at 125
(stating that the FDIC's and DOJ's actions as part of Operation Choke Point "put the
government far afield from its statutory authority").
426 Gulf Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Fed. Home Loan Bank Bd., 651 F.2d 259, 265 (5th Cir.
1981).
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1. Regulators.
To be sure, regulators can (and should) take measures to
decrease the likelihood that their reputations will be damaged by
reputation risk regulation. Regulators can instruct examiners that
politics has no place in bank examinations. Regulators can also
adopt procedures that make it more difficult for examiners to
regulate reputation risk in the absence of a violation of the law or
serious financial harm. For example, following the scrutiny of
Operation Choke Point, the FDIC instructed its examiners that any
directive to a bank to close a customer account "must be in writing,
must identify the legal and regulatory basis for the action, must be
approved by the relevant Regional Director before taking effect, and
must be reported quarterly to the FDIC Board." 427 These types of
policies and procedures work best to deter low-level agency staff
from idiosyncratically regulating reputation risk.
Reputation risk regulation, however, can come from the top of
the regulatory agency. Regulatory guidance is vetted by the top
agency officials.4 28 The New York regulator's guidance about gun
rights advocacy groups was driven by the Governor and the
Superintendent of Financial Services, not by overzealous
examiners. 429 Even enforcement decisions might be driven by the
top of the agency rather than the bottom. Indeed, it appears that
top regulatory officials drove the FDIC's regulation of payday

427 See FDIC'sRole in Operation Choke Point Hearing, supra note 291, at 7 (statement of
Martin J. Gruenberg, Chairman, FDIC).
428 See, e.g., Statement of Policy on the Development and Review of Regulations and
Policies, 78 Fed. Reg. 22,771-72 (Apr. 17, 2013) (noting that FDIC guidance is issued by the
FDIC's board of directors).
429 See Press Release, N.Y. Dep't of Fin. Servs., supra note 48 (stating that "Governor
Andrew M. Cuomo ... directed the Department of Financial Services" to act).
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lending 430 and tax refund anticipation loans. 4 31 There are few
intra-agency checks to prevent top officials from taking similar
actions. 432 Indeed, regulators have previously promised they would
not enforce reputation risk, 433 but they have. 4 3 4 There is no reason
to believe that new regulatory statements are any more binding.
2. Courts.
Courts may be able to play a limited role in limiting politicized
reputation risk enforcement. As explained in Section III.A, banks
may be able to successfully appeal enforcement actions brought
without evidence of financial harm that threatens their financial
integrity. The trouble with waiting for courts to make the correction
is that banks rarely challenge regulatory action in court. 435 Banks
have strong incentives to keep their regulators happy and may be
especially unwilling to fight regulators over third-party reputation
risk when the third-parties impacted are small industries with
whom the bank does little business. 436
The FDIC's Office of Inspector General report states:
The Chicago Regional Director informed us that he pursued a strategy of
persuading the institution to terminate its payment processing relationship
with the payday lender because it was his perception that senior FDIC
management in the Washington, D.C. office, including the current and
former Chairmen, did not favor banking services that facilitated payday
lending.
FDIC OIG CHOKE POINT REPORT, supra note 275, at 27. Other regional directors also believed
that "senior FDIC executives in Washington, D.C., up to and including the former and current
FDIC Chairmen, had serious concerns regarding the facilitation of payday lending by
FDIC-supervised institutions." Id. at 28. The perceptions of these regional regulators are
confirmed by e-mails showing that the FDIC's Director of the Division of Depositor and
Consumer Protection, based in Washington, D.C., participated in discussions about informal
enforcement strategies aimed at ending bank relationships with payday lenders. Id. at 26.
431 The FDIC efforts to drive banks out of tax refund anticipation loans started after
then-FDIC Chair Sheila Bair voiced her displeasure with the product. FDIC OIG REFUND
ANTICIPATION LOANS REPORT, supra note 49, at i. In addition, the FDIC's letters to banks
warning them of the reputation risk of the loans were "coordinated through the [FDIC's]
Washington, D.C., office." FDIC OIG CHOKE POINT REPORT, supra note 275, at 37.
432 Maor, supra note 397, at 30 (noting regulators might adopt positions that are not in the
long-term interest of their agency to advance personal political ambitions).
433 See supra Section IV.B.
434 See supra Sections IV.C-D.
4
John D. Hawke, Jr., Assuring Safety and Soundness: The Role of the Enforcement
Process, 5 ANN. REV. OF BANKING L. 167, 170 (1986) (explaining that "few cases are litigated"
and that "[t]he effectiveness of the formal enforcement process greatly depends on the consent
of the institutions that are confronted with enforcement action"); cf. Hill, supra note 199, at
675 (noting that ninety percent of capital enforcement actions between 1993 and 2010
involving capital requirements were entered with the consent of the bank).
436 See supra notes 331-42 and accompanying text.
430
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Third parties harmed by reputation risk regulation can also seek
redress in court. The lawsuits brought by payday lenders and the
NRA illustrate this possibility. 437 These cases, however, may be the
exception rather than the rule. Because bank examination reports
and other informal actions are confidential,438 it is difficult for bank
customers or other third parties to know when regulatory action
prevents them from receiving banking services. Did Bank of the
West exit the fossil fuel industry because it was concerned about
profit or because one of its regulators pressured it to divest? Bank
of the West's public statements suggest it was motivated by a
concern for the environment. 4 39 However, after the FDIC pressured
banks to stop service to payday lenders, the FDIC then pressured
banks to make it seem as though the decision was driven by bank
economics rather than regulatory demands. 440 If third parties do not
know regulators are curtailing their banking opportunities through
reputation risk regulation, they will be unable to object.
Even when third parties learn about problematic regulatory
action, they may not have the resources or inclination to sue.
Moreover, the settlement of the payday lender suit suggests that
remedies in these cases may be limited. Although government
reports described how regulatory overreach caused banks to
terminate payday lender accounts, 44 1 the plaintiffs settled for an
admission that "certain employees acted in a manner inconsistent
with FDIC policies" and a reiteration of the FDIC's "longstanding
policies and guidance regarding the circumstances in which the
FDIC recommends that a financial institution terminate a
customer's deposit account." 4 42 This result may be of little use to the
437 See Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief, supra note 268; Original Complaint
& Jury Demand, supra note 45; see also supra Sections IV.D.1-2 (discussing these cases).
43 See supra notes 262-63 and accompanying text.
439 Sell & Gruver, supra note 385 (noting Bank of the West's desire to "contribut[e] to more
sustainable and equitable growth").
440 Plaintiffs' Statement of Undisputed Material Facts at ¶ 126, Advance Am., Cash
Advance Ctrs, Inc., v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., No. 14-CV-953-TNM (D.D.C. Oct. 12, 2018)
("When regional [FDIC] officials learned that [a Bank's] Chairman had communicated to the
Bank's board that the FDIC had established a de facto policy against bank relationships with
payday lenders, [FDIC] Deputy Director [Phyllis] Patton reached out to him to 'express[|
concern' about that characterization and to reiterate 'that the basis for our concerns was
centered on what we perceived as a lack of awareness of regulatory (payday and third party
oversight guidance) and [safety and soundness] implications of the business."').
441 See supra Section IV.D.1.
442
Press Release, FDIC, FDIC Resolved Payday Lender Lawsuit (May 22, 2019),
https://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2019/prl9040.html.
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plaintiffs and does little to discourage similar agency behavior in
the future. 443
3. Congress.
This leaves legislation as the best avenue to restrain reputation
risk regulation. In 2017, the U.S. House of Representatives passed
a bill providing:
An appropriate Federal banking agency may not
formally or informally request or order a depository
institution to terminate a specific customer account or
group of customer accounts or to otherwise restrict or
discourage a depository institution from entering into
or maintaining a banking relationship with a specific
customer or group of customers unless-the agency has
a valid reason for such request or order; and such reason
is not based solely on reputation risk. 4 4 4
The bill also included measures designed to strengthen oversight
of regulatory action involving third parties. It required regulators
to provide banks with the legal justification for account closures and
required that banks relay that information to the affected
customers. 445 Thus, customers would have notice of regulatory
action affecting them. Finally, the bill required regulators to
annually report to Congress the number of customer accounts the
regulator requested closed and the legal authority for doing S0.446
Although the bill had broad bipartisan support in the House, it
never received a vote in the Senate. 447 Lawmakers may have lost

443 See C. Boyden Gray, The FDIC's 'Operation Chokepoint' Settlement Doesn't Make
Victims Whole, REALCLEARMARKETS (June 26, 2019), https://www.realclearmarkets.com/
articles/2019/06/26/the-fdics-operation-chokepoint-settlement doesnt make victims whole
103798.html (noting the settlement will not restore lost banking relationships, give banks
"confidence to re-establish relationships," or "prevent this abuse of power from happening
again").
H.R. 2706, 115th Cong. § 2(a) (as passed by the House, Dec. 11, 2017).
44
"
See id. § 1(b)-(c).
446 See id. § 1(d).
447 See H.R. REP. NO. 115-1122, at 106 (2019) (noting the bill passed the House with a vote
of 395-2 and was received by the Senate).
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interest in the measure after regulators repeatedly assured them
Operation Choke Point had ended and would not be resumed. 448
Reform for reputation risk regulation should not depend on the
status of Operation Choke Point. As Part III explains, Operation
Choke Point is not the only time regulators have required action
based on reputation risk alone. Indeed, regulators have taken
enforcement action based on reputation risk even after explaining
that they do not do so. 4 4 9 Operation Choke Point was not the
anomalous result of overzealous regulators with a disdain for
payday lending. It was a natural outgrowth of a regulatory
structure that sees reputation risk everywhere. 45 0 It is the
outgrowth of a definition of reputation risk that regulates any
negative publicity whether true or not. 4 5 1 It is the outgrowth of a
definition of reputation risk where regulators themselves are one of
the constituencies whose opinions must be considered. 452 And it is
an outgrowth of a system where regulators insist they have power
to regulate even when there is little evidence of serious financial
harm. 4 5 3 At best, the current reputation risk framework encourages
regulators to regulate banks based on regulators' uncertain
forecasts of negative publicity. At worst, it provides regulators cover
for implementing their own political agenda unrelated to the safety
or soundness of banks.

44
See Karen Kidd, With BipartisanSupport, Bill to Undo Obama-Era 'OperationChoke
Point' Awaits
Action
in
Senate,
LEGAL
NEWSLINE
(Jan.
22,
2018),
https://legalnewsline.com/stories/511318521-with-bipartisan-support-bill-to-undo-obamaera-operation-choke-point-awaits-action-in-senate (noting there was "no apparent opposition
to the legislation in the Senate but [also] no apparent urgency to take it up either"). In late
2018, the FDIC again repudiated "Operation Choke Point" stating regulators should act
based on laws and regulations and not on "personal beliefs or political motivations." Letter
from Jelena McWilliams to Blaine Luetkemeyer, supra note 413. At the same time, the OCC
stated: "To be clear, the OCC has no policy or program that targets any business operating
within state and federal law, and I am committed to ensuring that it does not have such policy
or program in the future." Letter from Joseph M. Otting, Comptroller of the Currency, to
Blaine
Luetkemeyer,
Member,
House
of Representatives
(Nov.
19,
2018),
https://luetkemeyer.house.gov/uploadedfiles/occ response-to-repluetkemeyer.pdf.
449
See supra Section IV.B (detailing regulatory guidance on reputation risk enforcement);
Sections IV.C-D (describing reputation risk enforcement).
450 See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
451 See supra notes 127-28 and accompanying text.
452
See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
453 See supra note 221 and accompanying text.
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VI. CONCLUSION

Rocker Joan Jett famously sings: "I don't give a damn 'bout my
reputation." 454 If bank regulators think Joan Jett has a bad
reputation unrelated to banking, should they be able to tell banks
not to do business with her? Currently bank regulators claim broad
regulatory authority over reputation risk-the risk that bank
stakeholders will negatively change their perceptions. Bank
regulators say reputation risk is present in every aspect of banking.
It can even arise from untrue rumors or from third-party conduct
unrelated to banking.
This broad regulation of reputation risk is unnecessary and
harmful. Bank regulators already have broad powers to correct
violations of law and conditions likely to cause serious financial
harm. At the same time, regulating reputation risk threatens to
politicize bank regulators. Regulators have already used reputation
risk to weigh in on hot-button political topics afield from bank safety
and soundness, like payday lending, fossil fuels, and gun rights.
There is little to prevent regulators from using reputation risk to
address other controversies. They might even extend reputation
risk enforcement to prevent banking services to individuals like
Joan Jett. Bankers and the public will have less faith in financial
regulators and in the banking system if regulators spend their time
regulating political causes afield from bank safety and soundness.

4

JOAN JETT, Bad Reputation, on BAD REPUTATION (Boardwalk Records 1981).
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